Mandatory rotation of company auditors: A critical examination

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 31-61

  Arruñada, Benito ^a   Paz Ares, Cándido ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031094066     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00063-4     Document Type: Article

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