Agent-based simulation model on pool-based electricity market using locational marginal price

Zhongguo Dianji Gongcheng Xuebao/Proceedings of the Chinese Society of Electrical Engineering

Volumn 25, Issue 15, 2005, Pages 7-11

  Zou, Bin ^a   Li, Qing Hua ^a   Yan, Mao Song ^b  

^a JIANGNAN UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Agent based simulation; Bid strategy; Electricity auction; Locational marginal price; Reinforcement learning

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; COSTS; ELECTRIC LINES; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; LEARNING ALGORITHMS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

AGENT BASED SIMULATION; BID STRATEGY; ELECTRICITY AUCTION; LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICE; REINFORCEMENT LEARNING;

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;

EID: 24344470999     PISSN: 02588013     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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