The dangers of regionalising international conflict management: The African experience

Political Science

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 41-60

  Jackson, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

Multiparty system; Simple plurality; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 25844474144     PISSN: 00323187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the New Zealand Political Studies Association Conference, Victoria University, Wellington, 1-3 December 1999. The author wishes to thank Chris Rudd, Gerald Chan, and two referees for many helpful comments and suggestions.
2. States that have contributed forces or liason teams to INTERFET include Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, USA, and UK. Ireland and Kenya have indicated that they intend to contribute forces in due course. See Letter dated 4 October 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/ sg1025.htm.
3. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999), 15 September 1999, http://www.un.org/ peace/etimor/9926481E.htm.
4. New Zealand and Australia provided troops for a Truce Monitoring Group in Bouganville, PNG, but this was an unarmed, small-scale operation. See John Henderson, 'Bouganville: The Uncertain Road to Peace', New Zealand International Review, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1999), pp. 10-13.
5. Also referred to as 'sub-contracting', 'subsidiarity', 'security regionalism', 'coalitions of the willing', the 'peace pyramid', or 'supervised devolution' of conflict management, I believe the term 'task-sharing' best describes the phenomenon of regionally-based coalitions of states undertaking peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement operations with UN approval and in concert with other UN conflict management efforts. There is obviously a fine line between UN operations and task-sharing operations, as both rely on contributions by member states. I consider task-sharing to be a situation where significant aspects of decision-making, especially in regards to security and the use of force, fall to the regional organisation or regional coalition of states rather than to the UN Secretary-General or Security Council.
6. The term 'Track II' describes methods of diplomacy outside the formal governmental system. It refers to non-governmental, informal, and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups aimed at conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and laying the groundwork for more formal negotiations. Track I is the world of official diplomacy, policymaking, and peacebuilding as expressed through formal inter-governmental processes. See Louise Diamond and John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace, 2nd ed. (West Hartford: Kumarian, 1996).
7. See Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 'Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1997), pp. 339-58.
8. See Rhoda E. Howard, 'Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: Internally Generated Causes', International Journal, LI (Winter 1995-96), pp. 27-53.
9. Paul Roe, 'The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a "Tragedy"?', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1999), pp. 183-202;
10. Roy Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993', American Political Science Review Vol. 89, No. 3 (1995), pp. 681-90.
11. Mohammed Ayoob, 'State-Making and Third World Security', in Jasjit Singh and Thomas Bernauer (eds.), Security of Third World Countries (Aldershot: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1993).
12. Hugh Miall, The Peacemakers: Peacefal Settlement of Disputes Since 1945 (London: Mcmillan, 1992), p. 185.
13. Edmond J. Keller, 'African Conflict Management and the New World Order', OAU Special Reports, http://\vww.oau-oua.org/internet_reso/reports/keller.htm (1994).
14. See Samuel Makinda, 'Somalia: Lessons from the UN Experience', in T. Woodhouse, R. Bruce, and M. Dando (eds.), Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998);
15. D. Sapir and H. Deconinck, 'The Paradox of Humanitarian Assistance and Military Intervention in Somalia', in Thomas Weiss (ed.), The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995);
16. Robert Patman, 'The UN Operation in Somalia', in Ramesh Thakur and C. Thayer (eds.), A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995);
17. J. Clarke, 'Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Response', in L. Damrosch (ed.), Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).
18. In Africa, the number of UN peacekeepers deployed was less than 2,000 as of late 1999. This is significantly down from the almost 40,000 in 1993. See Mark Malan, 'Leaner and Meaner? The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa', African Security Review Vol. 8, No. 4 (1999).
19. Dick A. Leurdijk, 'Before and after Dayton: The UN and NATO in the Former Yugoslavia', in Thomas Weiss (ed.), Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 50.
20. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Report on the Work of the Organisation' (New York: United Nations, 1992) p. 44.
21. Boutros Bouvos-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, A/47/277-S2411, (1992), Section IV, http://www.un.org/ Docs/SG/agpeace.html.
22. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, A/50/60-S/1995/1,(1995), Section IV, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html.
23. See Joaquin Tascan, 'Searching for OAS/UN Task-Sharing Opportunities in Central America and Haiti', in Weiss (ed.), Beyond UN Subcontracting.
24. See Leurdijk, 'Before and after Dayton'.
25. See S. Neil MacFarlane, 'On the Frontlines in the Near Abroad: the CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's Civil Wars', in Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting.
26. See Ettore Greco, 'New Trends in Peacekeeping: The Experience of Operation Alba', Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1998), pp. 201-12;
27. Georgios Kostakos and Dimitris Bourantonis, 'Innovations in Peacekeeping: The Case of Albania', Security Dialogue, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1998), pp. 49-58.
28. See Amadu Sesay, 'The Limits of Peace-keeping by a Regional Organisation: The OAU Peace-keeping Force in Chad', Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1991), pp. 7-26.
29. Another regional peacekeeping force of between 2,000 and 2,500 troops was preparing to deploy in Congo-Brazzaville in July 1997. It followed intense fighting between President Lissouba and his predecessor Sassou Nguesso, and had the backing of the UN Security Council. Before the force could deploy, however, Angola invaded on the side of Nguesso and installed him in a new government.
30. See Richard Jackson, 'African Solutions to African Problems? Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era', Paper Presented to the AFSAAP Conference, Perth, Australia (26-28 November, 1999).
31. There is not the space here to describe each of these cases. However, some of the main cases are examined in some detail in the following sources: E. Hutchful, 'The ECOMOG Experience with Peacekeeping in West Africa', in Mark Malan (ed.), Wither Peacekeeping in Africa? ISS Monograph 36 (South Africa, 1999);
32. Robert A. Mortimer, 'ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security in West Africa', in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996);
33. W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 'Regional Organisations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1994), pp. 261-302;
34. Fiona McFarlane, and Mark Malan, 'Crisis and Response in the Central African Republic: A New Trend in African Peacekeeping?', African Security Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1998);
35. Mark Malan, 'Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC - Running Amok with a Mythical Organ' ISS Occasional Paper No. 35 (Pretoria, 1998).
36. In October 1999 the UN Security Council approved a 6,000 strong UN peacekeeping force to take over from ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, following an eight-year civil war.
37. Here one tier refers to the international level and the second tier refers to regional level as well as sub-regional level.
38. Kofi Annan, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (16 April 1998), http://www.un.org/ ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/report.htm.
39. See M. Mwagiru, 'Who Will Bell the Cat? Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter and the Crisis of OAU Conflict Management', OAU Special Reports, (1998), http://www.snipe.ukc.ac.uk/international/ papers.dir/mwagiru.html.
40. Similar mechanisms and treaties in the OAS suffered the same fate.
41. Peacemaking is not to be confused with peace-enforcement. The OAU conceives of peacemaking as mediatory activities and measures to prevent disputes from arising or escalating. See OAU and International Peace Academy (IPA), The OAU and Conflict Management in Africa: Chairman's Report of Joint OUA/IPA Consultation (Addis Ababa: OAU/IPA, 1993).
42. Designed to deal with armed conflict between member states, external aggression, or external agitation of internal rebellions, the treaty provided for certain organisational structures around which intervention could be built. These were: an ECOWAS Authority to act as the supreme organ to determine when to invoke the protocol and determine the necessity for military actions; a Defence Council, composed of the Foreign and Defence ministers of member states, to assist the Authority in this function; a Defence Commission of Chiefs of Defence of member states responsible for examining the technical aspects of any defence issue and implementing any duties assigned by the Defence Council; a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military), who would be a senior serving military officer, to take charge of the administration and implementation of defence; and Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC), consisting of designated units of armed forces of member states, under a force commander appointed by the ECOWAS Authority on the advice of the Defence Council.
43. Earl Conteh-Morgan, 'Conflict and Militarisation in Africa: Past Trends and New Scenarios', Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 13 (Winter 1993), pp. 38-9.
44. Claude E. Welch Jr., 'The Military Factor in West Africa: Leadership or Regional Development', in Julius E. Okolo and Stephen Wrights (eds.), West African Regional Cooperation and Development (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p. 174.
45. The idea originated from a French initiative in 1994 to transform the 'Ndiambour' French-Senegalese manoeuvres into international operations, and create a permanent training centre for peacekeeping at Zombokro in Ivory Coast. Following meetings and seminars in 1997 and exercises in 1998 involving France, Senegal, Mali, and Mauritania, the elements needed for an 'African Intervention Force' appear to be in place. See ANB-BIA Supplement, http://www.peacelink.it/amb-bia/ar341/e01.htm
46. and Mark Malan, 'Peacekeeping in Africa: Trends and Responses', ISS Occasional Paper No. 31 (Pretoria, 1998), p. 4.
47. Mark Malan, 'US Response to African Crises: An Overview and Preliminary Analysis of the ACRI', ISS Occasional Paper No. 24 (Pretoria, 1997).
48. Malan, 'Peacekeeping in Africa', p. 5.
49. Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/sa/countrystories/other/19990415.htm.
50. Mwangiru, 'Who Will Bell the Cat?'.
51. Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regional Arrangements, the UN, and International Security: A Framework for Analysis', in Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting, p. 17;
52. See also Christopher Mitchell, 'External Peace-Making Initiatives and Intra-National Conflict', in M. Midlarsky (ed.), The Internationalisation of Communal Strife (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 276-7.
53. The OAS shows similar tendencies towards regime maintenance and lack of success in the Latin American region, especially in its post-Cold War efforts to provide leadership in restoring democracy. It condemned the coups in Guatemala, Haiti, and Peru and applied economic sanctions to back its demands for a return to democratic rule. See Tascan, 'Searching for OAS/UN Task-Sharing Opportunities', pp. 92-3.
54. Alagappa, 'Regional Arrangements, the UN, and International Security', p. 17.
55. See Cedric de Coning, 'Preparing for the Third Millennium: Towards a Policy Framework for the OAU Conflict Management Mechanism', ACCORD ONLINE Occasional Paper 4/99 (1991), http://www.accord.org.za/publications/papers/99-4.htm.
56. It cost the OAU approximately US$7.2 million to keep 64 military observers in Burundi from 1994-96 in the OMIB operation. It had to rely on donors for funding. See de Coning, 'Preparing for the Third Millennium'.
57. The secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993 is an example of such a situation.
58. Robert Jackson and C. Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridicial in Statehood', World Politics, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1982), pp. 1-24.
59. Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
60. See William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
61. See Hutchful, 'The ECOMOG Experience'.
62. The cleavage between South Africa and Zimbabwe over the role of SADC forces in DRC is a case in point.
63. See Clement E. Adibe, 'The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership', in Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting.
64. Such a situation occurred not only in Africa, but in Abkhazia where civilians were murdered while CIS and UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) personnel stood by. See MacFarlane, 'On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad', p. 127.
65. See Mark Malan, SADC and Sub-Regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo Vadis, ISS Monograph 19 (Pretoria, 1998).
66. Senegal, Uganda, and Mali, all partners in the ACRI programme, have ongoing anti-government insurgencies. Senegal is fighting a separatist insurgency in the Casamance region, Uganda is fighting the Sudanese-backed Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord's Resistence Army (LRA), and Mali has ongoing problems with a Tuareg rebellion.
67. The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, OAU Conflict Management Division, (1993) http://www.oau-oua.org/document/mechanism/english/contents.htm.
68. See Richard Jackson, Negotiation Versus Mediation in International Conflict: Deciding How to Deal with Violent Conflicts (PhD Dissertation: University of Canterbury, 1998);
69. Jacob Bercovitch, and Allison Houston, 'The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence', in Jacob Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996);
70. William Dixon. 'Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement', International Organisation, Vol. 50, No. 4 (1996), pp. 653-81.
71. Tascan, 'Searching for OAS/UN Task-Sharing Opportunities'.
72. Tascan, 'Searching for OAS/UN Task-Sharing Opportunities'.
73. Kofi Annan's 'Two Concepts of Sovereignty', The Economist, 18 September 1999, http:// www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/cea/countrystories/other/19991025a.htm.
74. See Edwin M. Smith and Thomas G. Weiss, 'UN Task-Sharing: Toward or Away from Global Governance', in Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting.
75. Smith and Weiss, 'UN Task-Sharing'.