Federalism as a public good

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 189-205

  Bednar, Jenna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Government performance; Institutional design; Intergovernmental relations

Indexed keywords

EID: 26444551206     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-005-2235-5     Document Type: Conference Paper

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