Social learning with private and common values

Economic Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 245-264

  Goeree, Jacob K ^a   Palfrey, Thomas R ^b   Rogers, Brian W ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Information aggregation; Social learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 23344435322     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0642-5     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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