Industrial location and voter participation in Europe

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 713-730

  Busch, Marc L ^a   Reinhardt, Eric ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25444438694     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123405000360     Document Type: Article

References (110)

1. For a fuller synopsis of this debate, see Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'Industrial Location and Protection: The Political and Economic Geography of U.S. Nontariff Barriers', American Journal of Political Science, 43 (1999), 1028-50.
2. Busch and Reinhardt, 'Industrial Location and Protection'.
3. Ronald Rogowski, 'Pork, Patronage, and Protection: How Geographic Concentration Affects Representation of Interests in Small-District Systems' (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco. 1997).
4. By district magnitude, we mean, of course, the number of seats per constituency, not the physical size of the district.
5. Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries', American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000), 703-19.
6. K. H. Midelfart-Knarvik, H. G. Overman, S. J. Redding and A. J. Venables, 'The Location of European Industry' (report prepared for the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission, 2000);
7. Busch and Reinhardt, 'Industrial Location and Protection'.
8. Busch and Reinhardt, 'Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries';
9. Rogowski, 'Pork, Patronage, and Protection';
10. Fiona McGillivray, 'Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs', American Journal of Political Science, 41 (1997), 584-607;
11. Daniel Trefler, 'Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy', Journal of Political Economy, 101 (1993), 138-60;
12. Wendy L Hansen, 'The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism', American Political Science Review, 84 (1990), 21-46;
13. James Snyder, 'Political Geography and Interest-Group Power', Social Choice and Welfare, 6 (1989), 103-25;
14. John J. Pincus, 'Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs', Journal of Political Economy, 83 (1975), 757-78.
15. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
16. See, for example, Trefler, 'Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection';
17. th Century Britain: To Concentrate or Not', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 37-58;
18. Real Lavergne, The Political Economy of U.S. Tariffs; An Empirical Analysis (Toronto: Academic Press, 1983).
19. James E. Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik and Ronald Rogowski, 'The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry', Comparative Political Studies, 29 (1996), 689-717.
20. Michael J. Hiscox, International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 19-20.
21. Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, 'What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?' Journal of International Economics, 54 (2001), 267-92.
22. Hiscox, International Trade and Political Conflict;
23. Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).
24. Hansen, 'The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism', p. 36.
25. Helen V. Milner, 'Industries, Governments, and the Creation of Regional Trade Blocs', in Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, eds, The Political Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 77-106, at p. 99.
26. Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger and Brian E. Roberts, "The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986', American Political Science Review, 88 (1994), 911-26, p. 918.
27. Busch and Reinhardt, 'Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries'.
28. Rogowski, 'Pork, Patronage, and Protection'.
29. Susanne Lohmann and Sharyn O'Halloran, 'Divided Government and US Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence', International Organization, 48 (1994), 559-632.
30. Ronald Rogowski, Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions', International Organization, 41 (1987), 203-23.
31. Busch and Reinhardt, 'Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries'.
32. Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, 'Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting', American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 495-527.
33. Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier, Annual Review of Political Science, 3 (2000), 183-219, pp. 192-4 and 203.
34. For exceptions, however, see David W. Romero and Stephen J. Stambough, 'Personal Economic Well-Being and the Individual Vote for Congress: A Pooled Analysis, 1980-1990', Political Research Quarterly, 49 (1996), 607-16.
35. Richard Nadeau, Richard G. Niemi and Antoine Yoshinaka, 'A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context Across Time and Nations', Electoral Studies, 21 (2002), 403-23.
36. Lee Sigelman, Carol K. Sigelman and David Bullock, 'Reconsidering Pocketbook Voting: An Experimental Approach', Political Behavior, 13 (1991), 129-49.
37. Brad T. Gomez and J. Matthew Wilson, 'Political Sophistication and Economic Voting in the American Electorate: A Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2001), 899-914.
38. Busch and Reinhardt, 'Industrial Location and Protection';
39. Michael J. White, 'The Measurement of Spatial Segregation', American Journal of Sociology, 88 (1983), 1008-18.
40. Busch and Reinhardt, 'Industrial Location and Protection'.
41. So defined, Geocon is restricted to assessing 'lumpiness' towards one central point. It does not perform well for strongly multimodal distributions. We emphasize, however, that no sector in any of the European countries in this article's samples exhibits multimodality in its spatial distribution, as verified by maps (available upon request) for each country-industry case. Here, s is chosen arbitrarily to scale the index so that extreme distances do not receive undue weight (e.g., by making it the mean distance among regions). White suggests using the exponent of negative distance. See White, 'The Measurement of Spatial Segregation', p. 1013.
42. This formula for geographic concentration is a simpler derivative of White's ('The Measurement of Spatial Segregation', p. 1012, Equation 4), the average distance between every worker and every other worker in the industry. For the multi-country Eurobarometer sample used below, our measure is highly correlated with White's (r = 0.975), yielding wholly comparable results.
43. The EU contains fifteen NUTSO countries, about a hundred NUTS1 regions, and some 260 or so NUTS2 districts.
44. We thank Martin Hallet of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs for generously sharing his data on gross value added (GVA) by region. See also Martin Hallet, 'Regional Specialisation and Concentration in the EU', Economic Papers No. 141 (Brussels: European Commission, 2000). For a list of 114 regions completing tiling the EU15, over the years 1980 through 1995 and the seventeen NACE-CLIO sectors, the correlation between GVA (available for all of this sample) and total employment (available from Regio for just 59 per cent of this sample) is 0.87 (n = 18,153). This validates our use of GVA as a substitute for number of employees.
45. Subnational data by sector are not available for the other seven EU member states. For the UK Geocon calculations, we exclude Northern Ireland, and for Germany we exclude former East Germany and Berlin.
46. Karlheinz Reif and Eric Marlier, Eurobarometer 44.3OVR: Employment, Unemployment, and Gender Equality, February-April 1996 [computer file]. Brussels: INRA [producer]. Koeln: Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung / Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1998.
47. See OECD, 'The OECD STAN Database for Industrial Analysis', February 2005, p. 27, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/21/34464010.doc. 'Non-exported domestic sales' is the value of production plus imports minus exports. Like Geocon, the trade data are cast at the national, not EU, level (thereby including internal and not simply external EU cross-border trade), and were obtained from three OECD datasets (STAN Database for Industrial Analysis, Structural Statistics for Industry and Services, and Statistics on International Trade in Services), all available via www.sourceoecd.org.
48. 'No Answer' accounts for just a quarter of the sample's 0 values for Turnout. If we exclude these 168 cases, Turnout is 1 in 81 per cent of the remaining observations, and the results are qualitatively identical for both models in Table 1 below. (Indeed, the coefficient of Geocon × Traded increases to 5.1 and 5.5, with p < 0.01 in both cases.)
49. There are competing arguments regarding the impact of urban versus rural residence on turnout and political participation more generally. Both revolve around claims that a citizen's place in social networks is greater in one community type than the other. Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-On Kim's examination of these views in the context of seven countries finds somewhat greater evidence for the hypothesis that rural citizens vote more. See Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-On Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 269-85.
50. This choice of reference category allows us to include over 500 respondents who did not report their income but meaningfully answered every other question in the model. This choice has no effect on the relative values of the income category coefficients. It merely means that, to draw inferences about the overall impact of income on turnout intention, we must test the null that the coefficients of the included income dummies are collectively equal to each other, not necessarily equal to zero. We report the results of such a test below.
51. The conventional term 'compulsory voting' is rather misleading in this context (as opposed to, say, the totalitarian setting). To be sure, statutory penalties for non-voting may encourage voter turnout in certain countries, at least to the extent they are enforced (a critical question). This would be a problem if any of our countries had 100 per cent turnout. Of course, in practice, turnout intention does indeed vary considerably within each of the eight included countries; in no country does the sample mean exceed 0.83, in fact. Hence the country fixed effects in our regressions absorb any concerns about comparability across countries in that regard.
52. Alan Siaroff and John W. A. Merer, 'Parliamentary Election Turnout in Europe Since 1990', Political Studies, 50 (2002), 916-27;
53. G. Bingham Powell Jr, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982);
54. Robert W. Jackman, 'Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 405-24.
55. Peverill Squire, Raymond E. Wolfinger and David P. Glass, 'Residential Mobility and Voter Turnout', American Political Science Review, 81(1987), 45-66;
56. Lee Sigelman, Philip W. Roeder, Malcolm E. Jewell and Michael A. Baer, 'Voting and Nonvoting: A Multi-Election Perspective', American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 749-65;
57. Russell J. Dalton, 'Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies', Journal of Politics, 46 (1984), 264-84;
58. Steven J. Rosenstone, 'Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout', American Journal of Political Science, 26 (1982), 25-46.
59. The strongly significant model chi-squared indicates the model fits the data well. There is little collinearity among the control variables, as diagnosed by ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression of each right-hand side (RHS) variable on all the others. These statements apply as well to all regression results reported elsewhere in the article. However, not surprisingly, Geocon and Traded do exhibit moderate to high (0.4 to 0.8) bivariate correlations with the interaction term, in all the tests. By raising the standard errors on the interaction term, this problem merely makes our inference more conservative.
60. Increasing Geocon just one standard deviation from its mean, in the same fashion, boosts the predicted probability by 5 percentage points.
61. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Political Economics; Explaining Economic Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
62. Raymond Horstman and Jan W. van Deth, Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies Data Source Book, 1971-1989 [computer file], 2nd ICPSR version (Amsterdam: Steinmetz Archive [producer]. Amsterdam: Steinmetz Archive/Ann Arbor: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 1997).
63. Robert C. Feenstra, Robert E. Lipsey and Harry P. Bowen, 'World Trade Flows, 1970-1992, with Production and Tariff Data', Working Paper No. 5910 (Cambridge: National Bureau for Economic Research, 1997). However, given the lack of subsequent availability, we used 1985 data on Traded for the 1986 survey year. Feenstra et al. also do not provide data for agriculture or services, leaving us with only seventeen of the original thirty-four survey sectors in the regression sample.
64. Recall that Traded may exceed 1 if the volume of production for export is greater than domestic sales, which is the case for the median industry in the Netherlands in this sample period.
65. Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman, 'Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995), 271-94;
66. G. Bingham Powell Jr, 'American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 17-43;
67. Sigelman et al., 'Voting and Nonvoting'.
68. Unfortunately, in contrast to the Eurobarometer used for the prior section's test, this survey does not ask about the number of employees at the respondent's worksite.
69. Scheve and Slaughter, 'What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?'
70. James E. Alt, Fredrik Carlsen, Per Heum and Kare Johansen, 'Asset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms: Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway', International Organization, 53 (19991), 99-116. The Eurostat R&D indicator is available for six countries and six of twelve aggregated sector categories, for a total of 1,547 respondents in our Eurobarometer sample.
71. The Eurostat figure has a bivariate correlation with Geocon of - 0.23 (n = 1,547) in the Eurobarometer sample, while the ANBERD is correlated at 0.06 (n = 487) with Geocon in the Dutch application.
72. Alessandro Nicita and Marcelo Olarreaga, 'Trade and Production, 1976-1999', Working Paper No. 2701 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2001).
73. Busch and Reinhardt, 'Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries';
74. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'Industrial Location and Protection'.
75. Busch and Reinhardt, 'Geography, International Trade, and Political Mobilization in U.S. Industries', p. 713.
76. Vincent Price and John Zaller, 'Who Gets the News? Alternative Measures of News Reception and Their Implications for Research', Public Opinion Quarterly, 57 (1993), 133-64;
77. John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). In the special case of negative campaign advertising, recent studies have questioned whether such political sophisticates are indeed more sensitive to elite mobilization efforts.
78. See, for example, Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenney, 'Do Negative Campaigns Mobilize or Suppress Turnout? Clarifying the Relationship between Negativity and Participation', American Political Science Review, 93 (1994), 877-89;
79. Steven E. Finkel and John G. Geer, 'A Spot Check: Casting Doubt on the Demobilizing Effect of Attack Advertising', American Journal of Political Science, 42 (1998), 573-95. We do not take a position on this question. Our point is simply that geographic concentration (combined with trade exposure) has its effect through another channel, not through mobilization by elites.
80. Horstman and van Deth, Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies Data Source Book, 1971-1989, p. 207.
81. Lee Sigelman, 'The Nonvoting Voter in Voting Research', American Journal of Political Science, 26 (1982), 47-56.
82. Barry C. Burden, 'Voter Turnout and the National Election Studies', Political Analysis, 8 (2000), 389-98;
83. Robert J. J. Voogt and Willem E. Saris, 'To Participate or Not to Participate: The Link Between Survey Participation, Electoral Participation, and Political Interest', Political Analysis, 11 (2003), 164-79.
84. Kevin Arceneaux, 'Is the Road to Bad Inference Paved with Good Intentions? An Audit of Vote Intention Survey Items' (paper presented at the Political Methodology Summer Conference, Atlanta, Ga., 2001).
85. Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman, Redding and Venables, 'The Location of European Industry', pp. 53-4;
86. Gilles Duranton and Henry Overman, Testing for Localisation Using Micro-Geographic Data', Discussion Paper No. 3379 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2002), p. 26.
87. The country fixed effects in our Eurobarometer regression absorb the effects of the differing geographic scales across countries, so that the impact of geographic concentration in the Table 1 model is essentially relative to other industries within a given country.
88. Munroe Eagles and Stephen Erfle, 'Community Cohesion and Voter Turnout in English Parliamentary Constituencies', British Journal of Political Science, 19 (1989), 115-25;
89. Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague, 'Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information', American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), 1197-216.
90. Alan S. Zuckerman, Nicholas A. Valentino and Ezra W. Zuckerman, 'A Structural Theory of Vote Choice: Social and Political Networks and Electoral Flows in Britain and the United States', Journal of Politics, 56 (1994), 1008-33, p. 1011.
91. Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka, 'A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting';
92. Gomez and Wilson, 'Political Sophistication and Economic Voting in the American Electorate';
93. Sigelman, Sigelman and Bullock, 'Reconsidering Pocketbook Voting'.
94. Michael Wallerstein and Bruce Western, 'Unions in Decline? What Has Changed and Why', Annual Review of Political Science, 3 (2000), 355-77, p. 368.
95. Marius Brillhart and Rolf Traeger, 'An Account of Geographic Concentration Patterns in Europe' (unpublished manuscript, University of Lausanne, 2002);
96. Karl Aiginger and Michael Pfaffermayr, 'The Single Market and Geographic Concentration in Europe' (unpublished manuscript, Austrian Institute of Economic Research, 2001);
97. Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman, Redding and Venables, 'The Location of European Industry'. Some first-generation studies of trends in the geographic concentration of industries in Western Europe produced ambiguous results, largely because they failed to incorporate data from the 1990s and they universally used distance-free measures of concentration, such as Gini or Herfindahl indices. See
98. Marius Brülhart, 'Economic Geography, Industry Location, and Trade; The Evidence', World Economy, 21 (1998), 775-801.
99. Rafael López Pintor and Maria Gratschew, Voter Turnout Since 1945: A Global Report (Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2002), p. 85.
100. Mark Gray and Miki Caul, 'Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950 to 1997: The Effects of Declining Group Mobilization', Comparative Political Studies, 33 (2000), 1091-122;
101. Benjamin Radcliff and Patricia Davis, 'Labor Organization and Electoral Participation in Industrial Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 44 (2000), 132-41.
102. Michael E. Porter, 'Clusters and the New Economics of Competition", Harvard Business Review, 76 (1998), 77-90;
103. Anthony J. Venables, 'Localization of Industry and Trade Performance', Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 12 (1996), 52-60.
104. Pierre M. Picard and Eric Toulemonde, 'Firms, Agglomeration, and Unions', Discussion Paper No. 3323 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2002);
105. Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables, The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and International Trade (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1999), p. 341.
106. Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano and Diego Puga, 'Agglomeration in the Global Economy: A Survey of the "New Economic Geography" ', World Economy, 21 (1998), 707-32.
107. Henry G. Overman and Diego Puga, 'Unemployment Clusters across Europe's Regions and Countries', Economic Policy, 34 (2002), 115-47.
108. Larry M. Bartels, 'Economic Inequality and Political Representation' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, 2002);
109. Kim Quaile Hill and Jan E. Leighley, 'The Policy Consequences of Class Bias in State Electorates', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 351-65;
110. Stephen Earl Bennett and David Resnick, 'The Implications of Nonvoting for Democracy in the United States', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 771-802.