Audit quality: attributes, private safeguards and the role of regulation

European Accounting Review

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 205-224

  Arrunada, Benito ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 25144468555     PISSN: 09638180     EISSN: 14684497     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09638180050129873     Document Type: Article

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