The credibility of monetary reform - New evidence

Public Choice

Volumn 124, Issue 3-4, 2005, Pages 391-409

  Freytag, Andreas ^a  

^a FRIEDRICH SCHILLER UNIVERSITY JENA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444591906     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-2055-1     Document Type: Article

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