Macroeconomic shocks and banking supervision

Journal of Financial Stability

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 93-110

  Rochet, Jean Charles ^a  

^a TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Capital requirements; Lender of last resort; Macro prudential supervision

Indexed keywords

EID: 24144468893     PISSN: 15723089     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2004.06.004     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. D'Amato, L., Grubisik, E., Powell, A., 1998. Contagion, Banks Fundamentals or Macroeconomic Shocks. Bank of Argentina (discussion paper).
2. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1988. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Basel, Switzerland.
3. Besanko, D., Kanatas, G., 1996. The regulation of bank capital: do capital standards promote bank safety? J. Financial Intermediation 5 (4), 160-183.
4. Blum, J., 1999. Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risk in banking? J. Banking Finance 23 (5), 755-771.
5. Blum, J., Hellwig, M., 1995. The macroeconomic implications of capital adequacy requirements for banks. Eur. Econ. Rev. 39, 739-749.
6. Boot, A., Greenbaum, S., 1993. Bank regulation, reputation and rents: theory and policy implications. In: Mayer, C., Vives, X. (Eds.), Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation, Cambridge University Press.
7. Calomiris, C., 1998. Blueprints for a New Global Financial Architecture, http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/blueprint.htm.
8. Calomiris, C., 1999. Building and incentive-compatible safety net. J. Banking Finance 23, 1499-1519.
9. Caminal, R., Matutes, C., 2002. Market power and banking failures. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 20 (9), 1341-1361.
10. Cook, D.O., Spellman, L.J., 1996. Firm and guarantor risk, risk contagion and the interfirm spread among insured deposits. J. Financial Quant. Anal. 31 (2), 265-281.
11. Cull, R., 1998. The Effect of Deposit Insurance on Financial Depth: A Cross-Country Analysis. The World Bank, working paper series 1875.
12. Degryse, H., Van Cayseele, P., 2000. Relationship lending within a bank-based system: evidence from european small business date. J. Financial Intermediation 9 (1), 90-109.
13. Demirgüc-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E., 1997. The Determinants of Banking Crises: Evidence form Developed and Developing Countries. Policy Research Working Paper 1828. The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.
14. Dewatripont, M., Maskin, E., 1995. Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies. Rev. Econ. Stud. 62, 541-555.
15. Dewatripont, M., Tirole, J., 1994. The Prudential Regulation of Banks. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA.
16. Diamond, D., 1984. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Rev. Econ. Stud. 51, 393-414.
17. Ellis, D., Flannery, M., 1992. Does the debt market assess large banks' risk? J. Monetary Econ. 30 (3), 481-502.
18. Evanoff, D., 1993. Preferred sources of market discipline. Yale J. Regul. 10, 347-367.
19. Flannery, M.J., 1998. Using market information in prudential bank supervision: a review of the US empirical evidence. J. Money Credit Banking 30, 273-305.
20. Flannery, M.J., Sorescu, S.M., 1996. Evidence of bank market discipline in subordinated debenture yields: 1983-1992. J. Finance 51 (4), 1347-1377.
21. Freixas, X., Parigi, B., Rochet, J.C., 2000. Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank. J. Money Credit Banking 3 (2), 611-638.
22. Furfine, C., 2000. Evidence on the Response of US Banks to Changes Capital Requirements. BIS Working Paper 88, Basel, Switzerland.
23. Furlong, F., Keeley, M., 1989. Bank capital regulation and risk taking: a note. J. Banking Finance 13 (6), 883-891.
24. Gorton, G., Santomero, A., 1990. Market discipline and bank subordinated debt. J. Money Credit Banking 22 (1), 119-128.
25. Hannan, T.H., Hanweck, G.A., 1988. Bank insolvency risk and the market for large certificates of deposit. J. Money Credit Banking 20, 203-211.
26. Hellman, T.F., Murdock, K.C., Stiglitz, J.E., 2000. Liberalization moral hazard in banking, and prudential regulation: are capital requirements enough? Am. Econ. Rev. 90 (1), 147-165.
27. Holmström, B., Tirole, J., 1997. Financial intermediation, loanable funds and the real sector. Quart. J. Econ. 112, 663-691.
28. Holmström, B., Tirole, J., 1998. Private and public supply of liquidity. J. Political Econ. 106, 1-40.
29. Jones, D., 2000. Emerging problems with the basel capital accord: regulatory capital arbitrage and related issues. J. Banking Finance 21 (4), 491-507.
30. Kim, D., Santomero, A., 1988. Risk in banking and capital regulation. J. Finance 43, 1219-1233.
31. Lindgren, C., Garcia, G., Saal, M., 1996. Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy. Washington, DC, USA.
32. Martinez Peria, M.S., Schmukler, S.L., 2001. Do depositors punish banks for "bad" behavior? Market discipline, deposit insurance and banking crises. J. Finance 56 (3), 1029-1051.
33. Milne, A., Whalley, E., 1998. Bank Capital Regulation and Incentives for Risk Taking. City University Business School, London, UK (discussion paper).
34. Park, S., Peristiani, S., 1998. Market discipline by thrift depositors. J. Money Credit Banking 26, 439-459.
35. Rochet, J.C., 1992. Capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks. Eur. Econ. Rev. 36, 1137-1178.
36. Rochet, J.C., Tirole, J., 1996. Interbank lending and systemic risk. J. Money Credit Banking 28 (4), 733-762.
37. Sharpe, S., 1990. Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: a stylized model of customer relationships. J. Finance 45, 1069-1085.
38. Sironi, A., 2000. An analysis of european bank snd issues and its implications for the design of a mandatory subordinated debt policy. J. Financial Services Res. 19, 233-266.
39. Solow, R., 1982. On the lender of last resort. In: Kindleberger, C.P., Laffarge, J.P. (Eds.), Financial Crises: Theory, History and Policy. Cambridge University Press, pp. 237-248.
40. Wall, L.D., 1989. A plan for reducing future deposit insurance losses: puttable subordinated debt. Econ. Rev., 2-17.