Selling NSC-68: The Truman administration, public opinion, and the politics of mobilization, 1950-51

Diplomatic History

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 655-690

  Casey, Steven ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 24644516666     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2005.00510.x     Document Type: Review

References (200)

1. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1950, 1: 1170-72, 191, 225-26.
2. See also NSC-68 reprinted in Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68 (Boston, 1993), 43, 54. The focus of this article is the government's publicity efforts, and not the actual development of the NSC-68 policy, which has been dealt with extensively elsewhere.
3. See, for instance, Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," in Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, eds. Warner R. Schilling et al. (New York, 1962), 271-378;
4. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC-68 and the Soviet Threat," International Security 4 (Spring 1979): 116-58;
5. Paul H. Nitze, "The Development of NSC-68," International Security 4 (Spring 1980): 170-76;
6. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA, 1992), 355-60, 369-74;
7. Walter S. Poole, The JCS and National Policy, 1950-1952. Volume 4: National Security (Washington, DC, 1998), 3-39.
8. See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1972), 351-52;
9. Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York, 1985);
10. Thomas G. Paterson, "Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years," Diplomatic History 3 (Winter 1979): 3-4;
11. Frank Kofsky, Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948 (New York, 1993).
12. FRUS, 1950, 1: 226;
13. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 374-75.
14. See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford, 1982), 108;
15. Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ, 1996), 125-27, 180-81;
16. Michael J. Hogan, Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge, UK, 1998), 300-301;
17. Nancy E. Bernhard, "Clearer Than Truth: Public Affairs Television and the State Department's Domestic Information Campaigns," Diplomatic History 21 (Fall 1997): 561-63;
18. idem, U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960 (Cambridge, 1999), 83-86;
19. Scott Lucas, Freedom's War: The U.S. Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945-1956 (Manchester, 1999).
20. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," 370;
21. Barton J. Bernstein, "The Week We Went to War: American Intervention in the Korean Civil War," Foreign Service Journal 54 (February 1977): 9;
22. Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24 (December 1980): 563;
23. Gaddis, Strategies, 109. Some historians have even speculated that Acheson invited the North Korean attack in order to rally support for NSC-68, or at least encouraged Truman to intervene for this reason.
24. See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton, NJ, 1990), 2: 431-35;
25. Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy (Ann Arbor, MI, 1998), 68-69, 115-16.
26. Most accounts focus on the extent to which opinion influenced policy rather than presentation; see Paterson, "Presidential Foreign Policy," 1-18;
27. Walter LaFeber, "American Policymakers, Public Opinion, and the Outbreak of the Cold War, 1945-50," in The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, eds. Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye (Tokyo, 1977), 49, 60;
28. Nancy B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York, 1983)
29. Bernhard, "Clearer Than Truth," 546-47;
30. Robert Griffith, "The Selling of America: The Advertising Council and American Politics, 1942-1960," Business History Review 57 (Autumn 1983): 388-412;
31. Michael Wala, "Selling the Marshall Plan at Home: The Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery, Diplomatic History 10 (Summer 1986): 247-65;
32. Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin," 116-58.
33. For recent political science studies on the government's more direct efforts at selling, see Martin J. Medhusrt, Robert L. Ivie, Philip Wander, and Robert L. Scott, Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology (New York, 1990);
34. Amos Kiewe, ed., The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric (Westport, CT, 1994). Some recent studies have shed important light on the Truman administration's relationship with Congress.
35. See, in particular, Hogan, Cross of Iron. But the interaction between the executive and legislature is still a relatively neglected subject.
36. See Robert David Johnson, "Congress and the Cold War," Journal of Cold War Studies, 3 (Spring 2001:) 76-100.
37. House Armed Services Committee, Defense Appropriations, FY 1951 (Washington, DC, 1950), 2659-2661;
38. Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 (Columbus, OH, 1966), 89-107, 119-23;
39. Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Volume 1: The Formative Years, 1947-1950 (Washington, DC, 1984), 75, 376-82.
40. Observations on Truman's speech are by Sir Oliver Franks, 7 January 1950, FO371/81615, Public Record Office, Kew, England.
41. Franks to Sir William Strang, 19 April 1950, FO371/81615. Franks was recounting a conversation with Gordon Gray, George Perkins, and James Webb.
42. Carlton Savage to Nitze, 2 May 1950, PPS Files, NSC-68, subject box 54, State Department Papers, RG 59, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NAII).
43. Brien McMahon, "The Hydrogen Bomb: A Plan for Atomic Peace," 2 February 1950;
44. "Peace and Problems of Atomic Energy," 1 March 1950;
45. both in Address and Press Releases File, box 7, McMahon Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter LC). See also Francis H. Russell to Mr. Rusk and Mr. Nitze, 6 February 1950, Asst. Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Files, subject box 3, RG 59.
46. The press soon reported that McMahon was receiving a "deluge" of approving mail over his suggestion. PA, "Daily Opinion Summary" (hereafter DOPS), 2 February and 10 March 1950, Office of Public Opinion Studies, Schuyler Foster Files, box 4, RG 59.
47. On the congressional reaction, see PA, DOPS, 7 and 17 February 1950, and 2 March 1950.
48. Poole, The JCS and National Policy, 4: 4-5, 9;
49. Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York, 1989), 96.
50. FRUS, 1950, 1: 185-87, 225-26.
51. FRUS, 1950, 1: 225-26.
52. NSC-68 itself only briefly discussed this problem, recommending that "sufficient information regarding the basic political, economic, and military elements of the present situation be made publicly available so that an intelligent popular opinion may be formed." May, ed., American Cold War Strategy, 43.
53. Department of State Bulletin (hereafter DSB), 22 (1950): 272-74, 427-30.
54. For observations on the background to these speeches, see British Embassy, "Weekly Political Summary," 18 March 1950, FO 371 /81611.
55. On the ideological language of NSC-68, see Emily S. Rosenberg, "Commentary," in American Cold War Strategy, ed. May, 160-64.
56. Herter, Memo of Conversation with Acheson, 21 March 1950, Political Files, bMS AM 1829 (c.890), Herter Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University (hereafter HU); FRUS, 1950, 1: 206-9, 2250;
57. DSB, 22 (1950): 673-75, 1038-1039.
58. See also Savage to Nitze, 2 May 1950.
59. For public and private comments by senior officials in this vein, see Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (Columbia, MO, 1980), 98-99, 134;
60. DSB, 23 (1950): 208, 799.
61. See also footnote 69 below.
62. Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1950), 86;
63. Martin Kriesberg, "Public Opinion: Dark Areas of Ignorance," in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, ed. Lester Markel (New York, 1949), 49-64.
64. On the social science debate, see Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus," International Studies Quarterly 36 (December 1992), 441-43.
65. On the State Department's awareness of, and connections with, these authors, see, for instance, Russell to Almond, 29 August 1950, Asst. Secretary of State for PA, Russell Files, subject box 1, RG 59; "Some Notes on Popular Knowledge Concerning Current Foreign Affairs," 22 January 1951, Foster Files, box 20.
66. "Some Notes on Popular Knowledge Concerning Current Foreign Affairs," 22 January 1951, Foster Files, box 20.
67. Russell to Rusk and Nitze, 6 February 1950.
68. Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin," 141-47;
69. Rosenberg, "Commentary," 62.
70. PA, DOPS, 9 March 1950. This comment was made in a Christian Science Monitor review (1 March 1950) of George Kennan's "Is War with Russia Inevitable?" Reader's Digest (March 1950), 1-9, which praised Kennan for offering a "potent antidote" to the fluctuating popular mood.
71. FRUS, 1950, 1: 140-41.
72. "Significance of the H-Bomb, and America's Dilemma," Newsweek, 13 February 1950, p. 20. In the conversation between Acheson and Herter, cited above, the Massachusetts congressman provided further evidence of the belligerent drift of thinking on the Hill. "My last word to him," Herter recorded, "was that I hoped that if Joe Stalin did not come through with his assistance in precipitating crises which would wake up the American people to the situation that he himself would not hesitate to create the crises himself." Acheson did not respond. Herter, Memo of Conversation with Acheson, 21 March 1950.
73. FRUS, 1950, 1: 185-87.
74. On preventive war sentiment at this time, see Russell D. Buhite and Wm. Christopher Hamel, "War for Peace: The Question of an American Preventive War against the Soviet Union, 1945-1955," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 374-75;
75. Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," International Security 13 Winter 1988/89): 20-21.
76. FRUS, 1950, 1: 312-13, 323-24.
77. For the NSRB position, see Thomas G. Lanipher, Memo for Mr. Symington, 17 May 1950, Security Classified Office Files: NSC Folder, box 17, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Papers, RG 304, NAII.
78. DSB, 22 (1950): 673-74;
79. Bernhard, "Clearer Than Truth," 563.
80. DSB, 23 (1950): 378, 615.
81. Senate Appropriations Committee, Defense Appropriations, FY 1951 (Washington, DC, 1950), 73;
82. Poole, The JCS and National Policy, 4: 11-12.
83. Truman, Public Papers, 2 March 1950, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/ publicpapers/index.php.
84. Hooker to Nitze, "Proposed Statement by President Truman," 22 March 1950, PPS Files, subject box 54.
85. Memo for Johnson, 25 April 1950, Safe File, box 139, Louis A. Johnson Papers, University of Virginia. PA, DOPS, 14 and 19 April 1950, and 5 May 1950.
86. Truman, Public Papers, 4 May 1950. For Tydings's comments see British Embassy, "Weekly Political Summary," 29 April and 6 May 1950, FO 371/ 81611.
87. Ernest K. Lindley, "Washington Tides: Is There a Real Danger of War?" Newsweek, May 15, 1950.
88. Truman, Public Papers, 4 and 25 May 1950, and 10 June 1950.
89. Joseph W. Alsop, "I've Seen the Rest of It" (New York, 1992), 301-2.
90. Hogan, Cross of Iron, 305-7.
91. Erasmus H. Kloman, "Notes on Public Relations Working Group Meeting," 11 July 1950, Asst. Secretary of State for PA Files, Records of PRWG, box 1, RG 59.
92. Johnson, "Statement," 25 July 1950, PSF, Speech File, Johnson folder, box 43, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (hereafter HSTL).
93. Alexis Johnson, "Interview with Representative Kruse," 6 July 1950, Asst. Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Files, subject box 2;
94. "Statement by the Secretary of State," 24 July 1950, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Reviews of the World Situation, 1949-1950 (Washington, DC, 1974), 321.
95. Eban Ayers Diary, 25 and 29 June 1950, box 20, Ayers Papers, HSTL; "Truman Calls Senate Leaders to 4th 2-Party Meeting Today," Washington Post, 11 July 1950.
96. Shulman to Barrett, "Secretary's Speech to Newspaper Guild," 28 June 1950, George M. Elsey Papers, box 71.
97. FRUS, 1950, 7: 158, 169-70, 186-87;
98. Edward R. Barrett, Truth Is Our Weapon (New York, 1953), 157.
99. Hardy to Brown, "Collected Statements of the Secretary on Necessity of Strength," 9 August 1950, Russell Files, subject box 10;
100. "Information Objectives for the Rest of 1950," 16 August 1950, PA Files, Numbered Information Memoranda, box 2, RG 59.
101. Acheson, Memo, 14 July 1950, box 66, Acheson Papers, HSTL; James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The JCS and National Policy, 1950-1951. Volume 3: The Korean War (Washington, DC, 1998), 76-84.
102. "Preparation of President's Message to Congress on Korea, 19 July 1950," box 71, Elsey Papers;
103. Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal (New York, 1973), 415;
104. Paul G. Pierpaoli, Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, MO, 1999), 33.
105. Truman, Public Papers, 19 July 1950;
106. Doris M. Condit, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Volume 2: The Test of War, 1950-1953 (Washington, DC, 1988), 227.
107. W. J. McWilliam to Dulles, 20 July 1950, Correspondence File, Barrett folder, box 47, Dulles Papers, Princeton University (hereafter PU).
108. Ronald J. Caridi, The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study (Philadelphia, 1968);
109. David R. Kepley, The Collapse of the Middle Way: Senate Republicans and the Bipartisan Foreign Policy, 1948-1952 (New York, 1988). These accounts of the demise of bipartisanship generally neglect the role played by the issue of mobilization.
110. This was the thrust of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's (R-MA) position, when he called for "an all-out preparedness effort that would know no party line." See "Lodge Closes Rift on Foreign Policy," Washington Post, 16 August 1950.
111. Taft to LeVander, 11 August 1950, War (Korean) Folder, box 924, Taft Papers, LC.
112. A point made by Senator Homer E. Capehart (R-EN). See Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Defence Production Act Hearings (Washington, DC, 1950), 135.
113. Gallup, "Public Would Rather Risk War Than Permit Red Expansion," Washington Post, 4 August 1950;
114. "Published Views on Current Temper of American People," 19 September 1950, Foster Files, box 20.
115. James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican (Boston, 1972), 454-55;
116. Taft, "The Economic Situation Produced by the Korean Crisis," 24 July 1950, box 628, Taft Papers, LC.
117. "15 Republicans Urge Standby Control Setup," Washington Post, 31 July 1950.
118. For the debate in Congress, see Congressional Record, 1950, 11506-11535, 1159102, 11609-11637, 11726-11769, 11830-11868, 12150-12177, 12197-12225, 12397-12412, 12910-11.
119. Pierpaoli, Truman and Korea, 35-36.
120. "Text of GOP Senators' Statement Charging Foreign Policy Bungling in Europe, Asia," New York Times, 14 August 1950;
121. Kepley, Collapse of the Middle Way, 95-97.
122. Nitze to Webb, 14 August 1950, PPS Files, Consultants Folder, box 8.
123. Theodore Tannenwald Diary, 15 August 1950, box 1, Tannenwald Papers, HSTL; Jack McFall, "Material for Answer to Republicans," 15 August 1950, Asst. Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Files, subject box 1.
124. "North Atlantic Union and Related Matters," 14 August 1940, box 67, Acheson Papers.
125. C.B. Marshall, Memo of Conversation with Vorys, 115 July 1950, Asst. Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Files, subject box 2. The day before, Vorys had commented privately that "we could be bled white by a series of incidents like Korea, while the other fellows are arming to the teeth. Some way or other, we have got to have a showdown before they are stronger than we are in atomic weapons, in addition to having superior strength in men and arms." At the same time, however, Vorys also opposed any public talk of using the A-bomb, especially in Korea, lest this encourage the Soviets to launch their own preventive strike. See Vorys to McClellan, 14 July 1950; Vorys to Giovanello, 24 July 1950; Vorys to Slick, 2 August 1950; all in General File, box 29, Vorys Papers, Ohio Historical Society.
126. PA, DOPS, 16 August 1950. For similar sentiments expressed on the floor of the House by Clare E. Hoffman (R-MI), William M. Colmer (D-MS), and Charles E. Potter (R-MI), see Congressional Record, 1950, 11431-32, 11511-12, 11616-17.
127. Arthur Krock, Memo, July 1950, Works and Memoranda Book II, box 1, Arthur Krock Papers, PU. Top Secret Memo, 17 August 1950, box 307, Harriman Papers, LC;
128. "Memo of Conversation between C. B. Marshall and a Person Whose Name Is Withheld," 26 August 1950, PPS Files, State-Defense Relations, box 12.
129. Matthews, "Aggressors for Peace Speech," 25 August 1950, Francis P. Matthews Papers, HSTL. Alsop to Hibbs, 31 August 1950, Special Correspondence folder, box 27, Alsop Papers, LC.
130. The State Department made a vain attempt to get Johnson to renounce in public the notion "that war is inevitable." See Walter K. Schwinn to Russell, 29 August 1950, Russell Files, subject box 5.
131. Truman, Public Papers, 7 September 1950.
132. Ibid., 1 and 9 September 1950. The comment to a reporter was by Elsey;
133. see Win Booth to Don Bermingham, "Prex Week - Speech," 2 September 1950, Dispatches from Time Magazine Correspondents, 1st Series, Folder 601, HU.
134. "Popular Sentiment on the Handling of U.S. Foreign Policy," 20 October 1950;
135. "Popular Attitudes toward Halting Further Communist Aggression," 23 October 1950. Both in Foster Files, box 20.
136. Delia Kuhn to Mr. Phillips and Mr. Micocci, 3 October 1950, Russell Files, subject box 5.
137. For Marshall's views, see "Minutes of Marshall's Press Conference," 27 March 1951, box 206, folder 58, Marshall Papers, VMI, Lexington, Virginia;
138. Poole, The JCS and National Policy, 4: 35.
139. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus, 175-78. The only evidence linking the two events is the recollection by the secretary of the army that Marshall worried about the consequences of "too precipitate an end to the war";
140. see Frank Pace, Oral History Transcript, HSTL.
141. FRUS, 1950, 7: 453-54, 480-81;
142. William W. Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1981), 204-6.
143. "Controls to Stay, Sawyer Declares," New York Times, 24 September 1950;
144. "U.S. Must Keep Up Its Forces Sent to Europe, Bradley Says," Washington Post, 28 September 1950.
145. Truman, Public Papers, 28 September 1950;
146. "Leaders Fear U.S. May Ease Arms Effort," Washington Post, 1 October 1950;
147. "Marshall Reveals a Defense Program of 4 Years or More," New York Times, 6 November 1950.
148. FRUS, 1950, 3: 377, 429-30.
149. For Hoover's comments, see PA, DOPS, 20 October 1950.
150. Symington to Kenneth W. McKellar, 14 September 1950, Classified Office Files: Congressional Correspondence Folder, box 13, RG 304. For observations on the Chicago exercise, see Berkeley Gage to Peter Stephens, 9 October 1950, FO 371/81733.
151. For observations on the Chicago exercise, see Berkeley Gage to Peter Stephens, 9 October 1950, FO 371/81733.
152. Minutes of the 63rd Meeting of the NSC, 29 September 1950, box 3, NSC Papers, RG 73, NAII;
153. Marshall to Nitze, 3 October 1950, PPS Files, subject box 54;
154. Condit, The Test of War, 231-33, 235-37;
155. Hogan, Cross of Iron, 308-10.
156. George M. Elsey, "Memo Concerning the President's Address to the UN," 10 November 1950, Speech File, box 47, Elsey Papers.
157. According to Truman's chief speechwriter, even "the talk about negotiation itself was toned down." See Charles S. Murphy, Memo for Mr. Symington, 23 October 1950, SMOF: Murphy Files, UN Assembly Speech Folder, box 8, HSTL.
158. Republican Party, Minority Policy Committee, "Observations on the Truman Administration's Relations with the People," October 1950, Speech Material, bMS AM 1829 (e.1360), Herter Papers; PA, DOPS, 5 and 6 October 1950.
159. Marshall to Nitze, "Legislative Prospect," 15 November 1950, PPS Files, Congressional Folder, box 8. Some internationalists were even more pessimistic about the likely makeup of the 82d Congress.
160. According to Senator Lodge, there were only "twelve Republican senators, of which he was one, who regard the defense of Western Europe as a matter of urgent priority. There are some 25 to 30 Republican senators who are divided roughly into three schools. The first is bent on economy. The second school of thought would throw our might in the Far Eastern area because it believes that area to be more important than the European area. The third school of thought is for defending the Western Hemisphere and giving up on the policy of arming our allies who can't be trusted anyway." DW [David Wainhouse], "Conversation with Senator Lodge," 11 November 1950, Asst. Secretary for Congressional Relations Files, subject box 1.
161. Nitze to Acheson, 9 October 1950, PPS Files, box 54.
162. Foster to Russell, 10 October 1950, Foster Files, box 20. "Memo on Public Information Concerning NSC-68," 18 October 1950; Russell to J. M. Flanagan, "Memo on Release of NSC-68 as a Public Document," 28 November 1950; both in Russell Files, subject box 6. Other officials also warned against a scare campaign. "The tone of the department's guidance should be one of cool calculations of the problems we face and of the dangers inherent in this particular period," recommended Delia Kuhn of PA. "It should avoid all suggestion of crisis or showdown with the USSR. It should impart a sense of direction and confidence in our ability to see the job through." Kuhn to Phillips and Micocci, 3 October 1950.
163. Minutes, Undersecretaries Meeting, 17 November 1950, PA, National Security Files, subject box 57.
164. Russell to Flanagan, "Memo on Release of NSC-68";
165. Barrett to Nitze, 15 November 1950;
166. Russell to Barrett, 16 November 1950;
167. Notes of Conversation between Russell and Elsey, 21 November 1950; all in Russell Files, subject box 11.
168. Memo of Conversation with the President, 27 November 1950, box 67, Acheson Papers.
169. Handwritten Notes of PPS Meetings, 12 December 1950, PPS Files, Staff Notes of Meetings, box 78.
170. "Notes for the Secretary," 2 December 1950, Acheson Papers, box 67.
171. Meeting of the President with Congressional Leaders, 13 December 1950, Elsey Papers, subject box 73.
172. "Acheson Declares War Risk Is Grave"; "Marshall Warns Nation Is Facing Long Period of Partial Mobilization"; both in New York Times, 30 November 1950. Truman, Public Papers, 15 December 1950.
173. Robert L. Ivie, "Declaring a National Emergency: Truman's Rhetorical Crisis and the Great Debate of 1951," in The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric, ed. Kiewe, 3-5.
174. FRUS, 1950, 1: 423.
175. "Taft Lacks 'Great Confidence' in U.S. Military," Washington Post, 30 December 1950.
176. Pierpaoli, Truman and Korea, 44-45, 49.
177. "Public Confidence in Government Officials Handling Foreign Policy," 9 January 1951, Foster Files, box 20.
178. DSB, 23 (1950), 839-40.
179. "Summary of Meeting," January 18, 1951, Asst. Secretary of State for PA Files, Records of PRWG, box 1.
180. Tracy S. Vorhees, "The Committee on the Present Danger," April 1968, Vorhees Papers, Rutgers University;
181. James Hershberg, James B. Conant (New York, 1993), 491-514;
182. Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis (Boston, 1983), 51-114;
183. Wells, "Sounding the Tocsin," 141-48.
184. Ervine J. Button, Memo for Major George, 15 February 1951, box 197, folder 6, Marshall Papers.
185. See footnote 7 above.
186. According to PA, this was far from an ideal situation. Indeed, having monitored the impact of the State Department's background briefings, PA concluded that only one broadcaster had actually changed his stance. This was CBS's Eric Sevareid, who "may be somewhat quicker to explain the department's position than he was a few months ago." See Russell to Lehrbas, "Examination of Comment by Selected Radio Correspondents," 30 March 1951, Russell Files, subject box 8.
187. Minutes of the 77th Meeting of the NSC, 4 January 1951.
188. Schwinn to John Ferguson, 5 January 1951, PA, Records Relating to NSC, box 3.
189. Marshall to Nitze, 25 January 1951;
190. Robert P. Joyce to Nitze, "NSC-100," 24 January 1951;
191. both in PPS Files, Working Papers: War Aims, box 73. Walsh, "Is It Immoral to Strike First If Attack is Imminent?" Washington Sunday Star, 24 December 1950. Actually, there was no evidence that CPD leaders did support a preventive war;
192. see Hershberg, Conant, 506, 531-33.
193. FRUS, 1951, 1, 7-118;
194. Alsop to Martin Sommers, 15 December 1950, Special Correspondence, box 27, Alsop Papers.
195. "U.S. Can Hit Back," New York Times, 1 January 1951;
196. Meeting with Ed Milne, Paul Martin, and Al Warner, 18 January 1951, box 82, Acheson Papers.
197. "Domestic Public Opinion and the Achievement of National Objectives," 5 June 1951, PA, National Security Files, subject box 57.
198. "Monthly Survey of American Opinion on International Affairs," September 1950 and April 1951, Foster Files, box 12.
199. Horace H. Smith to McFall, 23 August 1950;
200. Ambassador Jessup, Discussion with Senator Pepper, 24 August 1950; both in Asst. Secretary for Congressional Relations Files, subject box 1.