Economic principles of sustainable multi-use fisheries management, with a case history economic model for Pacific halibut

American Fisheries Society Symposium

Volumn 2004, Issue 43, 2004, Pages 143-171

  Criddle, Keith R ^a  

^a UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HIPPOGLOSSUS STENOLEPIS;

EID: 24344505924     PISSN: 08922284     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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