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Volumn 11, Issue 5, 2005, Pages 832-850

Management compensation and earnings-based covenants as signaling devices in credit markets

Author keywords

Credit markets; Earnings based covenant; Management compensation

Indexed keywords


EID: 27144435490     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.08.002     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (21)

References (20)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.