Pretrial settlement with fairness

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 54, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 287-296

  Farmer, Amy ^a   Pecorino, Paul ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Fairness; Pretrial bargaining

Indexed keywords

EID: 2642560192     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2003.02.002     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. Babcock L. Loewenstein G. Explaining bargaining impasse: the role of self-serving biases Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 1997 109-126
2. Banks J.S. Sobel J. Equilibrium selection in signaling games Econometrica 55 1987 647-661
3. Bar-Gill O. 2002 The success and survival of cautious optimism: legal rule, and endogenous perceptions in pre-trial settlement negotiations. Harvard Law School Public Law Working Paper No. 35.
4. Bebchuk L.A. Litigation and settlement under imperfect information RAND Journal of Economics 15 1984 404-415
5. Binmore K. Shaked A. Sutton J. Testing noncooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study American Economic Review 75 1985 1178-1180
6. Binmore K. Shaked A. Sutton J. A further test of noncooperative bargaining theory: reply American Economic Review 78 1988 837-839
7. Binmore K. Morgan P. Shaked A. Sutton J. Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study Games and Economic Behavior 3 1991 295-322
8. Carmichael L. MacLeod W.B. Caring About Sunk Costs: a behavioral solution to hold-up problems with small stakes Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 19 2003 106-118
9. Farmer A. Pecorino P. Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences International Review of Law and Economics 14 1994 273-282
10. Farmer A. Pecorino P. Pretrial bargaining with self-serving bias and asymmetric information Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 48 2002 163-176
11. Frank R.H. If homo economicus could choose his own utility function, would he want one with a conscience American Economic Review 77 1987 593-604
12. Gould J.P. The economics of legal conflicts Journal of Legal Studies 2 1973 279-300
13. Güth W. Schmittberger R. Schwarze B. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3 1982 367-388
14. Jolls C. Sunstein C.R. Thaler R. A behavioral approach to law and economics Stanford Law Review 50 1998 1471-1550
15. Landes W.M. An economic analysis of the courts Journal of Law and Economics 14 1971 61-107
16. Nalebuff B. Credible pretrial negotiation RAND Journal of Economics 18 1987 198-210
17. Neelin J. Sonnenschein H. Spiegel M. A further test of noncooperative bargaining theory American Economic Review 78 1988 824-836
18. Posner R.A. An economic approach to legal procedure and judicial administration Journal of Legal Studies 2 1973 399-458
19. Priest G.L. Klein B. The selection of disputes for litigation Journal of Legal Studies 13 1984 215-243
20. Rabin M. Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics American Economic Review 83 1993 1281-1302
21. Reinganum J.F. Wilde L.L. Settlement, litigation, and the allocation of litigation costs RAND Journal of Economics 17 1986 557-566
22. Shavell S. Suit, settlement, and trial: a theoretical analysis under alternative methods for the allocation of legal costs Journal of Legal Studies 11 1982 55-82
23. Slonim R. Roth A. Learning in high stakes ultimatum games Econometrica 66 1998 569-596
24. Sunstein C.R. Behavioral law and economics: a progress report American Law and Economics Review 1 1999 115-157
25. Thaler R.H. Anomalies: the ultimatum game Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 1988 195-206