The decline of the nation-state and its implications for international law

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law

Volumn 36, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 7-22

  Schachter, Oscar ^a  

^a Department of International Law and Diplomacy ^*

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EID: 26244438544     PISSN: 00101931     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. In deference to Professor Henkin, who regards sovereignty as a "bad word" which should be expunged, I will use "autonomy" in this paper. See Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values, Functions, 216 RECUEIL. DES COURS [REC. DES COURS] 13, 24-25 (1990).
2. See generally Oscar Schachter, Sovereignty - Then and Now, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 671 (R. St. J. Macdonald ed., 1993) (providing an analysis of sovereignty).
3. See, e.g., JEAN-MARIE GUÉNHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE (V. Elliot trans., 1995);
4. MATTHEW HORSMAN & ANDREW MARSHALL, AFTER THE NATION-STATE (1994);
5. KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE (1995);
6. WALTER WRISTON, THE TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1992).
7. See generally, 124(2) DAEDALUS (Spring 1995) (special volume, What Future for the State);
8. cf. SUSAN STRANGE, STATES AND MARKETS (2d ed. 1994); BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD V. MCWORLD (1995) (deploring the erosion of state authority, especially in the economic sphere). International law is largely ignored in most of these writings.
9. F. W. NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 48 (W. Kauffmann trans., 1978).
10. CHARLES KINDELBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 207 (1969).
11. Vincent Cable, The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power, 124(2) DAEDALUS (Spring 1995) at 27. See also BARBER, supra note 2, at 241.
12. See Cable, supra note 5, at 32.
13. See David Korten, Sustainable Development: A Review Essay, 9 WORLD POL'Y J. 157, 173 (1992) ("Today the most intense competition in the globally integrated market is not between gargantuan oligopolistic transnational corporations. It is between governments that find themselves competing with one another for investors by offering the cheapest and most compliant labour, the weakest environmental, health, and safety standards; the lowest taxes; and the most fully developed infrastructure. Often governments must borrow to finance the social and physical infrastructure needed to attract private investors. Having pushed almost the entire social and environmental costs of production onto the community, many firms are able to turn a handsome profit. Having bargained away their tax base and accepted low wages for their labour, many communities reap relatively few benefits from the foreign investment, however, and are left with no evident way to repay the loans contracted on the firms' behalf.")
14. See Vivien A. Schmidt, The New World-Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State, 124(2) DAEDALUS (Spring 1995) at 75, 79;
15. Susan Strange, The Defective State, 124(2) DAEDALUS (Spring 1995) at 55, 58-59.
16. See John Gerard Ruggie, At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalisation and Domestic Stability in the New World Economy, 24 MILLENNIUM 507, 518-22 (1995).
17. See OHMAE, supra note 2, at 27-70. Two of Ohmae's chapter headings are revealing: The New "Melting Pot" and "National Interest" as a Declining Industry. See generally RICHARD BARNET & JOHN CAVANAUGH, GLOBAL DREAMS, IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1994). But see Cable, supra note 5, at 31 ("[T]he question of identity is . . . less clear-cut than the rhetoric about globalization often suggests . . . . [M]ost multinationals clearly reflect the ethos of their home country management and shareholders.");
18. The Non-Global Firm, 326, NO. 7804 ECONOMIST, March 27, 1993, at 10;
19. Robert Wade, Globalization and its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy are Greatly Exaggerated, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 60, 78-82 (S. Berger & S. Dore eds., 1996).
20. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD 135-224 (1995).
21. The need for international regulation has become acute in regard to the new information technology. See Saskia Sassen, When the State Encounters a New Space Economy: The Case of Information Industries, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 769-70 (1995).
22. See also Christoph Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 447, 457-60 (1993) (discussing the relationship between different legal orders).
23. See generally Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-23 (1994) (discussing the wide range of U.N. law).
24. See also UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER (O. Schachter & C. Joyner eds., 2 vols., 1995) (including studies of the many sectors of law developed and applied by the United Nations and its special bodies).
25. See DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHWOOD, WYATT & DASHWOOD'S EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 181-650 (3d ed. 1993);
26. DERICK K. URWIN, THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE: A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SINCE 1945 (1991). See also Schreuer, supra note 11, at 458-59.
27. See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994);
28. Deborah Z. Cass, The Word That Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers Within the European Community, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1107, 1110-28 (1992). It is interesting that while regional integration such as the E.U. diminishes the autonomy of its members, it also may in a relative sense increase the economic power of the small states which gain by regional integration. Hence, adherents of separatism in European countries (and in Quebec) have pointed to the benefit of a regional common market in enabling small states to overcome the defects of their size. Thus, ironically, integration may support fragmentation in some places and increase the number of nation-states.
29. See generally Berthold Goldman, Nouvelles Reflexions sur la Lex Mercatoria, in ÉTUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL À L'HONNEUR PIERRE LALIVE 241, 241-55 (C. Dominicé ed., 1993);
30. Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 613 (1989);
31. GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3-108 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1996).
32. See generally CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE (John Keane ed., 1988);
33. M.J. Peterson, Transnational Activity, International Society and World Politics, 21 MILLENNIUM 371 (1992).
34. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 517 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1969).
35. See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign Self, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1355, 1355 n. 2 (1991).
36. See generally Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in International Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 295 (1993);
37. SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
38. For a recent survey of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the U.N., see generally NGOs, THE U.N. & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (T.G. Weiss & L. Gordenker eds., 1996). This book includes an extensive annotated bibliography on NGOs in the international system along with several detailed studies.
39. The Commission on Global Governance called for "more space in global governance for people and their organizations - for civil society as distinct from governments." It also proposed a People's Assembly as part of the U.N. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 11, at 256-58.
40. See Peter Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control, 43 INT'L ORG. 377, 401-02 (1989).
41. GUÉNHENNO, supra note 2, at 58. See generally GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE supra note 15, at 3-108.
42. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911 (1996);
43. David Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
44. See INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 12 (1997) ("Drug Trafficking is one of the world's most lucrative commercial activities . . . . Illicit drugs . . . now move across international boundaries with unprecedented speed and efficiency.").
45. See generally PAUL STARES, GLOBAL HABIT: THE DRUG PROBLEM IN A BORDERLESS WORLD (1996).
46. See THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND ILLEGAL TRAFFICKFNG OF ARMS 3-20, 119-44 (P.C. Unsinger & H.W. More eds., 1989).
47. See generally WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTER-MEASURES (1995).
48. See UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, STATES OF DISARRAY: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION 72-94 (1995).
49. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, U.N. GAOR, G.A. Res. 2625, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
50. See Oscar Schachter, Micronationalism and Secession, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 179, 180-81 (Ulurich Beyerlin et al. eds. 1995);
51. see generally A. BUCHANAN, SECESSION (1991);
52. Daniel Turp, Le droit de secession en droit international public, 20 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 24, 24-78 (1982).
53. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 72 (James Strachey trans., 1989).
54. See Schachter, supra note 29, at 185-86.
55. See Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by Non-State Groups in International Law, 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 481, 488-94 (1992);
56. cf. Benedict Kingsbury, Whose International Law? Sovereignty and Non-State Groups, 88 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 1, 1-13 (1995).
57. See HORSMAN & MARSHALL, supra note 2, at 185-99; see generally JEFFERY BERRY, THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY (1993).
58. Thomas Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyally, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 382 (1996).
59. See generally Steven Ratner, The Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993).
60. See Rosalyn Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment, and Resolution of Conflicts: General Course in Public International Law, 230 REC. DES COURS 9, 73-74, 164-65 (1993-V).
61. See Ian Brownlie, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. General Course in Public International Law, 255 REC. DES COURS 9, 73 (1996).
62. See, e.g., Security Council Res. 277, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/277 (1970) (denying representation to the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia); G.A. Res. 3411 D, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/10342 (1975) (denying recognition of the Bantustans set up by South Africa); Security Council Res. 541, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/541 (1983) (denying recognition to the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cypress"). See generally JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1987).
63. See Security Council Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
64. See Fernando Tesón, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323, 358-62 (1996);
65. O. Corten, La Résolution 940 du Conseil de sécurite autorisant une intervention militaire en Haïti: L'émergence d'un principe de légitimité démocratique en droit international?, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 116, 116-33 (1995).
66. Rawls distinguishes liberal democratic societies from well-ordered hierarchical societies which he views as societies with a "common good conception of justice" and with a "reasonable consultation hierarchy" that allows different voices to be heard. In his view, basic human rights can be protected in these cases and as part of a "reasonable law of peoples" forceful intervention should be excluded. See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36 (1993);
67. cf. Fernando Tesón, Some Observations on John Rawls's The Law of Peoples, 88 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 18, 18-22 (1995).
68. Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a Member State, G. A. Res. 396(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 16, U.K. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
69. Recent articles on the relationship between democracy and recognition include Gregory Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1995);
70. Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992);
71. Brad Roth, Democratic Intolerance: Observations on Fox and Nolte, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 231, 235 (1996);
72. Jean Salmon, Reconnaissance d'États, 25 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 226 (1992) (discussing recognition of successor state to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
73. Influential proponents of the minimal state include FRIEDRICH HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1993)
74. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
75. See Richard Falk, The World Order Between Inter-State Law and the Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil Society Institutions, in COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 15 (D. Archibugi & D. Held eds., 1995);
76. NGOs, THE U.N. & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at 209-21.
77. Georges Abi-Saab, Cours General de Droit Internationale Public, 207 REC. DES COURS 15, 69 (1987-VII).
78. See Martii Koskenniemi, The Wonderful Artificiality of States, 88 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 22, 28-29 (1995) ("Within the state, the various conceptions of economic or managerial effectiveness, individual rights, or just principles, meet and find reconciliation.").