Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 263-305

  Boutilier, Craig ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Belief revision; Iteration; Nested conditionals; Ramsey test

Indexed keywords

EID: 53349118091     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00248151     Document Type: Article

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