Minimum harmonization and the internal market

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 853-885

  Dougan, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 85102831490     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: 18758320     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005681128602     Document Type: Article

References (94)

1. 1. E.g. Edwards and Philippart, “Flexibility and the Treaty of Amsterdam: Europe’s new Byzantium”, CELS Occasional Paper Number 3 (CUP, 1997); Constantinesco, “Les clauses de coope´ration renforce´e”, 33 RTDE (1997), 751; Kortenberg, “Closer cooperation in the Treaty of Amsterdam”, 35 CML Rev. (1998), 833; Gaja, “How flexible is flexibility under the Amsterdam Treaty?”, 35 CML Rev. (1998), 855; Ehlermann, “Differentiation, flexibility, closer co-operation: The new provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty”, 4 ELJ (1998), 246; Tuytschaever, Differentiation in European Union Law (Hart, 1999).
2. 2. The true position is, of course, more complex: Slot, “Harmonization”, 21 EL Rev. (1996), 378; Vignes, “The harmonization of national legislation and the EEC”, 15 EL Rev. (1990), 358; Sauter and Vos, “Harmonization under Community law: The Comitology issue” in Craig and Harlow (Eds.), Lawmaking in the European Union (Kluwer, 1998). Consider, in particular, the practice of “partial harmonization”, coupled with the principle of “mutual recognition of equivalent domestic standards”, which underlay the Commission’s 1985 New Approach to Technical Harmonization: Pelkmans, “The new approach to technical harmonization and standardization”, 25 JCMS (1987), 249; Burrows, “Harmonization of technical standards: Reculer pour mieux sauter?”, 53 MLR (1990), 597; McGee and Weatherill, “The evolution of the Single Market – Harmonization or liberalization”, 53 MLR (1990), 578.
3. 3. E.g. Case 60/86, Commission v. United Kingdom, [1988] ECR 3921; Cases C-129– 130/97, Chiciak and Fol, [1998] ECR I-3315.
4. 4. An image used by Weatherill, “Beyond preemption? Shared competence and constitutional change in the European Community” in O’Keeffe and Twomey (Eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Wiley, 1994). This includes the competence to make only partial use of a derogation provided under the relevant harmonization measure: Case 228/87, Pretura unificata di Torino v. X, [1988] ECR 5099.
5. 5. Art. 176 (ex 130t) EC, in respect of measures adopted under Art. 175 (ex 130s).
6. 6. Art. 153(5) EC, in respect of measures adopted under Art. 153(3)(b) and (4) (ex 129a).
7. 7. Art. 137(5) EC, in respect of measures adopted under Art. 137(2) and (3) (previously contained in the Agreement on Social Policy annexed to the Treaty through the Protocol on Social Policy).
8. 8. Art. 152(4)(a) (ex 129) EC.
9. 9. Art. 95(4)-(9) EC.
10. 10. E.g. Art. 7(2) Bathing Water Directive 76/160/EEC O.J. 1976, L 31/1; Art. 9 Shell-fish Waters Directive 79/923/EEC O.J. 1979, L 281/47; Art. 16 Drinking Water Directive 80/778/EEC O.J. 1980, L 229/11; Art. 4(3) Directive 88/609/EEC on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants O.J. 1988, L 336/1.
11. 11. E.g. Art. 8 Doorstep Selling Directive 85/577/EEC O.J. 1985, L 372/31; Art. 15 Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC O.J. 1987, L 42/48; Art. 8 Package Travel Directive 90/314/EEC O.J. 1990, L 158/59; Art. 8 Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC O.J. 1993, L 95/29; Art. 11 Timeshare Directive 94/47/EC O.J. 1994, L 280/83; Art. 14 Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC O.J. 1997, L 144/19.
12. 12. E.g. Art. 5 Collective Redundancies Directive 98/59/EC O.J. 1998, L 225/16; Art. 7 Acquired Rights Directive 77/187/EEC O.J. 1977, L 61/26; Art. 9 Insolvency Directive 80/987/EEC O.J. 1980, L 283/23; Art. 7 Conditions of Employment Directive 91/533/EEC O.J. 1991, L 288/32; Clause 4(1) Framework Agreement on Parental Leave annexed to Directive 96/34/EC O.J. 1996, L 145/4; Clause 6(1) Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work annexed to Directive 97/81/EC O.J. 1998, L 14/9.
13. 13. Case C-11/92, [1993] ECR I-3545.
14. 14. O.J. 1989, L 359/1.
15. 15. Also: Case C-222/91, Philip Morris Belgium, [1993] ECR I-3469; Case C-128/94, Hans Ho¨nig, [1995] ECR I-3389; Case C-389/96, Aher-Waggon, [1998] ECR I-4473; Case C-376/90, Commission v. Belgium, [1992] ECR I-6153.
16. 16. There were limited Treaty references to more welfare-orientated concerns, e.g. Art. 141 (ex 119) EC on equal pay for men and women.
17. 17. There are many sectoral accounts of the development of the Community’s social competences. On environmental policy, e.g. Jans, European Environmental Law (Kluwer Law International, 1995); Ziegler, Trade and Environmental Law in the European Community (Clarendon, 1996). On consumer policy, e.g. Weatherill, EC Consumer Law and Policy (Longman, 1997); Howells and Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law (Dartmouth, 1997). On social policy, e.g. Barnard, EC Employment Law (Wiley, 1996); Nielsen and Szyszczak, The Social Dimension of the European Union (Handelshøjskolens Forlag, 1997).
18. 18. E.g. in the context of free movement for goods, under the express Treaty derogations provided by Art. 30 (ex 36) EC, or the “mandatory requirements” developed through the Cassis de Dijon case law (Case 120/78, [1979] ECR 649).
19. 19. E.g. adopted under Art. 94 or 95 (ex 100 or 100a) EC.
20. 20. E.g. Declaration by the Heads of Government of the Member States meeting in Paris in 1972 (Bull. EC 10-1972: The First Summit Conference of the Enlarged Community 19–20 Oct. 1972). Cf. Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on the Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Environment O.J. 1973, C 112/1; Council Resolution concerning a social action programme O.J. 1974, C 13/1; Council Resolution on a preliminary programme of the European Economic Community for a consumer protection and information policy O.J. 1975, C 92/1. In similar spirit, e.g. the report on the promotion of “A People’s Europe” commissioned and approved by the European Council in the mid-1980s: Supplement 7/85 – Bull. EC: A People’s Europe: Reports from the ad hoc Committee.
21. 21. These developments were encouraged and consolidated by the ECJ. E.g. Case 240/83, ADBHU, [1985] ECR 531: environmental protection is one of the Community’s “essential objectives” and therefore legitimate subject-matter for secondary legislation; this validation of expanding Community activities pre-dated the formal introduction of a Treaty Title on environmental policy.
22. 22. Cf. Art. 6, 153(2) and 152(1) (ex 3c, as introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 129a and 129) EC: the Community must integrate environmental, consumer and health concerns into the pursuit of other policy objectives. It must also base approximation of law proposals under Art. 95 on high levels of protection for each of these interests: Art. 95(3) EC. On social policy, cf. Case C-67/96, Albany International, Judgment of 21 Sept. 1999, nyr, paras. 52–60 and Cases C-270–271/97, Deutsche Post v. Sievers, Judgment of 10 Feb. 2000, nyr, paras. 53–57.
23. 23. E.g. Wessels, “An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on integration processes”, 35 JCMS (1997), 267; and “The growth and differentiation of multi-level networks: A corporatist mega-bureaucracy or an open city?” in Wallace and Young (Eds.), Participation and Policy-Making in the European Union (Clarendon, 1997). Cf. Caporaso, “The European Union and forms of state: Westphalian, regulatory or post-modern?”, 34 JCMS (1996), 29.
24. 24. Cf. the results of a Community-wide survey of public opinion conducted before the 1999 European Parliament elections: “L’autre Europe que veulent les Europe´ens”, Le Monde, 1 June 1999. This trend took a new step forward with the creation of “citizenship of the Union” by the Maastricht Treaty. E.g. A.G. Jacobs in Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz, [1998] ECR I-7637: the introduction of the notion of citizenship “was largely inspired by the concern to bring the Union closer to its citizens and to give expression to its character as more than a purely economic union” (para 23 Opinion). Further: O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (Kluwer, 1996); Everson, “The Legacy of the market citizen” in Shaw and More (Eds.), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon, 1995); Wiener and Della Sala, “Constitution-making and citizenship practice – Bridging the democracy gap in the EU?”, 35 JCMS (1997), 595; Shaw, “The interpretation of European Union citizenship”, 61 MLR (1998), 293. Cf. Annex IV to the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council of 3 and 4 June 1999: European Council Decision on the Drawing Up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (full transcript and related materials are available at the EU website http://www.europa.eu.int).
25. 25. Cf. the related issues analysed by Dehousse, Integration v Regulation? Social Regulation in the European Community, European University Institute Working Paper LAW No 92/23 (EUI, 1992).
26. 26. Cf. Art. 15 and 95(10) (ex 7c and 100a(5)) EC. Further: Dehousse et.al., Europe After 1992 – New Regulatory Strategies, European University Institute Working Paper LAW No 92/31 (EUI, 1992).
27. 27. Also: Weatherill, “On the depth and breadth of European integration”, 17 OJLS (1997), 537; and “Flexibility or fragmentation: Trends in European integration” in Usher (Ed.), The State of the European Union: Structure, Enlargement and Economic Union (Longman, 2000).
28. 28. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, [1963] ECR 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. Enel, [1964] ECR 585; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125; Case 106/77, Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629.
29. 29. On the Community’s geographical expansion: Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union (Routledge, 1997).
30. 30. That is, the EC Treaty’s legislative processes. In the context of the other pillars of the European Union, intergovernmental is preferred to supranational styles of decision-making.
31. 31. Further: Weiler, “The Community system: The dual character of supranationalism”, 1 YEL (1981), 267.
32. 32. E.g. Art. 5 (ex 3b) EC setting out the principles of attributed powers, subsidiarity and proportionality; also the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality introduced at Amsterdam. Further: Dashwood, “The limits of European Community powers”, 21 EL Rev. (1996), 113; and “States in the European Union”, 23 EL Rev. (1998), 201. Cf. the discussion of the principle of supremacy by Weiler and Haltern, “Constitutional or international? The foundations of the Community legal order and the question of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz” in Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler (Eds.), The European Court and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1998).
33. 33. Further: Shaw, “European Union legal studies in crisis? Towards a new dynamic”, 16 OJLS (1996), 231. Also: Dehousse, “Le Traite´ d’Amsterdam, reflet de la nouvelle Europe”, CDE (1997), 265.
34. 34. O.J. 1987, L 42/48 (as amended by Directive 90/88/EEC O.J. 1990, L 61/14; now also by Directive 98/7/EC O.J. 1998, L 101/17).
35. 35. COM (95) 117 final.
36. 36. Case C-84/94, UK v. Council, [1996] ECR I-5755, paras. 17 and 56.
37. 37. Case C-284/95, Safety Hi-Tech v. S&T, [1998] ECR I-4301, para 49; Case C-341/95, Bettati v. Safety Hi-Tech, [1998] ECR I-4355, para 47. Also: A.G. Saggio in Case C-232/97, Nederhoff, Judgment of 29 Sept. 1999, nyr (para 30 Opinion).
38. 38. Further: Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council, [1997] ECR I-2405, para 48; A.G. Jacobs in Case C-6/98, ARD v. PRO Sieben Media, paras. 52–60 Opinion delivered on 24 June 1999, nyr.
39. 39. E.g. Case C-11/92, R v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Gallaher [1993] ECR I-3545, para 22; Case C-128/94, Hans Ho¨nig, [1995] ECR I-3389, para 17; A.G. Cosmas in Case C-389/96, Aher-Waggon, [1998] ECR I-4473, para 15 Opinion; A.G. Jacobs in Case C-6/98, ARD v. PRO Sieben Media, para 84 Opinion delivered on 24 June 1999, nyr.
40. 40. E.g. Case C-203/96, Dusseldorp, [1998] ECR I-4075, paras. 43–44.
41. 41. Or, in the context of exportation, to goods/services destined for the Community as well as the domestic market?
42. 42. E.g. Case 148/78, Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629. More recently, e.g. Case C-315/92, Clinique, [1994] ECR I-317; Case C-77/97, Unilever v. Smithkline Beecham, [1999] ECR I-431; Case C-220/98, Este´e Lauder v. Lancaster Group, Judgment of 13 Jan. 2000, nyr.
43. 43. The most prominent example of this situation is Art. 95(4)-(9) EC, which will be considered in greater detail below. There are also examples in the secondary legislation, e.g. Case C-241/89, SARPP, [1990] ECR I-4695; Case 5/77, Tedeschi, [1977] ECR 1555.
44. 44. A good example is the “Television Without Frontiers” Directive 89/552/EEC O.J. 1989, L 298/23 (as amended by Directive 97/36/EC O.J. 1997, L 202/60): compare Cases C-34– 36/95, De Agostini, [1997] ECR I-3843 with Case C-412/93, Leclerc-Siplec, [1995] ECR I-179. Also: Case C-11/92, R v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Gallaher, [1993] ECR I-3545; Case C-222/91, Philip Morris Belgium, [1993] ECR I-3469.
45. 45. A situation which is compatible with Community law: Case 355/85, Driancourt v. Michel Cognet, [1986] ECR 3231; Case 98/86, Arthur Mathot, [1987] ECR 809.
46. 46. Cases C-320, 328–329 and 337–339/94, RTI, [1996] ECR I-6471; Case C-6/98, ARD v. PRO Sieben Media, Judgment of 28 Oct. 1999, nyr.
47. 47. For a flavour of this debate: Reich, “Competition between legal orders: A new paradigm of EC law?”, 29 CML Rev. (1992), 861; Pelkmans and Sun, “Regulatory competition in the Single Market”, 33 JCMS (1995), 67; Van den Bergh, “Subsidiarity as an economic demarcation principle and the emergence of European private law”, 5 MJ (1998), 129; Barnard, “Social dumping and the race to the bottom: Some lessons for the European Union from Delaware?”, 25 EL Rev. (2000), 57. Cf. Editorial Comments, “Are European values being hoovered away?”, 30 CML Rev. (1993), 445.
48. 48. Note that A.G. Mischo in Case C-2/97, Borsana, [1998] ECR I-8597 suggested a possible third limit to the Member State’s powers under a minimum harmonization clause, i.e. whereby regardless of any impact on free movement, all more stringent national standards must comply with the general principle of proportionality (paras. 35–47 Opinion). However, this suggestion seems to have been rebuffed by the Court, which denied its own competence to assess the compatibility of more stringent domestic rules with the principle of proportionality, save where this requirement was implicit in safeguarding fundamental Treaty freedoms whose exercise the Member State sought to restrict (para 40 Judgment).
49. 49. Bernard, “The future of European Economic law in the light of the principle of subsidi-arity”, 33 CML Rev. (1996), 633 at 646–7.
50. 50. Cf. Martin, “Le droit social communautaire: droit commun des Etats membres de la Communaute´ europe´enne en matie‘re sociale?”, 30 RTDE (1994), 609, who argues that modern Community social policy remains no more than an instrument for achieving the common market, and thus subordinate to the principles of free movement and equal competitive conditions upon which the success of that common market is postulated.
51. 51. Slot, “Harmonization”, 21 EL Rev. (1996), 378 at 385.
52. 52. A proposition which has also attracted academic support, e.g. Weatherill, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 23–25; Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in the European Community, 3rd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), pp. 376–378; Whelan, “Fundamental principles of EU environmental law”, 8 IJEL (1999), 37; Stuyck, “European consumer law after the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer policy in or beyond the internal market?”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 367.
53. 53. Case 382/87, [1989] ECR 1235.
54. 54. Art. 8 Doorstep Selling Directive 85/577/EEC O.J. 1985, L 372/31.
55. 55. Also: Case C-241/89, SARPP, [1990] ECR I-4695.
56. 56. Cases C-267–268/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097 and their offspring.
57. 57. Case C-389/96, [1998] ECR I-4473.
58. 58. O.J. 1980, L 18/26 (as amended by Directive 83/206/EEC O.J. 1983, L 117/15).
59. 59. Aher-Waggon, para 12 Opinion. Another example of more stringent national meas-ures restricting free movement but capable, in principle, of being justified by the imperative requirement of environmental protection: Case C-232/97, Nederhoff, Judgment of 29 Sept. 1999, nyr. Similarly, by the imperative requirement of consumer protection: Case C-410/96, Andre´ Ambry, [1998] ECR I-7875; discussed by Huglo, “Liberte´ d’e´tablissement et libre prestation de services”, 35 RTDE (1999), 729. Cf. Case C-203/96, Dusseldorp, [1998] ECR I-4075: the ECJ appeared sympathetic to claims that more stringent domestic rules adopted pursuant to Art. 176 EC and restricting the free movement of goods contrary to Art. 29 EC could be justified, in principle, by considerations of environmental protection as well as the express derogations in Art. 30 EC; however, the Dutch law in question was distinctly applicable and thus, according to established case law, incapable of objective justification by reference to the imperative requirements. Contrast the views of A.G. Jacobs in Dusseldorp, paras. 89–90 Opinion with Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, [1992] ECR I-4431; note by Notaro, 36 CML Rev. (1999), 1309; Van Calster, 24 EL Rev. (1999), 178.
60. 60. Case C-169/89, [1990] ECR I-2143.
61. 61. O.J. 1979, L 103/1.
62. 62. Gourmetterie, paras. 7–10 Opinion. Also: Scott, EC Environmental Law (Longman, 1998), pp. 79–85. Cf. in the context of Art. 49 (ex 59) EC: Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments, [1995] ECR I-1141.
63. 63. Case C-1/96, [1998] ECR I-1251 (hereafter: CIWF).
64. 64. O.J. 1991, L 340/28.
65. 65. CIWF, para 62.
66. 66. CIWF, paras. 74–94 and 113–120 Opinion; Case C-5/94, R v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas, [1996] ECR I-2553, paras. 22–38 Opinion.
67. 67. As in Case C-5/94, R v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas, [1996] ECR I-2553. Further: Jarvis, The Application of EC Law by National Courts: Free Movement of Goods (Oxford, 1998), pp. 281–288.
68. 68. CIWF, para 60 Opinion (emphasis added).
69. 69. In particular, Regulation 805/68 O.J. 1968, Special English Edition, p. 187.
70. 70. E.g. Case 31/74, Galli, [1975] ECR 47; Case 5/79, Buys, Pesch, Dullieux and Denkavit, [1979] ECR 3203.
71. 71. CIWF, paras. 41–44.
72. 72. CIWF, para 53.
73. 73. Note Case C-203/96, Dusseldorp, [1998] ECR I-4075 as a possible example of this approach with regard to measures adopted under Art. 176 EC.
74. 74. Also: Case C-241/89, SARPP, [1990] ECR I-4695; Case C-410/96, Andre´ Ambry, [1998] ECR I-7875; Case C-232/97, Nederhoff, Judgment of 29 Sept. 1999, nyr.
75. 75. Aher-Waggon, para 8 Opinion.
76. 76. Also: in several cases where the ECJ adopted a generous approach to the existence/scope of a minimum harmonization clause, the Court observed that the measure in question was intended merely as a “first step” in the full programme of harmonization envisaged by the Community legislature, e.g. Case C-128/94, Hans Ho¨nig, [1995] ECR I-3389. This suggests that the Court’s approach to the relationship between minimum harmonization and free movement may be informed by not only a contextual but also a temporal dimension: where the relevant Community measure occupies a relatively early position within a broader multi-step harmonization enterprise, the Court will be more likely to permit more stringent domestic standards to impede free movement; where the legislation joins an already mature system of Community-level regulation, the Court may feel more inclined to protect the internal integrity of that regime rather than defer to a national competence which has already been significantly eroded. However, insofar as any such temporal factor may be at work, one should recall that multi-step harmonization need not necessarily imply a progressively more restrictive approach to national competence or to social-welfare regulation. E.g. in the context of company law, it has been argued that the Community’s evolving harmonization programme has become less uniform/prescriptive, and more differentiated/flexible: Woods and Villiers, “The Legislative Process and the Institutions of the European Union: A Case Study of the Development of European Company Law” in Craig and Harlow (Eds.), Lawmaking in the European Union (Kluwer, 1998).
77. 77. E.g. A.G. Tesauro in Case C-41/93, France v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-1829, para 4 Opinion.
78. 78. E.g. Jacque´, “L’Acte unique europe´en”, 22 RTDE (1986), 575; Ehlermann, “The internal market following the Single European Act”, 24 CML Rev. (1987), 361; Flynn, “How will Article 100A(4) Work? A comparison with Article 93”, 24 CML Rev. (1987), 689; Pescatore, “Some Critical Remarks on the ‘Single European Act”’, 24 CML Rev. (1987), 9.
79. 79. Only a few instances of Member State action under the old Art. 100a(4) are extant, e.g. Commission Decisions 94/783/EC O.J. 1994, L 316/43 and 96/211/EC O.J. 1996, L 68/32.
80. 80. Cf. Case C-41/93, France v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-1829, para 24.
81. 81. A view shared by Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in the European Community, 3rd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), pp. 365–366.
82. 82. Some commentators have doubted whether this will ever be a realistic possibility, e.g. Kra¨mer, EC Treaty and Environmental Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), pp. 135–137.
83. 83. And under much of the secondary legislation establishing a minimum harmonization facility.
84. 84. By analogy: Case 174/84, Bulk Oil, [1986] ECR 559; Case 380/87, Enichem Base, [1989] ECR 2491; Case C-235/95, Franc¸ois Dumon, [1998] ECR I-4531. Also: A.G. Mischo in Case C-2/97, Borsana, [1998] ECR I-8597, paras. 50–52 Opinion; Weatherill, “Compulsory notification of draft technical regulations: The contribution of Directive 83/189 to the management of the internal market”, 16 YEL (1996), 129 at 181.
85. 85. Case C-41/93, France v. Commission, [1994] ECR I-1829, paras. 24–30.
86. 86. Case C-319/97, Kortas, Judgment of 1 June 1999, nyr. As with a failure to notify under Directive 98/34/EC O.J. 1998, L 204/37 (previously Directive 83/189/EEC O.J. 1983, L 109/8) laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations: Case C-194/94, CIA Security International, [1996] ECR I-2201; cf. Case C-226/97, Martinus Lemmens, [1998] ECR I-3711.
87. 87. Case C-319/97, Kortas, Judgment of 1 June 1999, nyr. There is now a time limit within which the Commission must reach a decision, failing which the national measures shall be deemed to have been confirmed: new Art. 95(6) EC.
88. 88. Case C-155/91, Commission v. Council (Waste Directive), [1993] ECR I-939; Case C-187/93, Parliament v. Council (Waste Regulation), [1994] ECR I-2857; Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. Council (Working Time Directive), [1996] ECR I-5755; Case C-233/94, Germany v. Parliament and Council (Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive), [1997] ECR I-2405.
89. 89. Particularly when compared to the previous position in Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide), [1991] ECR I-2867. Further: Chalmers, “The Single Market: From prima donna to journeyman” in Shaw and More (Eds.), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Clarendon, 1995); Dashwood, “The Working Time Judgment in a wider perspective” in The ECJ’s Working Time Judgment: The Social Market Vindicated, CELS Occasional Paper Number 2 (CUP, 1997).
90. 90. Barents, “The internal market unlimited: Some observations on the legal basis of Community legislation”, 30 CML Rev. (1993), 85; Emiliou, “Opening Pandora’s Box: The legal basis of Community Measures before the Court of Justice”, 19 EL Rev. (1994), 488; Geradin, “Trade and environmental protection: Community harmonization and national environmental standards”, 13 YEL (1993), 151; Debroux, “Le choix de la base juridique dans l’action environnementale de l’Union europe´enne”, CDE (1995), 383.
91. 91. Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide), [1991] ECR I-2867, para 20.
92. 92. On the other hand, overlapping policy areas with contrasting legislative procedures persist and can cause problems even post-Amsterdam. This is well-illustrated by two recent legal basis cases, decided under the pre-Amsterdam Treaty but which could equally have arisen post-May 1999: Case C-42/97, Parliament v. Council, [1999] ECR I-869; Cases C-164-5/97, Parliament v. Council, [1999] ECR I-1139. Further: Cullen and Charlesworth, “Diplomacy By other means: The use of legal basis litigation as a political strategy by the European Parliament and Member States” 36 CML Rev. (1999), 1243.
93. 93. As regards which Art. 11 (ex 5a, as introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam) EC spells out certain but not all of the parameters. Further: Weatherill, “If I’d Wanted You to Understand I Would Have Explained it Better: What is the Purpose of the Provisions on Closer Co-operation Introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam?” in O’Keeffe and Twomey (Eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Hart, 1999).
94. 94. E.g. Shaw, “The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of flexibility and legitimacy”, 4 ELJ (1998), 63; Walker, “Sovereignty and differentiated integration in the European Union”, 4 ELJ (1998), 355.