Carl Cohen’s ‘kind’ arguments for animal rights and Against human rights

Journal of Applied Philosophy

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 43-59

  Nobis, Nathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; ANIMAL; ANIMAL EXPERIMENT; ANIMAL RIGHTS; ARTICLE; BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; ETHICS; HUMAN; HUMAN RIGHTS; MORALITY; PERSONHOOD; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; PHILOSOPHY; SPECIES DIFFERENCE; VIVISECTION;

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH;

ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION; ANIMAL RIGHTS; ANIMALS; HUMAN RIGHTS; HUMANS; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; PERSONHOOD; PHILOSOPHY; SPECIES SPECIFICITY; VIVISECTION;

EID: 2442603472     PISSN: 02643758     EISSN: 14685930     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0264-3758.2004.00262.x     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. David DeGrazia repons that Cohen’s arguments against animal rights and in favour of speciesism, not giving animals’ interests even serious (not necessarily equal) consideration and the human utility of vivisection have been ‘much praised by the medical community but severely criticized by philosophers.’
2. DeGrazia (1996) Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 36.
3. R. G. Frey, (2001) Justifying animal experimentation: the starting point in F. Paul and J. Paul (eds.) Why Animal Experimentation Matters: The Use of Animals in Medical Research (London, Transaction Publishers), pp. 197-214.
4. T. Regan (2002) Empty cages: animal rights and vivisection, in Ryder, R., Matfield, M., Derbyshire, D. and Regan, T. Animal Experimentation: Good or Bad? (London, Hodder & Stoughton Educational). Michael Allan Fox provides a similar catalogue of procedures, noting that anaesthesia is often not used.
5. M. A. Fox (1986) The Case for Animal Experimentation: An Evolutionary and Ethical Perspectives (Berkeley, University of California Press), p. 97.
6. D. DeGrazia (1999) The ethics of animal research: what are the prospects for agreement? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 8, pp. 23-34.
7. [4J C. Cohen (1986). The case for the use of animals in biomedical research, The New England Journal of Medicine, 315, 14, October 2, pp. 865-870, p. 865.
8. [6J Cohen (2001), p. 22
9. C. Cohen and T. Regan (2001) The Animal Rights Debate (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield).
10. T. Regan, pp. 19-20, footnote 1, in Cohen, C. and Regan, T. (2001) op. cit. Emphasis mine.
11. A. Taylor (2003) Ethics and Animals (Calgary, Broadview Press), pp. 134-135.
12. Cohen, C. (1986) Ethics and Animals (Calgary, Broadview Press) p. 866;
13. C. Cohen (1997) Do animals have rights? Ethics & Behavior, 7, 2, 91-102, pp. 94-98;
14. Cohen, C. (2001) Do animals have rights? Ethics & Behavior, 7, 2, pp. 30-40. Cohen’s arguments are quite similar in all his writings: more recent discussions are not more developed.
15. Cohen, C. (2001) Do animals have rights? Ethics & Behavior, 7, 2, pp. 30-40. DeGrazia repons that Cohen ‘never really argues that humans have rights, instead [he relies on] appealing to the authority of philosophical tradition’ to suppon his claim that humans have rights.
16. D. DeGrazia (2003) Review of Cohen, Carl and Regan, Tom. The Animal Rights Debate, Ethics 113, 3, pp. 692-695, p. 692.
17. R. Scruton (2000) Animal Rights and Wrongs (London, Demos), p. 55.
18. J. Rachels (1990) Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 186-187.
19. A. White (1984) Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
20. T. Regan and P. Singer (1989) Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall), pp. 119-121, p. 120. Emphasis mine.
21. Cohen (2001) Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall) p. 37.
22. C. Cohen (2001) The moral inequality of species: why ‘speciesism’ is right, pp. 59-68
23. Cohen, C. and Regan, T. (2001) The moral inequality of species: why ‘speciesism’ is right, pp. 59-68
24. Rachels, J. (1990) The moral inequality of species: why ‘speciesism’ is right, pp. 173-174, 187.
25. M. A. Fox (1987) Animal experimentation: a philosopher’s changing views’ Between the Species 3, 55-60, 75, 80, 82.
26. D. Schmidtz (1998) Are all species equal? Journal of Applied Philosophy 15, 1, pp. 57-76, p. 61.
27. L. P. Francis and R. Norman (1978) Some animals are more equal than others Philosophy 53, pp. 507-527, p. 518.
28. R. WENNBERG (2003) God, Humans and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans Publishing), p. 120.
29. Cohen (1986) God, Humans and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans Publishing), p. 865.
30. Cohen (1997) God, Humans and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans Publishing), p. 95.
31. Regan (2001) God, Humans and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans Publishing), p. 95.
32. C. Cohen and T. Regain, God, Humans and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans Publishing), 74-275.
33. Cohen, p. 29 in Cohen and Regan, God, Humans and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe. Cohen advocates the humane treatment of animals and sees this obligation as a direct duty to animals because they are sentient.
34. Regan, pp. 283-284 in Cohen and Regan, God, Humans and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe.
35. Cohen (2001), p. 37
36. Cohen (1986) God, Humans and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe, p. 866.
37. Cohen (1997) God, Humans and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge our Moral Universe, p. 97. Emphases mine.
38. P. Carruthers (1992) The Animals Issue (New York, Cambridge University Press).
39. S. Wilson (2001) Carruthers and the argument from marginal cases, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 18, 2, pp. 135-147
40. Wennberg Carruthers and the argument from marginal cases, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 18, 2, pp. 132-137. Tibor Machan claims, for Cohen-esque reasons, that humans’ use of animals is permissible because doing so makes ‘the best use of nature for our success in living our lives.’
41. T. Machan (2002) Why human beings may use animals. Journal of Value Inquiry, 36, 1, pp. 9-14, p. 11.
42. E. F. Paul and J. Paul (eds.), Why human beings may use animals. Journal of Value Inquiry, 36, 1, pp. 9-14. (see Note [2] above), but their attempts fail.
43. N. Nobis. So why does animal experimentation matter? review of Ellen Franken Paul and Jeffrey Paul (eds.) Why Animal Experimentation Matters: The Use of Animals in Medical Research, American Journal of Bioethics 3, 1 (available only online at www.bioethics.net).
44. M. Engel (2001) The mere considerabilitv of animals, Acta Analytica, 16, pp. 89-108.
45. Cohen, p. 52 in Cohen and Regan, op. cit.
46. C. Fink (1991) Animal experimentation and the argument from limited resources, Between the Species, Spring 90-96.
47. C. Greek and J. GREEK (2000) Sacred Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experiments on Animals (New York, Continuum).
48. T. R. Gregory (2000) The failure of traditional arguments in the vivisection debate, Public Affairs Quarterly 14, 2, pp. 159-182;
49. S. Kaufman (1995) Does vivisection pass the utilitarian test? Public Affairs Quarterly 9, pp. 127-137;
50. H. LaFollette and N. Shanks (1998) Utilitarian assessment of animal experimentation in M. Bekoff (ed.) Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare (Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press);
51. H. LaFollette and N. Shanks (1995) Utilizing animals. Journal of Applied Philosophy 12, pp. 13-25;
52. H. LaFollette and N. SHANKS (1996) Brute Science: Dilemmas of Animal Experimentation (New York, Routedge);
53. Regan, T. (2002) Brute Science: Dilemmas of Animal Experimentation (New York, Routedge)
54. Trulie Ankerberg-Nobis, Andy Cullison, Mylan Engel, David Jehle, Steve Kershnar, Ben Margolis, Rebekka Puderbaugh, and Mark Rowlands for helpful suggestions.