The modal argument for hypercomputing minds

Theoretical Computer Science

Volumn 317, Issue 1-3, 2004, Pages 167-190

  Bringsjord, Selmer ^a   Arkoudas, Konstantine ^a  

^a Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

Computationalism; Hypercomputation; Incompleteness theorems

Indexed keywords

COGNITIVE SYSTEMS; COMPUTATION THEORY; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; THEOREM PROVING; TURING MACHINES;

COMPUTATIONALISM; HYPERCOMPUTATION; INCOMPLETENESS THEOREMS;

COMPUTER SCIENCE;

EID: 2442549794     PISSN: 03043975     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2003.12.010     Document Type: Conference Paper

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