Why Gödel's theorem cannot refute computationalism

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 104, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 265-286

  LaForte, Geoffrey ^b   Hayes, Patrick J ^b   Ford, Kenneth M ^a,b  

^a NASA AMES RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

^b INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN AND MACHINE COGNITION   (United States)

Author keywords

Computationalism; G del; Truth

Indexed keywords

COMPUTABILITY AND DECIDABILITY; THEOREM PROVING;

COMPUTATIONALISM; GODEL THEOREM;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 0032156178     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0004-3702(98)00052-6     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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5. D. Lewis, Lucas against mechanism II, Canad. J. Philos. 9 (1989) 373-376.
6. J.R. Lucas, Minds, machines, and Gödel, Philosophy 36 (1961) 120-124.
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8. R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994.
9. R. Penrose, Discussion of Shadows of the Mind, Psyche 2 (23) (1996); on-line filename: psyche-96-2-23-shadows-10-penrose.
10. H. Putnam, Review of Shadows of the Mind, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 32 (1995) 370-373.