The UN's unnecessary crisis

Survival

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 7-32

  Berdal, Mats ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 23844513094     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00396330500248003     Document Type: Review

References (125)

1. Kofi Annan, Address to General Assembly, 23 September 2003.
2. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (henceforth HLP) (New York: United Nations, 2004), p. 90.
3. In addition to the resignation of Ruud Lubbers as high commissioner for refugees in February, following allegations of sexual harassment, the first half of 2005 has also seen a number of high-level departures from the Secretariat in New York. These followed the replacement in early January of Iqbal Riza as chef de cabinet by Mark Malloch Brown. Since his arrival on the 38th floor, Malloch Brown, formerly United Nations Development Program administrator, has assumed an unusually high public profile, at times eclipsing that of the Secretary-General, and clearly generating a high level of friction within the higher echelons of the organisation. While Riza's departure had been agreed with the Secretary-General some time ago, two other high-level departures evidently were not: Kieran Prendergast, under-secretary-general for political affairs, and Elizabeth Lindenmayer, deputy chef de cabinet and one of Annan's longest serving and most loyal aides until her sudden resignation in February 2005. Both departures were messy and badly managed, with Prendergast's departure leaving the Department of Political Affairs profoundly demoralised and in a state of drift. For his part, Malloch Brown recently observed that 'the place [the Secretariat] is entirely like revolutionary France, where the level of backstabbing and betrayal would make Shakespeare wince'. Quoted in 'UN backstabbing would make Shakespeare wince, says Annan aide', Sunday Times, 19 June 2005.
4. The Millennium Declaration committed member states to a series of goals - the Millennium Development Goals - in an effort to stimulate development and substantially reduce world poverty by 2015. The UN Millennium Project, an advisory body led by Jeffery Sachs, presented its 'blueprint' for the implementation of the goals to Kofi Annan in January 2005. See 'Investing in Development', http://www.unmillenniumproject.org.
5. Kofi Annan, '"In Larger Freedom": Decision Time at the UN', Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, no. 3, May/June 2005, pp. 63-75.
6. I b i d.
7. 'In Larger Freedom: towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All', http:/www.un.org/largerfreedom. The report expands most notably on the panel in the area of human rights, rule of law and democracy with a separate section entitled 'Freedom to live in Dignity'.
8. 'In Larger Freedom', p. 55;
9. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, 2nd ed. (London: The Free Press/Simon and Schuster, 2004), p. 264.
10. In announcing the creation of the High Level Panel, Kofi Annan expressed his 'hope' that the work of the panel would result in 'far-reaching institutional reforms'. Annan, Address to General Assembly, 23 September 2003.
11. I b i d.
12. 4 would have liked two African candidates to join the group, agreement among African countries on suitable candidates has so far proved elusive. At the African Union (AU) summit in Libya on 3-5 July 2005, African leaders again failed to agree on which two African candidates should be put forward for permanent seats.
13. 'Statement by Ambassador Günter Pleuger', 7 April 2005, http:// www.germany-un.org/archive/speeches/2005/sp_04_07_05.html.
14. Japan's contribution to the regular UN budget is close to 20%, making it the second largest contributor after the United States, with Germany in third place accounting for over 8.5%.
15. For a compelling case of why council reform is unlikely to succeed, see Edward Luck, 'Rediscovering the Security Council: The High-Level Panel and Beyond', in Reforming the United Nations for Peace and Security, Proceedings of a Workshop on UN Reform Yale Centre for the Study of Globalization, March 2005. Luck persuasively shows that 'those calling for substantial reform' of the Security Council have yet to 'clarify both their diagnosis of what is wrong with the Council today and how their favoured reforms would remedy these failings' (p. 128).
16. James S. Sutterlin, 'Some Thoughts - Mostly Cautionary - on the Recommendations of the HLP', in Reforming the UN for Peace and Security, p. 180.
17. See 'If 22 Million Chinese Prevail at UN, Japan Won't', New York Times, 1 April 2005;
18. 'China Pushing and Scripting Japanese Protests', New York Times, 15 April 2005;
19. and 'China Fights Enlarging Security Council', Washington Post, 5 April 2005.
20. 'The Passion Sours for Latin America's "Romeo and Juliet"', Financial Times, 7 May 2005.
21. David Malone, rather less charitably, has observed that substantive issues regarding the workings of the Security Council have been 'largely obscured in an orgy of influence-peddling and self-serving posturing dressed up in claims of moral rectitude and the common good of the membership'. David Malone, 'The High Level Panel and the Security Council', Security Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 3, September 2005 (forthcoming).
22. Position Paper on Security Council Reform - 'United for Consensus', 16 February 2005, http://www.un.int/mexico/2005/declaracion_021805ing.htm.
23. See also http://www.italyun.org/docs/italyun/ufc.htm.
24. A set of proposals was put forward in 1997 by then-President of the General Assembly Razali Ismail. In brief, the Razali Plan envisaged five new permanent members without veto power and four new non-permanent members. For details see Sam Daws and Sydney Bailey, The Procedure of the Security Council, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 385-90.
25. Statement by Ambassador Enrique Berruga (Mexico), General Assembly, 8 April 2005, http://www.un.int/mexico/2005/interv_040805ing. htm.
26. Private interviews, May/June 2005. See also, 'Payback for Germany in Wrangle over UN Top Seat', The Times, 17 June 2005.
27. See 'Uniting for Consensus', 11 April 2005, http://www.italyun.org/docs/ italyun/ufc.htm.
28. For an excellent assessment of possible consequences of enlargement along these lines, see Edward Luck, 'The UN Security Council: Reform or Enlarge?', conference paper, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Ontario, April 2005.
29. For specific details of how progress may be achieved in this area see 'non-paper' prepared by Edward Luck for the Swiss Government and its Permanent Mission to the UN, 'Reforming the Security Council - Step One: Improving Working methods', 25 April 2005.
30. Annan, Address to General Assembly, 23 September 2003.
31. I b i d.
32. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.
33. See Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (London and New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004);
34. Evgenia Peretz, David Rose and David Wise, 'The Path to War', Vanity Fair, May 2005;
35. and James Fallows, 'Blind into Baghdad', The Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004.
36. See The White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002.
37. 'War on Terrorism at the Top of White House Priorities', Financial Times, 8 February 2005;
38. 'Budget Message of the President', 7 February 2005, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/message.html.
39. The budget request proposes a 4.8% increase in defence spending and an 8% increase in spending for homeland security. See The White House, 'FYo6 Budget Priorities', http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/ protecting.html.
40. 'Guantanamo Bay trials unfair, says Attorney General', Daily Telegraph, 26 June 2004.
41. See also debate in UK Parliament in January 2005 following the return of four British detainees from Guantanamo, http:// www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmhansrd/cm050111/debindx/ 50111-x.htm.
42. Steven E. Miller, 'Terrifying Thoughts: Power, Order, and Terror after 9/ 11', Global Governance, vol. 11, 2005, p. 253.
43. Ibid., p. 270.
44. Miller's excellent and sobering review article provides a powerful corrective to those who have sought to downplay the lasting impact of 11 September on US strategic policy. He suggests persuasively that Richard Perle and David Frum's An End to Evil - usually dismissed in Europe as a neo-conservative rant - provides the true 'key' to understanding US policy 'in the recent past, immediate future ... if not longer'. Richard Perle and David Frum, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror (New York: Ballantine Books, 2004).
45. David Malone and Lotta Hagman, 'The North-South Divide at the United Nations: Fading at Last?', Security Dialogue, vol. 33, no. 4, December 2002, p. 399. As Malone has noted elsewhere, the North-South divide at the UN may be 'anachronistic' but 'trade off[s] across [the divide] characterize many interactions of member states at the UN'. Malone, 'The High Level Panel and the Security Council'.
46. 'Remarks by the Permanent Representative of India, 9 December, 2004', http://www.un.int/india/ind1040.pdf.
47. For a similar emphasis on development issues in responding to the panel, see also 'Ambassador Enrique Berruga Filloy (Mexico), informal session on the HLP, 59th UNGA, 24 February 2005', http://www.un.int/mexico/2005/ interv_012405ing.htm;
48. and 'Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, (Brazil), informal session on the HLP, 59th UNGA, 23 February 2005', http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/ 005d-rms-agnu-Millenniun%20Project2302.htm.
49. Muchkund Dubey, 'Comments on the HLP', Reforming the UN for Peace and Security, pp. 56-7.
50. See 'Final Document of the XIII Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement Kuala Lumpur, 24-25 February 2003', ch. 1, para. 5, http://www.nam.gov.za/media/030227e.htm;
51. and the declaration issued on 13 June 2005 following the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the NAM in Doha, Qatar, http:// www.un.int/Malaysia/NAM/dec13062005.htm.
52. Kanti Bajpai, 'Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice', in Rosemary Foot, John Lewis Gaddis and Andrew Hurrell (eds), Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 259.
53. Mohammed Ayoob, 'What Transatlantic Crisis?', International Herald Tribune, 24 February 2005.
54. I b i d.
55. The argument is developed more fully in Mohammed Ayoob and Matthew Zierler, 'The Unipolar Concert: The North-South Divide Trumps Transatlantic Differences', World Policy Journal, vol. 22, no. 1, spring 2005, pp. 31-42.
56. For a most useful overview of African perspectives on the panel, echoing the aforementioned concerns of developing countries, see A More Secure Continent: African Perspectives on the UN High-Level Report, Seminar Report, Centre for Conflict Resolution. University of Cape Town, 23-24 April 2005.
57. HLP, p. 7.
58. Kofi Annan, Address to General Assembly, 23 September 2003.
59. Michael J. Glennon, 'Idealism at the UN', Policy Review, no. 129, February-March 2005, p. 1.
60. Inis L. Claude Jr, 'The New International Security Order: Changing Concepts', Naval War College Review, vol. 47, no. 1, winter 1994, p. 12.
61. HLP, pp. 7-8.
62. Ibid., p. 24.
63. Ibid., p. 51.
64. Ibid., p. 52.
65. I b i d.
66. Luck, 'Rediscovering the Security Council', p. 128.
67. HLP, p. 10.
68. Ibid., p. 18.
69. Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
70. HLP, p. 68.
71. Our Global Neighbourhood, p. 222. For those interested in pursuing the comparison further, see the relevant sections in each report dealing with the threat posed by WMD. The Commission on Global Governance called on the 'international community' to 'initiate a programme' that would make the goal of eliminating 'nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from all nations ... a reality in ten to fifteen years' (p. 115).
72. HLP, p. 61.
73. Ibid., p. 10.
74. Ibid., p. 53.
75. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
76. Talk of a 'single grand bargain' to be struck in September persists in much of the media. See 'Under Fire: the UN struggles to meet the challenges of a changes world', Financial Times, 6 June 2005.
77. HLP, p. 8.
78. Ibid., pp. 15-17.
79. 'Statement by Ambassador Stafford Neil (representing G77) on HLP', 27 January 2005, http://www.g77.org/Speeches/012705.htm.
80. HLP, p. 16.
81. For discussion of the connections between poverty and war, see Morris Miller, 'Poverty as a Cause of Wars?', Interdisciplinary Science Review, vol. 25, no. 4, 2000, pp. 273-96.
82. HLP, p. 27.
83. HLP, pp. 34-6.
84. For a succinct account of the ever more apparent weaknesses of the existing non-proliferation regime, echoing many of the findings of the panel, see Strategic Survey 2004-05 (Abingdon: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), pp. 37-50.
85. HLP, pp. 45-6.
86. For an assessment of the threat from transnational organised crime is evolving, see Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano (eds), Business as Usual? Transnational Organised Crime and International Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, June 2002).
87. See HLP, p. 26.
88. Ibid. p. 10.
89. Ibid, p. 8
90. Ibid, p. 34.
91. See An Agenda for Peace, June 1992.
92. Ibid., p. 65.
93. For further discussion see 'Discussion Paper on the HLP: Recommendation to Establish a Peacebuilding Commission', Center on International Cooperation, NYU, January 2005; and Sutterlin, 'Thoughts on the Recommendations of the HLP', p. 5.
94. 'In Large Freedom', para. 115.
95. HLP, p. 73. Even these proposals have met with resistance as China, for reasons unclear, has expressed 'serious reservations on the abolition of the Military Staff Committee'.
96. See 'Ambassador Wang Guangya on Cluster IV of the Secretary-General's comprehensive report at GA 59th Session (27 April 2005)', http:// www.china-un.org/eng/xw/t193602.htm.
97. James Fearon, 'Comments on the Report of the HLP', Reforming the UN for Peace and Security, March 2005, p. 103.
98. These are followed by Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal and Nigeria. The figures include military observers and police in addition to regular troops. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/data/pktp05.htm.
99. Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305-S/2000/809).
100. HLP, para. 218. The value of drawing upon these mechanisms was one of lessons to emerge from the UN deployment to Liberia in 2003-04.
101. See Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, DPKO, Lessons Learned Study on the Start-Up Phase of the UN Mission in Liberia (New York: United Nations, 2004).
102. HLP, para. 227.
103. HLP, para.271.
104. Interviews, Brussels, 6 June 2005. NATO's Allied Movement Coordination Center (AMCC) is ideally suited for managing such operations, a fact that so far has not weighed heavily in French and Belgium calculations.
105. HLP para. 101.
106. For a good overview of the challenges facing especially the DPA, see Bill Durch, 'Strengthening the UN Secretariat Capacity for Civilian Post-Conflict Response', prepared for the Centre on International Cooperation, NYU, June 2004.
107. HLP, para. 101.
108. I b i d.
109. For support to the proposal for a Peacebuilding Commission, see 'Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary of the General Assembly of September 2005 Submitted by the President of the General Assembly', 8 June 2005, UN document A/59/HLPM/CRP. 1.
110. 'In Larger Freedom', para. 11.
111. Ibid., para. 10.
112. For a view along those lines see Perle and Frum, An End to Evil, pp. 229-34.
113. 'Love at Second Sight', The Economist, 26 March 2005,
114. and Kim Holmes, 'Why Multilateral Orgnizations are Important to the US', 1 March 2005, http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/43137.htm.
115. See Holmes, 'Why the United Nations Matters to US Foreign Policy'; and Statement by Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli senior advisor to the secretary of state on UN reform, the Secretary-General General's Report on UN Reform, in the General Assembly, April 7, 2005 posted in full at http://www.un.int/usa/05_063.htm.
116. 'US Weighs going to UN Council on North Korea', International Herald Tribune, 6 June 2005.
117. Miler, 'Terrifying Thoughts, pp. 248-9.
118. 'Hyde Introduces UN Reform Legislation', http://www.house.gov/ international_relations/109/news06075.htm.
119. The analogy drawn to Paul Wolfowitz's World Bank appointment seems to me misplaced, as Bolton's record reveals a far more consistent, long-standing and unremitting pattern of hostility towards the UN. The best guide to Bolton's views on the UN and its proper place in US foreign policy is probably his 'The Creation, Fall, Rise, and Fall of the United Nations'in Ted Carpenter (ed), Delusions of Grandeur: the UN and Global Intervention (Washington DC: CATO Institute, 1997).
120. Dubey, 'Comments on the HLP', p. 65.
121. See note 37 and also views expressed by the G77 as a whole, South Africa and China, the latter associating itself with the official G77 position. 'Ambassador Stafford Neil (Jamaica), Chairman G77, Informal Meeting on the HLP, 27 January 2005, UNGA 59th Session', http://www.G77.Org/ Speeches/012705.htm;
122. 'Statement by Xolisa Mabhongo (South Africa) on the HLP, 22 February 2005', http://www.southafrica-newyork.net/pmun/;
123. 'Statement by Wang Guangya on the HLP, Informal Consultations of UNGA 59th Session',http://www.china-un.org/eng/xw/t184368.htm; interviews, May/June 2005.
124. Daws and Bailey, The Procedure of the Security Council, pp. 321-32.
125. UN Charter, Article 97.