Special Sciences: Still a flawed argument after all these years

Cognitive Science

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 409-432

  Jones, Todd Edwin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

Fodor; Mental states; Mind body problem; Physical states; Reductionism; Special Sciences

Indexed keywords

EID: 2442699137     PISSN: 03640213     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsci.2003.10.004     Document Type: Article

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