Some considerations on conditional chances

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 667-680

  Humphreys, Paul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24944479159     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/55.4.667     Document Type: Review

References (9)

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2. Fetzer, J. [1981]: Scientific Knowledge: Causation, Explanation, and Corroboration, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 69, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
3. Gillies, D. [2000]: 'Varieties of Propensity', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51, pp. 807-35.
4. Humphreys, P. [1985]: 'Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities', The Philosophical Review, 94, pp. 557-70.
5. McCurdy, C. [1996]: 'Humphreys's Paradox and the Interpretation of Inverse Conditional Propensities', Synthese, 108, pp. 105-25.
6. Miller, D. [1994]: Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence, LaSalle: Open Court.
7. Miller, D. [2002]: 'Propensities May Satisfy Bayes' Theorem', Proceedings of the British Academy, 113, pp. 111-6.
8. Milne, P. [1986]: 'Can there be a Realist Single-Case Interpretation of Probability?', Erkenntnis, 25, pp. 129-32.
9. Popper, K. [1990]: A World of Propensities, Bristol: Thoemmes Antiquarian Books Ltd.