A computational analysis of the Needham-Schroeder-(Lowe) protocol

Journal of Computer Security

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 565-591

  Warinschi, Bogdan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Cryptography; Needham Schroeder; Protocol analysis

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; CRYPTOGRAPHY; SECURITY OF DATA;

COMPUTATIONAL ANALYSIS; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS; NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER; PROTOCOL ANALYSIS;

NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

EID: 24144469346     PISSN: 0926227X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3233/JCS-2005-13307     Document Type: Conference Paper

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