When not all conflict is bad: Manufacturing-marketing conflict and strategic incentive design

Management Science

Volumn 50, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 489-502

  Balasubramanian, Sridhar ^a   Bhardwaj, Pradeep ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Manufacturing marketing conflict; Manufacturing marketing coordination; Marketing strategy; Pricing strategy; Product quality; Strategic incentive design

Indexed keywords

COSTS; GAME THEORY; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; MANAGERS; MANUFACTURE; MARKETING; PLANNING; PRODUCT DESIGN;

MANUFACTURING-MARKETING CONFLICTS; MANUFACTURING-MARKETING COORDINATION; MARKETING STRATEGIES; PRICING STRATEGIES; PRODUCT QUALITY; STRATEGIC INCENTIVE DESIGN;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 2342468040     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1030.0180     Document Type: Review

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