Institutional design versus reputational effects on bureaucratic performance: Evidence from U.S. government macroeconomic and fiscal projections

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 281-306

  Krause, George A ^a   Douglas, James W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25844457338     PISSN: 10531858     EISSN: 14779803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mui038     Document Type: Review

References (75)

1. Allen, Mike, and Jonathan Weisman. 2002. Treasury chief, key economic aide resign as jobless rate hits 6 percent. Washington Post, 1 December: A1(2).
2. Auerbach, Alan J. 1999. On the performance and use of government revenue forecasts. National Tax Journal 52 (December): 767-82.
3. Balla, Steven J. 1998. Administrative procedures and political control of the bureaucracy. American Political Science Review 92 (September): 663-73.
4. Barro, Robert J., and David Gordon. 1983. Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (July): 101-22.
5. Batchelor, Roy. 2001. How useful are the forecasts of intergovernmental agencies? The IMF and OECD versus the consensus. Applied Economics 33 (February): 225-35.
6. Bawn, Kathleen. 1995. Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures. American Political Science Review 89 (March): 62-73.
7. Bendor, Jonathan, Serge Taylor, and Roland Van Gaalen. 1987. Stacking the deck - Bureaucratic missions and policy design. American Political Science Review 81 (May): 872-96.
8. Berry, William D. 1979. Utility regulation in the states: The policy effects of professionalism and salience to the consumer. American Journal of Political Science 23 (May): 263-77.
9. _. 1984. An alternative to the capture theory of regulation. American Journal of Political Science 28 (August): 524-58.
10. Blackley, Paul R., and Larry DeBoer. 1993. Bias in OMB's economics forecasts and budget proposals. Public Choice 76 (July): 215-32.
11. Brehm, John, and Scott Gates. 1997. Working, shirking, and sabotage. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
12. Brock, William, Davis Dechert, Jose Sheinkman, and Blake LeBaron. 1996. A test for independence based on the correlation dimension. Econometric Reviews 15 (August): 197-235.
13. Campbell, Bryan, and Jean-Marie Dufour. 1995. Exact nonparametric orthogonality and random walk tests. Review of Economics and Statistics 77 (February): 1-16.
14. Campbell, Bryan, and Eric Ghysels. 1995. Federal budget projections: A nonparametric assessment of bias and efficiency. Review of Economics and Statistics 77 (February): 17-31.
15. Carpenter, Daniel P. 2001. The forging of bureaucratic autonomy: Reputations, networks, and policy innovation in executive agencies, 1862-2928. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
16. Chappell, Henry W., Jr., and Rob Roy McGregor. 2001. Did time inconsistency contribute to the great inflation? Evidence from the FOMC transcripts. Typescript, University of South Carolina.
17. Corder, J. Kevin. 2005. Managing uncertainty: The bias and efficiency of federal macroeconomic forecasts. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15 (January): 55-70.
18. Diebold, Francis X., and Roberta S. Mariano. 1995. Comparing predictive accuracy. Journal of Economic and Business Statistics 13 (July): 134-44.
19. Eisner, Marc A. 1991. Antitrust and the triumph of economics: Institutions, expertise, and policy change. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
20. Engstrom, Erik J., and Samuel Kernell. 1999. Serving competing principals: The budget estimates of OMB and CBO in an era of divided government. Presidential Studies Quarterly 29 (December): 820-30.
21. Fair, Ray C., and Robert J. Shiller. 1990. Comparing information in forecasts from econometric models. American Economic Review 80 (June): 375-89.
22. Feldstein, Martin. 1992. The Council of Economic Advisers and economic advising in the United States. Economic Journal 102 (September): 1223-34.
23. Fox, Harrison W., Jr., and Susan Webb Hammond. 1977. Congressional staffs: The invisible force in American lawmaking. New York: Free Press.
24. Frendreis, John, and Raymond Tatalovich. 2000. Accuracy and bias in macroeconomic forecasting by the administration, the CBO, and the Federal Reserve Board. Polity 32 (Summer): 623-32.
25. Gilmour, John B. 1990. Reconcilable differences? Congress, the budget process, and the deficit. Berkeley: University of California Press.
26. Greider, William. 1987. Secrets of the temple: How the Federal Reserve runs the country. New York: Simon and Schuster.
27. Havrilesky, Thomas. 1995. The pressures on American monetary policy. 2d ed. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Press.
28. Heclo, Hugh. 1975. OMB and the presidency - The problem of "neutral competence." The Public Interest 38 (Winter): 80-99.
29. Howard, James A. 1987. Government economic projections: A comparison between CBO and OMB forecasts. Public Budgeting and Finance 7 (Autumn): 14-25.
30. Kamlet, Mark S., David C. Mowery, and Tsai-Tsu Su. 1987. Whom do you trust? An analysis of executive and congressional economic forecasts. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 6 (Spring): 365-84.
31. Karamouzis, Nicholas, and Raymond Lombra. 1989. Federal Reserve policymaking: An overview and analysis of the policy process. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 30:7-62.
32. Kettl, Donald F. 2003. Deficit politics: The search for balance in American politics. 2d ed. New York: Longman Press.
33. Kruskal, William H. 1952. A nonparametric test for the several sample problem. Annals of Mathematical Statistics 23 (December): 525-40.
34. LeLoup, Lance T. 1988. From microbudgeting to macrobudgeting: Evolution in theory and practice. In New directions in budget theory, ed. Irene S. Rubin, 19-42. Albany: State University of New York Press.
35. Lewis, David E. 2002. The politics of agency termination, 19-42. Confronting the myth of agency immortality. Journal of Politics 64 (February): 89-107.
36. _. 2003. Presidents and the politics of agency design: Political insulation in the United States government bureaucracy, 1946-1997. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
37. March, James G. 1988. Decisions and organizations. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
38. _. 1999. The pursuit of organizational intelligence. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
39. McCubbins, Mathew D. 1985. Legislative design of regulatory structure. American Journal of Political Science 29 (November): 721-48.
40. McNees, Stephen. 1995. An assessment of the "official" economic forecasts. New England Economic Review, July-August: 13-23.
41. Meltsner, Arnold J. 1976. Policy analysts in the bureaucracy. Berkeley: University of California Press.
42. _. 1990. Rules for rulers: The politics of advice. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
43. Miller, Gary J., and Terry M. Moe. 1983. Bureaucrats, legislators, and the size of government. American Political Science Review 77 (June): 297-322.
44. Moe, Terry M. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The new direction in American politics, ed. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, 235-71. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
45. _. 1989. The politics of bureaucratic structure. In Can the government govern? ed. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, 267-329. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
46. Morris, Irwin L. 1999. Congress, the president, and the Federal Reserve: The politics of American monetary policymaking. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
47. Mosher, Frederick C. 1982. Democracy in the public service. New York: Oxford University Press.
48. Mowery, David C., Mark S. Kamlet, and John P. Crecine. 1980. Presidential management of budgetary and fiscal policymaking. Political Science Quarterly 95 (Autumn): 395-425.
49. Nelson, Robert H. 1987. The economics profession and the making of public policy. Journal of Economic Literature 25 (March): 49-91.
50. Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and representative government. Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton.
51. Palazzolo, Daniel J. 1999. Done deal? The politics of the 1997 budget agreement. New York: Chatham House Publishers.
52. Penner, Rudolph G., and Alan J. Abramson. 1988. Broken purse strings: Congressional budgeting 1974 to 1988. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
53. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1990. Macroeconomic policy, credibility, and politics. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.
54. Plesko, George A. 1988. The accuracy of government forecasts and budget projections. National Tax Journal 41 (December): 483-501.
55. Radin, Beryl A. 1997. The evolution of the policy analysis field: From conversation to conversations. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 16 (April): 204-18.
56. Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 2000. Federal Reserve information and the behavior of interest rates. American Economic Review 90 (June): 429-57.
57. Rourke, Francis E. 1984. Bureaucracy, politics, and public policy. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
58. _. 1992. Responsiveness and neutral competence in American bureaucracy. Public Administration Review 52 (November-December): 539-46.
59. Rubin, Irene S. 2003. Balancing the federal budget. New York: Chatham House Publishers.
60. Santoni, G. J. 1986. The Employment Act of 1946: Some history notes. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 68 (November): 5-16.
61. Schick, Allen. 1980. Congress and money: Budgeting, spending, and taxing. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
62. _. 2000. The federal budget: Politics, policy, process. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
63. Spence, David B. 1999. Agency discretion and the dynamics of procedural reform. Public Administration Review 59 (September-October): 425-42.
64. Stockman, David A. 1986. The triumph of politics: How the Reagan revolution failed. New York: Harper and Row Publishers.
65. Stone, Deborah. 1997. Policy paradox: The art of political decision making. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
66. Tomkin, Shelly Lynne. 1998. Inside OMB: Politics and process in the president's budget office. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
67. Weatherford, M. Stephen. 1987. The interplay of ideology and advice in economic policy-making: The case of political business cycles. Journal of Politics 49 (November): 925-52.
68. Weimer, David L., and Aidan R. Vining. 1999. Policy analysis: Concepts and practice. 3d ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.
69. Weiss, Carol H. 1982. Ideology, interests, and information: The basis of policy positions. In Ethics, the social science, and policy analysis, ed. Daniel Callahan and Bruce Jennings, 213-45. New York: Plenum Press.
70. White, Joseph, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1989. The deficit and the public interest: The search for responsible budgeting in the 1980s. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
71. Whitford, Andrew B. 2002. Bureaucratic discretion, agency structure, and democratic responsiveness: The case of the United States attorneys. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 12 (January): 3-27.
72. _. 2003. Adapting agencies: An essay on competition, imitation, and punishment. In Politics, policy and organizations: Essays on the scientific study of bureaucracy, ed. George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier, 160-206. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
73. Wildavsky, Aaron, and Naomi Caiden. 2001. The new politics of the budgetary process. 4th ed. New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc.
74. Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. New York: Basic Books.
75. Woolley, John T. 1984. Monetary politics: The Federal Reserve and the politics of monetary policy. New York: Cambridge University Press.