Reflections on the generalization of agency theory: Cross-cultural considerations

Human Resource Management Review

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 325-335

  Johnson, Nancy Brown ^a   Droege, Scott ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

^b MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Behavior and outcome based pay; Culture

Indexed keywords

EID: 22944466044     PISSN: 10534822     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.hrmr.2004.06.003     Document Type: Article

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