Making better decisions: From measuring to constructing preferences

Health Psychology

Volumn 24, Issue 4 SUPPL., 2005, Pages

  Johnson, Eric J ^a,b   Steffel, Mary ^a,b   Goldstein, Daniel G ^a,b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

Author keywords

Affective forecasting; Constructive preferences; Decision analysis; Decision environments; Defaults

Indexed keywords

CLINICAL PRACTICE; COMPREHENSION; CONSTRUCTIVE PREFERENCE; DATA ANALYSIS; DECISION THEORY; DOCTOR PATIENT RELATION; EVIDENCE BASED MEDICINE; HUMAN; ILLNESS BEHAVIOR; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; PATIENT ATTITUDE; PATIENT CARE; PROBABILITY; REVIEW; TREATMENT OUTCOME;

DECISION MAKING; DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE; HUMANS; PATIENT PARTICIPATION; PATIENT SATISFACTION; UNITED STATES;

EID: 23244442865     PISSN: 02786133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0278-6133.24.4.S17     Document Type: Review

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