Optimal liability with stochastic harms, judgement-proof injurers, and asymmetric information

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 181-203

  Innes, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033147628     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(99)00004-6     Document Type: Article

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