Bargaining in environmental regulation revisited

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 422-433

  Arguedas, Carmen ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD EUROPEA DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Environmental standards; Environmental technologies; Non compliance

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING; FEES AND CHARGES; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE;

BARGAINING; ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS; ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES; NON-COMPLIANCE;

CODES (STANDARDS);

BARGAINING; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; REGULATORY APPROACH;

EID: 23944477940     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2004.11.003     Document Type: Article

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