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Volumn 89, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 134-140

Erratum: "The uniform price auction with endogenous supply" (Economics Letters (2005) vol. 88 (152-158) 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.004)

Author keywords

Consistency; Endogenous supply; Proportional rationing

Indexed keywords


EID: 24344467364     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.06.011     Document Type: Erratum
Times cited : (3)

References (11)
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  • 2
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    • Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
    • K. Back J.F. Zender Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply Economics Letters 73 2001 29-34
    • (2001) Economics Letters , vol.73 , pp. 29-34
    • Back, K.1    Zender, J.F.2
  • 4
    • 20444433890 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why don't IPO firms disclose a reservation price?
    • Manuscript, University of Western Ontario, Canada
    • Brisley, N., Busaba, W.Y., 2003. Why don't IPO firms disclose a reservation price? Manuscript, University of Western Ontario, Canada.
    • (2003)
    • Brisley, N.1    Busaba, W.Y.2
  • 5
    • 24344444302 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Second time lucky? Underwriter switching and the performance of withdrawn IPOs that return to the market
    • Manuscript, University of Western Ontario, Canada
    • Dunbar, C., Foerster, S., 2002. Second time lucky? Underwriter switching and the performance of withdrawn IPOs that return to the market. Manuscript, University of Western Ontario, Canada.
    • (2002)
    • Dunbar, C.1    Foerster, S.2
  • 6
    • 0035647217 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Should the Treasury price discriminate? A procedure for computing hypothetical bid functions
    • D. Heller Y. Lengwiler Should the Treasury price discriminate? A procedure for computing hypothetical bid functions Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 157 2001 413-429
    • (2001) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , vol.157 , pp. 413-429
    • Heller, D.1    Lengwiler, Y.2
  • 7
    • 2442715114 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Divisible-good auctions: The role of allocation rules
    • I. Kremer K. Nyborg Divisible-good auctions: The role of allocation rules RAND Journal of Economics 35 2004 147-159
    • (2004) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.35 , pp. 147-159
    • Kremer, I.1    Nyborg, K.2
  • 8
    • 0040532592 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Collusive seeming equilibria in the uniform price auction
    • Manuscript. Stanford University
    • McAdams, D., 2000. Collusive seeming equilibria in the uniform price auction. Manuscript. Stanford University.
    • (2000)
    • McAdams, D.1
  • 9
    • 0036245661 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bidder behavior in multi-unit auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury auctions
    • K. Nyborg K. Rydqvist S. Sundarcsan Bidder behavior in multi-unit auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury auctions Journal of Political Economy 110 2002 394-424
    • (2002) Journal of Political Economy , vol.110 , pp. 394-424
    • Nyborg, K.1    Rydqvist, K.2    Sundarcsan, S.3
  • 10
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    • An empirical study of the Mexican T-bill auction
    • S.R. Umlauf An empirical study of the Mexican T-bill auction Journal of Financial Economics 33 1993 313-340
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    • Umlauf, S.R.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.