Vertical antitrust policy as a problem of inference

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 23, Issue 7-8, 2005, Pages 639-664

  Cooper, James C ^a,b   Froeb, Luke M ^a,c,d   O'Brien, Dan ^a,c   Vita, Michael G ^a,c  

^a FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   (United States)

^b Office of Policy Planning

^c Bureau of Economics   (United States)

^d VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Inference; Optimal enforcement rule; Vertical antitrust policy

Indexed keywords

INFERENCE; OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT RULE; OPTIMAL POLICY; VERTICAL ANTITRUST POLICY;

DECISION MAKING; LAW ENFORCEMENT; LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

PUBLIC POLICY;

EID: 24644465518     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.04.003     Document Type: Article

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