Poverty as a cause of wars?

Interdisciplinary Science Reviews

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 273-297

  Miller, Morris ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA   (Canada)

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EID: 0042724882     PISSN: 03080188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1179/030801800679314     Document Type: Article

References (89)

1. Mahatma Gandhi, as quoted in J. C. KAPUR: 'Towards a new human order', Man & Development, (New Delhi), 1998, (12).
2. M. BERDAL and D. MALONE, (ed.): 'Greed and grievance: economic agendas in civil wars'; 2000, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre.
3. 'Significant' is a rather vague magnitude. We are here characterising 'war' according to the definition suggested by the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI): 'prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organised armed group, and incurring battle related deaths of at least 1000 people for the duration of the conflict'. The Correlates of War project defines war as 'sustained combat involving regular armed forces of two or more sovereign states and leading to at least 1000 battle fatalities among combatant personnel'. The scale and character of such armed conflicts would exclude sporadic activities related to terrorism, armed insurrections, localised riots, and, as well, civil wars that are revolutionary in intent and of short duration though, possibly, intensely violent.
4. As counted by Ruth Leger Sivard in her annual reports, 'World military and social expenditures', for the SIPRI yearbook and by Donald Kagan in his book 'On the origins of war and the preservation of peace' (Doubleday, 1995). The commentary is that of Ruben Mendez in his essay 'Peace as a global public good', in 'Global public goods: international cooperation in the 21st century', (ed. I. Kaul et al.), 404; 1999, New York, NY/Oxford, Oxford University Press. The exaggeration is evident in considering that, as COR studies show, 'more than half the nations have never participated in large-scale wars while a few have had a high propensity to become involved in wars, particularly the major powers that in the 150 year period from 1816 to 1965 were almost seven times more likely to be so engaged than were the others.' For statistical details, see 'The correlates of war II: an interim summary and evaluation', pp. 289-292. By the World Bank's tally in 1999 there were twenty-seven conflicts of which twenty-five were internal and in the decade of the 1990s there were thirty-nine major conflicts, each of which took a toll of more than a thousand deaths in any one year.
5. As counted by Ruth Leger Sivard in her annual reports, 'World military and social expenditures', for the SIPRI yearbook and by Donald Kagan in his book 'On the origins of war and the preservation of peace' (Doubleday, 1995). The commentary is that of Ruben Mendez in his essay 'Peace as a global public good', in 'Global public goods: international cooperation in the 21st century', (ed. I. Kaul et al.), 404; 1999, New York, NY/Oxford, Oxford University Press. The exaggeration is evident in considering that, as COR studies show, 'more than half the nations have never participated in large-scale wars while a few have had a high propensity to become involved in wars, particularly the major powers that in the 150 year period from 1816 to 1965 were almost seven times more likely to be so engaged than were the others.' For statistical details, see 'The correlates of war II: an interim summary and evaluation', pp. 289-292. By the World Bank's tally in 1999 there were twenty-seven conflicts of which twenty-five were internal and in the decade of the 1990s there were thirty-nine major conflicts, each of which took a toll of more than a thousand deaths in any one year.
6. L. ROBBINS: 'The economic causes of war', 61; 1939, London, Jonathan Cape.
7. The information is provided in the chapter 'Peace as a global public good' in 'Global public goods', p. 394 (see Note 4). The source for the statistics is Ruth Leger Sivard's 'World military and social expenditures'. Mendez notes that the intrastate wars have generated 'massive negative externalities' and cites as one of these 'externalities' the estimate of more than twenty-two million refugees and displaced persons at the end of 1997.
8. The COR project has amassed a large amount of data for research on war covering the period of the last century and a half and all the relevant nations, and from the database has endeavoured to systematise the knowledge as to the causes of war through correlation analyses of factors including key features of the global political, economic, and financial system and of the nations that play their roles within this system, so as to identify the systemic forces that are likely to lead nations to war. See J. D. SINGER: 'Explaining war: selected papers from the Correlates of War project'; 1979, Beverley Hills, CA, Sage Publicatons; J. D. SINGER (ed.): 'The correlates of war II: testing some realpolitik models'; 1980, New York, NY, Macmillan; and also his 'Correlates of War project: continuity, diversity and convergence', in 'Quantitative international politics: an appraisal', (ed. F. Hoole et al.); 1976, New York, NY, Praeger; and ' The Correlates of War project: interim report and rationale', World Politics, 1972.
9. The COR project has amassed a large amount of data for research on war covering the period of the last century and a half and all the relevant nations, and from the database has endeavoured to systematise the knowledge as to the causes of war through correlation analyses of factors including key features of the global political, economic, and financial system and of the nations that play their roles within this system, so as to identify the systemic forces that are likely to lead nations to war. See J. D. SINGER: 'Explaining war: selected papers from the Correlates of War project'; 1979, Beverley Hills, CA, Sage Publicatons; J. D. SINGER (ed.): 'The correlates of war II: testing some realpolitik models'; 1980, New York, NY, Macmillan; and also his 'Correlates of War project: continuity, diversity and convergence', in 'Quantitative international politics: an appraisal', (ed. F. Hoole et al.); 1976, New York, NY, Praeger; and ' The Correlates of War project: interim report and rationale', World Politics, 1972.
10. The COR project has amassed a large amount of data for research on war covering the period of the last century and a half and all the relevant nations, and from the database has endeavoured to systematise the knowledge as to the causes of war through correlation analyses of factors including key features of the global political, economic, and financial system and of the nations that play their roles within this system, so as to identify the systemic forces that are likely to lead nations to war. See J. D. SINGER: 'Explaining war: selected papers from the Correlates of War project'; 1979, Beverley Hills, CA, Sage Publicatons; J. D. SINGER (ed.): 'The correlates of war II: testing some realpolitik models'; 1980, New York, NY, Macmillan; and also his 'Correlates of War project: continuity, diversity and convergence', in 'Quantitative international politics: an appraisal', (ed. F. Hoole et al.); 1976, New York, NY, Praeger; and ' The Correlates of War project: interim report and rationale', World Politics, 1972.
11. The COR project has amassed a large amount of data for research on war covering the period of the last century and a half and all the relevant nations, and from the database has endeavoured to systematise the knowledge as to the causes of war through correlation analyses of factors including key features of the global political, economic, and financial system and of the nations that play their roles within this system, so as to identify the systemic forces that are likely to lead nations to war. See J. D. SINGER: 'Explaining war: selected papers from the Correlates of War project'; 1979, Beverley Hills, CA, Sage Publicatons; J. D. SINGER (ed.): 'The correlates of war II: testing some realpolitik models'; 1980, New York, NY, Macmillan; and also his 'Correlates of War project: continuity, diversity and convergence', in 'Quantitative international politics: an appraisal', (ed. F. Hoole et al.); 1976, New York, NY, Praeger; and ' The Correlates of War project: interim report and rationale', World Politics, 1972.
12. M. BRECHER: 'Crises in world politics: theory and reality', xv: 1993, Permagon Press. Brecher points out that 'the major reason for studyng crisis is that it is closely linked to conflict and war, all of them crucial concepts and phenomena in world politics' (p. 8). See also two articles, 'Towards a theory of international crisis behavior', Int. Stud Q., 1999, and 'Crises in world politics', World Politics, 1982.
13. M. BRECHER: 'Crises in world politics: theory and reality', xv: 1993, Permagon Press. Brecher points out that 'the major reason for studyng crisis is that it is closely linked to conflict and war, all of them crucial concepts and phenomena in world politics' (p. 8). See also two articles, 'Towards a theory of international crisis behavior', Int. Stud Q., 1999, and 'Crises in world politics', World Politics, 1982.
14. M. BRECHER: 'Crises in world politics: theory and reality', xv: 1993, Permagon Press. Brecher points out that 'the major reason for studyng crisis is that it is closely linked to conflict and war, all of them crucial concepts and phenomena in world politics' (p. 8). See also two articles, 'Towards a theory of international crisis behavior', Int. Stud Q., 1999, and 'Crises in world politics', World Politics, 1982.
15. 'Crises in world politics', p. 38 (see Note 8). In a footnote to this statement. Professor Brecher notes that 'necessary and sufficient condition(s)' can also be taken to mean 'defining condition(s)'.
16. A. RAPOPORT: 'Approaches to peace research', in 'War: its causes and correlates', (ed. M. Nettleship et al.); 1975, The Hague, Mouton Publishers.
17. J. D. SINGER (ed.): 'The Correlates of War II: testing some realpolitik models', xxii; 1980, New York, NY, Macmillan.
18. For a clear and concise analysis of this case, see Max Forsythe's 'A course of study on the great war' for the Insirador Ruinae Institute, available at www.bright.net/~m4suth/iri/ww1a.
19. The song is by Shania Twain, the Canadian pop singer. The reference to the lyrics of the song is a contribution of my nine year old granddaughter. Alyse, when she overheard me discussing the theme of this paper.
20. It is estimated that nine out of ten casualties in the civil wars of the last decade were non-combatants, and in the case of wars such as those in Kuwait and Kosovo, the USA has resorted to reliance on bombing so that US casualties are very low while the civilian and combatant casualties on the other side are very high. In the case of the Iraq-Kuwait war there were no US casualties but over 100 000 Iraqis killed.
21. A news clipping from the Toronto Globe & Mail of 24 April 2000 makes that point. It is headlined, 'War depletes resources as hunger stalks millions: concern over money going to Eritrean battle'. The commentary begins: 'while eight million of its people struggle through their worst food shortage in nearly two decades, the Ethiopian government is waging a hugely expensive war, estimated to cost at least $700,000 a day in salaries alone ... One diplomat estimates that salaries for 350,000 soldiers cost between $20 million and $30 million a month [and] that does not count perhaps hundreds of millions spent on ammunition and arms. Nor does it count the large number of dead -estimated at a minimum of 20,000 soldiers killed - over small stakes ... The overt reason for the war is a strip of land with no particular value along the border of the two nations which split amicably in 1991 ... The Ethiopian Prime Minister contends that this war is an issue of national sovereignty. "We do not believe that sovereignty is a luxury for the rich" ...'.
22. 'The economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy', Washington, DC, 2000. At a press conference on this report on 15 June 2000, Paul Collier, Director of the World Bank's Research Department made the observation: 'Diamonds are the guerrilla's best friend. Civil wars are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievances ... that are the background noise of the universe' (reported in the International Herald Tribune of 1718 June 2000 in a column headed 'Gems and dope fuel civil wars around world, a study finds' and authored by Joseph Kahn writing for the New York Times Service). The World Bank has issued several reports on this theme, such as 'Why are there so many civil wars in Africa?', 'Justice-seeking and loot-seeking in civil war', 'The economics of civil war, crime and violence'. The World Bank's research reveals that countries that have suffered civil war during the past five years have a 53% chance of a return to civil war, a probability that faces the fifth of Africa's people who have been living during that period of time in countries that were ravaged by civil war.
23. The article is headlined 'Diamonds are a war's best friend: profits made from violent conflict only fuel more violence, say two international peace scholars'. The scholars are Mats Berdal, Director of Studies at the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, and David Malone, President of the International Peace Academy in New York.
24. The Economist, 1999, 31 December, 31. Under the heading 'Attempted suicide' the authors comment on the impact of war on poverty as an outcome: 'Death, anguish, starvation and despair are written over Western Europe. Hell has been let loose ... The longer the war lasts, the more acute will be the economic distress and the longer the process of recovery. In the opinion of many shrewd judges, a social upheaval, a tremendous revolution, is the certain consequence.' This was written in 1914!
25. 'Democracies grow more resilient to economic crisis', IHT, 2000, 4 March. The authors ascribe the democracies' resilience to 'their institutional capacity to enforce political accountability via elections or confidence votes. Governments fall but democracy survives as a system of government [whereas] dictatorships and semi-democracies facing a crisis situation have little capacity to adjust.'
26. For the most comprehensive statistics covering a wide range of social indicators, see the UNDP's annual 'Human development report' and the World Bank's annual 'World development report'.
27. 'Bread, not bombs: a political agenda for social justice', 21; 1999, Edmonton, University of Alberta Press. Senator Roche goes on to list other 'seeds of conflict': 'the bursting of an oppressed people seeking self-determination, racial hatreds and cultural hostilities'.
28. 'Global public goods', p. 374 (see Note 4). Another typical example that is both succinct and dramatic is provided by an eminent Indian, J. C. Kapur: 'Globalization and greed will be explosively irreconcilable in the twenty-first century...' ('Towards a new human order within an "indispensible power"'. Man & Development, (New Delhi), December 1998).
29. 'Global public goods', p. 374 (see Note 4). Another typical example that is both succinct and dramatic is provided by an eminent Indian, J. C. Kapur: 'Globalization and greed will be explosively irreconcilable in the twenty-first century...' ('Towards a new human order within an "indispensible power"'. Man & Development, (New Delhi), December 1998).
30. The last factor of unequal power relationships manifests itself most often in cases of water conflicts in river basins, when the downstream riparians recognise their relative powerlessness against any abusive practices of the upstream riparians.
31. The concept of governance as the UN defines it is as follows: 'the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation's affairs (and, by extension, the affairs of a global system). It is the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences. Governance embraces all the methods - good and bad - that societies use to distribute power and manage public resources and problems.' The Institute on Governance, a Canadian organisation, uses a simpler definition: 'the traditions, institutions and processes that determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are made on issues of public concern'.
32. 'Crises in world politics', pp. 557-558 (see Note 8).
33. The Economist of 12 June 1999 presented tables of the ten countries with highest inequality and the ten with lowest inequality, with Sierra Leone and Colombia in the first group and Rwanda and Laos in the second.
34. M. RENNER: 'Ending violent conflict', Worldwatch paper 146, 18-19; 1999, Washington, DC, Worldwatch Institute.
35. J. ELIASSON: 'Responding to crises', Security Dialogue, 1995, 26.
36. See, for example, B. EHRENREICH: 'Blood rites: origins and history of the passions of war'; 1996, New York, NY, Metropolitan Books.
37. H. J. MORGENTHAU: 'Politics among nations'; 1972, New York, NY, Knopf, as quoted and interpreted in R. J. LEMG: 'Influence strategies and interstate conflict', in 'The correlates of war II', (ed. J. D. Singer); 1980, New York, NY, Macmillan (in a section titled 'The realistic model'). Professor Peter Sorokin, in 'The crisis of our age' (1990, Oneworld, pp. 205-206), seems to subscribe to the same view.
38. H. J. MORGENTHAU: 'Politics among nations'; 1972, New York, NY, Knopf, as quoted and interpreted in R. J. LEMG: 'Influence strategies and interstate conflict', in 'The correlates of war II', (ed. J. D. Singer); 1980, New York, NY, Macmillan (in a section titled 'The realistic model'). Professor Peter Sorokin, in 'The crisis of our age' (1990, Oneworld, pp. 205-206), seems to subscribe to the same view.
39. H. J. MORGENTHAU: 'Politics among nations'; 1972, New York, NY, Knopf, as quoted and interpreted in R. J. LEMG: 'Influence strategies and interstate conflict', in 'The correlates of war II', (ed. J. D. Singer); 1980, New York, NY, Macmillan (in a section titled 'The realistic model'). Professor Peter Sorokin, in 'The crisis of our age' (1990, Oneworld, pp. 205-206), seems to subscribe to the same view.
40. This thesis propounded by Barabara Ehrenreich has been strongly citicised by Thomas Powers ('The roots of war', Atlantic Monthly, August 1997) and by Michael Ignatieff ('The gods of war', NY Rev. Books, 1997, 10 September). The criticism is based on the fact that the Ehrenreich hypothesis is not amenable to proof either by reference to history or to theory with respect to societal violence as organised warfare.
41. This thesis propounded by Barabara Ehrenreich has been strongly citicised by Thomas Powers ('The roots of war', Atlantic Monthly, August 1997) and by Michael Ignatieff ('The gods of war', NY Rev. Books, 1997, 10 September). The criticism is based on the fact that the Ehrenreich hypothesis is not amenable to proof either by reference to history or to theory with respect to societal violence as organised warfare.
42. This point was conveyed to me by correspondence from David Smith of Barrie, Ontario, who has written on the subject of the history of war. He states that '[in both these civilizations and others] there was vigorous production and distribution of food for all members of society. There was common ownership of the means of production. The social organization was based on cooperative, egalitarian values. They traded but built no walls around their cities and lived peaceably with their neighbours. About 7000 years ago these civilization began to collapse, primarily as a result of raids by people who had taken a different path which included war as one of their institutions. Cretian civilization collapsed about 3200 years ago. The egalitarian, cooperative kind of social organization was replaced by a hierarchical one with greed as a hallmark: what was easier than to mobilize the men and raid a neighbouring town or city? Greed and violence became the pattern and by the time our history began to be recorded such raids had become a fact of life.'
43. Angus Maddison has written extensively on this issue. The statistical records show greater financial outflows than inflows for the empire building endeavours of some colonising nations, but, in all cases, the benefits were skewed to favour the segment of the population that was already rich and politically powerful.
44. L. ROBBINS: 'The economic causes of war', 45; 1939, London, Jonathan Cape. Robbins cites the Boer War as an example: 'taken by and large, the whole incident [of the Jameson Raid that was planned by Rand capitalists] is an excellent example of the way in which pressure from foreign investors can lead to international war.' He goes on to note that there is 'abundant evidence of "passive instrumentality" rather than an active role on the part of high finance'.
45. J. SCHUMPETER: 'Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen', Archiv fur Sozialwissenshaft und Politik, 1918-19, XLVII, as quoted by Lionel Robbins, who commented that 'there is much weight in this contention as the history of modern times shows many instances in which whole peoples have apparently been willing and sometimes even anxious to go to war [even] when there could be no gain in the economic sense for any but a tiny minority.' He cites as examples colonial wars launched by the Americans, the British, the Germans, and the Italians that are characterised as 'colonial wars of exploitation for the benefit of the few, not the many'.
46. 'The economic causes of war', pp. 65, 66, 74, 84 (see Note 35). For examples related to some of the non-economic factors, Robbins cites the work of Durbin and Bowlby, 'Personal aggressiveness and war'. The focus of Professor Robbins' book is, however, on the economic aspects and, in this connection, he examines 'the types of institutional settings amid which such [war prone] motives may be conceived to be engendered'. In a chapter on 'The Marxist theory of imperialism as a cause of wars' he argues that the Marxist argument that all important wars can be attributed to the existence of the capitalist system with its institutions of private property and the market is not substantiated by an examination of the history of wars. But he does not let the ruling elites in capitalist states, especially corporate leaders with substantial foreign investments abroad and their financial backers, off the hook. His aim is to refute the claims of inevitability and universality inherent in the Marxist thesis of the causes of war as a byproduct of the capitalist system so as to clear the way for his suggestions for improvement in the working of human institutions.
47. The Westphalian treaty spelt the death knell of what was known as the Holy Roman Empire and brought to an end the armed conflicts that, under religious banners, had ravaged Europe for almost a century and a half, culminating in what we know us the Thirty Years War. It achieved this relatively peaceful resolution by agreeing to endow about three hundred princes with territorial sovereignty. The peace was, however, temporary, as armed conflicts or, often, the threat of conflict alone changed the territorial scope of sovereignty. The Napoleonic Wars and the two world wars of the twentieth century were preventable, but the dynamic of the pursuit of hegemonic power by national leaders as well as their folly, misconceptions, and such made these major wars possible and, perhaps, even probable but certainly not inevitable.
48. K. VALASKAKIS: 'Long-term trends in global governance: from "Westphalia" to "Seattle"', Proc. OECD Conference for the Future: '21st century governance: power in the global knowledge economy and society', March 2000. Valaskakis notes that the legitimisation of war is a logical extension of the primacy of sovereignty: 'if two sovereign states disagree and there is no power greater than sovereignty, the conflict resolution must come through war. In a Westphalian War unconditional surrender or capitulation is the proper way of legally transferring sovereignty from the vanquished to the victor.'
49. This is essentially the Malthusian thesis where the model depicts a divergent rate of increase of population and of food supplies that can only be brought back into equilibrium by periodic occurrences of 'pestilence, famines and wars' that have the effect of decimating the population. For an elaboration on this theme, see M. MILLER: 'The chicken-little syndrome and its implications', University of Ottawa Working Paper 95-37, 1995 (ISSN 0701-3086).
50. For an interesting discussion that covers most issues involved in this controversy, see 'Environmental security and violent conflict: a debate', which is readily available if one is able to tap in to www.ics.st. edu/PROGRAMS/DIS/ECS/report2/debate.htm. The debaters are Professor Thomas Homer-Dixon, Director of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Toronto, Marc Levy, Instructor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, Gareth Porter, International Program Director at the Environmental and Energy Study Institute in Washington, and Jack Goldstone, Professor of Sociology and International Relations at the University of California at Davis where he is also the Director of the Center for Comparative Research on History, Societies and Culture.
51. P. GLEICK: 'Environment and security: the clear connection', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, April 1991; 'Water and conflict: fresh water resources and international security,' International Security, 1993, 1; 'Water, war, and peace in the Middle East', Environment, 1994, 36; 'Conflict and cooperation over fresh water,' Pugwash Conference Papers, Rustenberg, South Africa, 1999; and 'The world's waters 1998-1999'; 1998, Washington, DC, Island Press.
52. P. GLEICK: 'Environment and security: the clear connection', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, April 1991; 'Water and conflict: fresh water resources and international security,' International Security, 1993, 1; 'Water, war, and peace in the Middle East', Environment, 1994, 36; 'Conflict and cooperation over fresh water,' Pugwash Conference Papers, Rustenberg, South Africa, 1999; and 'The world's waters 1998-1999'; 1998, Washington, DC, Island Press.
53. P. GLEICK: 'Environment and security: the clear connection', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, April 1991; 'Water and conflict: fresh water resources and international security,' International Security, 1993, 1; 'Water, war, and peace in the Middle East', Environment, 1994, 36; 'Conflict and cooperation over fresh water,' Pugwash Conference Papers, Rustenberg, South Africa, 1999; and 'The world's waters 1998-1999'; 1998, Washington, DC, Island Press.
54. P. GLEICK: 'Environment and security: the clear connection', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, April 1991; 'Water and conflict: fresh water resources and international security,' International Security, 1993, 1; 'Water, war, and peace in the Middle East', Environment, 1994, 36; 'Conflict and cooperation over fresh water,' Pugwash Conference Papers, Rustenberg, South Africa, 1999; and 'The world's waters 1998-1999'; 1998, Washington, DC, Island Press.
55. P. GLEICK: 'Environment and security: the clear connection', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, April 1991; 'Water and conflict: fresh water resources and international security,' International Security, 1993, 1; 'Water, war, and peace in the Middle East', Environment, 1994, 36; 'Conflict and cooperation over fresh water,' Pugwash Conference Papers, Rustenberg, South Africa, 1999; and 'The world's waters 1998-1999'; 1998, Washington, DC, Island Press.
56. See Note 41. Homer-Dixon goes on to assert that 'international theorists have usually focused on the possibility of interstate conflict over resources. We are claiming that because environmental scarcities are worsening we can expect an increase in the frequency of conflicts with an environmental component.'
57. As, for example, Boutros Boutros Ghali when he was Egypt's foreign minister, declaring that if Ethiopia were to build a dam on the Blue Nile, it would be a cause for war. Such threats are only indications of tension but, on examination, hardly credible.
58. In the article 'Poverty ain't what it used to be', Challenge: the Magazine of Economic Affairs, March/April 2000, 100, the authors, G. Mangum, A. Sum, and N. Fogg, tackle the issue of defining and measuring poverty: 'Difficult as measuring poverty may be, it is even more problematic. Poverty, from an economic standpoint, can be defined as experiencing economic deprivation - to be deprived of an adequate level of consumption of goods and services. However, because standards of adequacy vary with societal wealth and public attitudes toward deprivation, there is no universally accepted definition of basic needs. The annual amount of income necessary to provide for an agreed-upon set of basic needs is equally difficult to determine.'
59. 'Environmental scarcity, poverty and conflict: future avenues for research', chapter 2 of a book prepared by the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo, Norway (www.prio.no/html/EPC-2.htm). Ms Percival worked under the direction of Thomas Homer-Dixon at the University of Toronto. She cites the case of the Aral Sea, which represents one of the worst ever environmental disasters, and the fact that the scarcities stemming from this disaster have not led to armed conflict on the part of the people of that region. She then raises the question as to how useful the modelling exercises could be when many critical variables are not included and, by their nature, cannot be included so as to arrive at useful generalisations about the impact of 'environmental scarcities'.
60. M. BROWN: 'The international dimensions of internal conflict: an international security reader', 571: 1996, New York, NY, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
61. This is not to assert that preparedness for war and engagement in war is always a mistaken policy or a decision to be unequivocally deplored and condemned. Raymond Aron, the French political scientist, made this point in his 1996 book 'Peace and war: a theory of international relations' with reference to France's policies and the Nazi threat of the early 1930s: 'War has not always been meaningless or criminal; it has had meaning and function.' Such a war is one that is motivated by the desire to overthrow corrupt despotic leaders who seek to perpetuate exploitative regimes or by the desire to defend against the threat of such despotism being imposed. It is also one that is started only when the armed conflict phase of the struggle is a last resort, that is, when the circumstances preclude any other course of action.
62. 'Preventing deadly conflict', in 'Global public goods', p. 370 (see Note 4). The list of supporters of this 'theory' includes the following: Stuart Brimmer ('Dangerous dyads: conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict resolution, 1992, 36, (2)); M. Doyle ('Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983, 12, (3)); James Ray ('Democracy and international conflict: an evaluation of the democratic peace proposition'; 1995, University of South Carolina Press); Bruce Russett ('Grasping the democratic peace: principles for a post-Cold War world'; 1993, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press); Rudolph Rummel ('Understanding conflict and war', in 5 volumes; 1975-81, Sage); and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (in their final report of 1997).
63. 'Preventing deadly conflict', in 'Global public goods', p. 370 (see Note 4). The list of supporters of this 'theory' includes the following: Stuart Brimmer ('Dangerous dyads: conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict resolution, 1992, 36, (2)); M. Doyle ('Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983, 12, (3)); James Ray ('Democracy and international conflict: an evaluation of the democratic peace proposition'; 1995, University of South Carolina Press); Bruce Russett ('Grasping the democratic peace: principles for a post-Cold War world'; 1993, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press); Rudolph Rummel ('Understanding conflict and war', in 5 volumes; 1975-81, Sage); and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (in their final report of 1997).
64. 'Preventing deadly conflict', in 'Global public goods', p. 370 (see Note 4). The list of supporters of this 'theory' includes the following: Stuart Brimmer ('Dangerous dyads: conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict resolution, 1992, 36, (2)); M. Doyle ('Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983, 12, (3)); James Ray ('Democracy and international conflict: an evaluation of the democratic peace proposition'; 1995, University of South Carolina Press); Bruce Russett ('Grasping the democratic peace: principles for a post-Cold War world'; 1993, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press); Rudolph Rummel ('Understanding conflict and war', in 5 volumes; 1975-81, Sage); and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (in their final report of 1997).
65. 'Preventing deadly conflict', in 'Global public goods', p. 370 (see Note 4). The list of supporters of this 'theory' includes the following: Stuart Brimmer ('Dangerous dyads: conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict resolution, 1992, 36, (2)); M. Doyle ('Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983, 12, (3)); James Ray ('Democracy and international conflict: an evaluation of the democratic peace proposition'; 1995, University of South Carolina Press); Bruce Russett ('Grasping the democratic peace: principles for a post-Cold War world'; 1993, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press); Rudolph Rummel ('Understanding conflict and war', in 5 volumes; 1975-81, Sage); and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (in their final report of 1997).
66. 'Preventing deadly conflict', in 'Global public goods', p. 370 (see Note 4). The list of supporters of this 'theory' includes the following: Stuart Brimmer ('Dangerous dyads: conditions affecting the likelihood of interstate war 1816-1965', Journal of Conflict resolution, 1992, 36, (2)); M. Doyle ('Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983, 12, (3)); James Ray ('Democracy and international conflict: an evaluation of the democratic peace proposition'; 1995, University of South Carolina Press); Bruce Russett ('Grasping the democratic peace: principles for a post-Cold War world'; 1993, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press); Rudolph Rummel ('Understanding conflict and war', in 5 volumes; 1975-81, Sage); and the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (in their final report of 1997).
67. See the interview with R. J. Rummel, 'Democracies don't fight democracies', in the June 1999 issue of Peace Magazine (Toronto), and the replies and counter-replies in the Fall 1999 issue.
68. Under the heading 'The use and abuse of governance', in a paper titled 'Wealth, values, institutions: trends in government and governance', for the OECD conference on '21st century governance: power in the global knowledge economy and society', March 2000. Professor Tarschys cites Amartya Sen, the 1998 Nobel Laureate in Economics, on the relationship of famines and democratic governance (as elucidated in 'The politics of hunger', 1995): famine disasters occur in non-democratic regimes as a consequence of repressive policies or a skewed distribution of political resources such that victims can be easily neglected and emergency measures are, therefore, not taken in time or on the required scale.
69. On this theme, see M. MILLER: 'High-technology to the rescue? The role H-T could play involving the rural poor in the knowledge economy', University of Ottawa Discussion Paper 97-25, 1997 (ISSN 0701-3086).
70. 'Preventing deadly conflict', in 'Global public goods', p. 374 (see Note 4).
71. 'Preventing deadly conflict', in 'Global public goods', p. 404 (see Note 4).
72. This is elaborated in my paper 'High-tech to the rescue?' (see Note 52), available on my homepage www.gutenberg.com/~miller.
73. A. PARKER: 'Report urges "chain of custody" for diamonds', Financial Times (London), 2000, 20 June.
74. Cited by John Kenneth Galbraith in comments he submitted at an ECAAR meeting on 8 January 2000 and by Hamburg and Holl (see Notes 4 and 22).
75. Thomas Powers ('The roots of war', Atlantic Monthly, August 1997) counters Barbara Ehrenreich's reasoning about the root cause of war lying in human nature by suggesting that an equally plausible factor is the existence of so much weaponry and its easy availability. And behind this is the motivation of governments to arm not only for their own defence but to profit from the sale of weaponry, a practice that lowers the per unit costs and provides foreign exchange earnings.
76. R. Norton-Taylor and O. Bowcott of the International Institute for Strategic Studies writing in Guardian Weekly ('Civil wars, civilian bloodshed and Western inaction: hallmarks of a 20th century conflict', 1999, 28 November-3 December). The numbers they cite are from the military balance estimates that indicate an upward trend in warfare with ten interstate and twenty-five civil wars occurring in the year to 1 August 1999, arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa nearly doubling over that year to nearly eleven billion dollars.
77. Perhaps the most forceful view was put forward by Lionel Robbins when he stated in 1939 that 'the existence of independent sovereign states ought to be justly regarded as the fundamental cause of conflict [since] it is the chaos of independent sovereignties which is the ultimate condition of international conflict. We know today that unless we destroy the sovereign state, the sovereign state will destroy us ... The remedy is plain: independent sovereignty must be limited by a framework of law and order supported by solid sanctions which prevent the emergence of those policies that are eventually responsible for conflict ... We need an effective supernational authority that is compatible with independent national sovereignty' ('The economic causes of war', pp. 104-105, see Note 35).
78. Imagine the difficulty and dangers of instituting Professor Robbins' suggestion of establishing 'a federal (global) organization, not a mere confederation of sovereign states but a genuine federation that takes over from the states of which it is composed, those powers that engender conflict.'
79. William Pfaff in a column in the IHT of 27 June 2000 ('Globalism replacing nationalism? Don't hold your breath') takes issue with the thesis that 'national sovereignties are doomed by technological determinism that are making national regulation obsolete and national sovereignty empty' and that 'nationalism is mainly responsible for wars: remove the nation-state and the problem of state violence would be solved.' He states that 'the thought that war is a permanent part of human nature is a fundamental fallacy that goes beyond pragmatic action to block conflicts or to educate people in techniques of accommodation and practical compromise.'
80. 'The age of rights', LSE Magazine, Summer 1999.
81. In an interview published in the newsletter Mondial, January 2000, headed 'Resolving the sovereignty dilemma'.
82. They recently signed the Lysòen Declaration (named after the Norwegian island where it was negotiated) that sets out specific proposals for action on a range of issues including human rights, humanitarian law, and child soldiers. 'We need to make every effort to secure full respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the provision of international organizations whose aim is to ensure respect for human rights in all circumstances and all countries.' Jan Eliasson, in his talk, speaks of 'the development of a new and promising form of diplomacy, humanitarian diplomacy which could open up crisis-ridden countries to humanitarian corridors and other arrangements' (p. 409).
83. The 30% reduction in the risk of a repetition of civil war is the number put forward by Paul Collier in the World Bank's 15 June 2000 press conference on the publication release of the report. 'The economic causes of civil conflict and their implication for policy'.
84. This is elaborated in my book 'Coping is not enough! The role of the World Bank and the IMF in the global debt crisis' (1986, Oxford University Press). As a senior economist on the staff and later as an Executive Director on the World Bank's board, I had a unique opportunity to participate in as well as to observe the culture.
85. Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc Stern in the concluding chapter, 'Global public goods: concepts, policies and strategies', of 'Global public goods' (p. 452) (see Note 4).
86. A great deal has been written on this proposal. One of the most concise treatments is to be found in an article by Professor David Felix titled 'The Tobin tax: background, issues and prospects' (Futures. The Journal of Forecasting, Planning and Policy, March 1995, 195-208).
87. 'A new system to finance the United Nations', Futures, March 1995, 171-179.
88. As testimony to the US opposition to a measure such as the Tobin tax, Senators Helm and Dole once introduced an act, 'the Prohibition on United Nations Taxation Act of 1996', in the Second Session of the 104th Congress, the purpose of which was to prohibit any discussion of the idea in the UN on pain of the USA taking some punitive measures against the UN. The Tobin tax would impose a charge of a very tiny fraction of 1% on international financial transactions that now total over one and a half trillion dollars per day, the overwhelming part of which is speculative. Senator Jesse Helm is Chairman of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee. The action of these two senators prompted one observer in reviewing the Tobin tax idea to comment: 'Senator Dole's bill is remarkable since it was designed to limit freedom of thought and research by government action, a practice unusual in democracies' (Kunibert Rafter: 'The Tobin tax: reviving a discussion', p. 529).
89. For an elaboration on this aspect, see my paper 'Where is globalization taking us? Why we need a 'new' Bretton Woods', Futures, (Special edition on the the UN at fifty: policy and financing alternatives), March 1995, prepared for the UN Social Summit meeting in Copenhagen. See also my 'Global governance to address the crises of debt, poverty and environment', chapter 10 of 'World security: the new challenge'; 1994, Dundurn Press, a paper prepared for a previous Pugwash conference.