Pricing and allocation for quality-differentiated online services

Management Science

Volumn 51, Issue 7, 2005, Pages 1141-1150

  Bapna, Ravi ^a   Goes, Paulo ^a   Gupta, Alok ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions to reveal valuations of one time services; Nonstandard knapsack formulation; Quality of service oriented digital services

Indexed keywords

AUCTIONS TO REVEAL VALUATIONS OF ONE-TIME SERVICES; DATA STREAMS; NONSTANDARD KNAPSACK FORMULATION; QUALITY-OF-SERVICE-ORIENTED DIGITAL SERVICES;

COGNITIVE SYSTEMS; COMMERCE; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; DATA REDUCTION; PROBLEM SOLVING; QUALITY OF SERVICE; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

ONLINE SYSTEMS;

EID: 25144460011     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0419     Document Type: Article

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