Nonprofit environmental organizations and the restructuring of institutions for ecosystem management

Ecology Law Quarterly

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 692-706

  Breckenridge, Lee P ^a  

^a NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 22644450298     PISSN: 00461121     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (105)

1. See, e.g., TED BERNARD & JORA YOUNG, THE ECOLOGY OF HOPE, COMMUNITIES COLLABORATE FOR SUSTAINABILITY (1997);
2. LAND CONSERVATION THROUGH PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Eve Endicott ed., 1993);
3. FREDERICK J. LONG & MATTHEW B. ARNOLD, THE POWER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PARTNERSHIPS (1995).
4. The rhetoric of partnership appears widely throughout current policy literature and government documents on ecosystem management. See Lee P. Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape: The Institutional Challenges of Ecosystem Management for Lands in Private Ownership, 19 VT. L. REV. 363, 403-408 (1995).
5. An extensive listing of recent publications addressing the formation of partnerships in the environmental field may be found in Kris Bronars and Sarah Michaels, Annotated Bibliography on Partnerships for Natural Resource Management (1997), available at 〈http://www.icls.harvard.edu/ppp/contents.htm#sources〉 (the web site is maintained by the Institute for Cultural Landscape Studies of the Arnold Arboretum, Harvard University).
6. Regarding the development of nonprofit sector roles in the United States, see generally PETER DOBKIN HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND OTHER ESSAYS ON PHILANTHROPY, VOLUNTARISM, AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 13-83 (1992) [hereinafter HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR];
7. Peter Dobkin Hall, A Historical Overview of the Private Nonprofit Sector, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 3 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
8. In this paper I focus on formally-organized nonprofit organizations that are subject to a "nondistribution constraint" under the laws of the state where they are formed, preventing distribution of profits to the persons who control the enterprise (such as members or directors). See Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 27, 28.
9. The discussion here consequently does not reach a broader spectrum of less formally organized voluntary associations. See Carl Milofsky, Networks, Markets, Culture, and Contracts: Understanding Community Organizations, in COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS: STUDIES IN RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND EXCHANGE (Carl Milofsky ed., 1988) (defining types of voluntary associations).
10. The tax treatment of nonprofit organizations under federal and state law is summarized in John G. Simon. The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Review of Federal and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 67.
11. See Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 708 (summarizing legal developments that expanded public rights to participate in government decisions affecting the environment).
12. Although the advocacy role can overlap with other activities to provide public goods, political theory has treated nonprofit organizations engaged in advocacy separately from other voluntary organizations, given their distinct roles in the workings of democratic government. See James Douglas, Political Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 43, 51-52. The literature on political action organizations is extensive, and I do not attempt to summarize it here.
13. A useful introduction is provided by J. Craig Jenkins, Nonprofit Organizations and Policy Advocacy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, at 296.
14. See Frederico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077, 1087 (1996) (describing growth in the number of land trusts);
15. David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or Compensation for Lost Expectations?, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 346-52 (1995) (discussing the work of the Land Trust Alliance and the Nature Conservancy).
16. Government agencies rely on nonprofit organizations for scientific and technical advice, and the making of rules and policies in the environmental field has been especially dependent on the gathering and interpretation of scientific information. See CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, FACING TOWARD GOVERNMENTS: NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVICE (1993).
17. The Nature Conservancy's work on locating and cataloguing rare species is an especially prominent example of scientific research that has laid the groundwork for government as well as private actions. See William Stolzenburg, The Seekers of the Rare, NATURE CONSERVANCY, May/June 1998, at 12 (describing the development of the biological inventory conducted by the Nature Conservancy and the Natural Heritage Network).
18. See Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1997) (summarizing key aspects of the interest representation and civic republican models of administrative law).
19. While scientific knowledge can be seen as contingent and embedded in political frameworks, maintenance of the perceived boundary between the rational criteria of "science" and the biases of "policy" has been central to the role of organizations that conduct scientific research. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 14 (1990).
20. The growing governmental support for place-based environmental organizing coincides with the elaboration of government policies calling for the integrated management of ecosystems and watersheds, reaching across existing jurisdictional and property boundaries. The momentum for the creation of new "partnerships" and collaborative arrangements is thus closely intertwined with current ideas about how to achieve wise resource management. See Thomas T. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystem Management and the Everglades: A Legal and Institutional Analysis, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 473 (1996) (providing an insightful discussion of the connections among ecosystem management concepts and institutional developments);
21. Symposium, Ecosystem Approach: New Departure for Land and Water, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1997);
22. George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the Clinton Administration, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39 (1996).
23. See also, THE KEYSTONE CENTER, THE KEYSTONE NATIONAL POLICY DIALOGUE ON ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (1996);
24. Symposium on Ecology and the Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (1994);
25. Biodiversity Symposium, 8 Tulane Envtl. L.J. 1 (1994).
26. In focusing on building partnerships with nonprofit organizations, government "reinvention" efforts have drawn on the blueprint for reform advanced by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1993). In a list of thirty-six alternatives to standard government service delivery activities, the book includes "Public-Private Partnerships," "Catalyzing Nongovernmental Efforts." "Convening Nongovernmental Leaders," "Technical Assistance," "Volunteers," "Seed Money," and "Voluntary Associations."
27. See also, Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of Institutional Choice and Government-Created Charitable Organizations, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 945 (1997) (focusing specifically on government creation of nonprofit organizations as part of the "reinvention" efforts).
28. The theme of supporting and relying upon nonprofit activities as an alternative to government action now appears widely in federal government documents dealing with environmental subjects. E.g., ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE PROGRAM, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, A GUIDEBOOK OF FINANCIAL TOOLS 1E-9 (1997), available at 〈http://www.epa.gov/efinpage/guidebk/guindex.htm〉: Environmental non-profit organizations are growing in importance in terms of cooperative activity with all levels of government. NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] can serve as entities to mix public and private donations to support particular governmental goals. . . .The potential use of NGOs to pursue quasi-governmental environmental activities in lieu of governments, or on their behalf, is growing. NGOs constitute a logical place for governmental out-sour[c]ing for technical, resource management, training and other work.
29. Id. While references to nonprofit activities in policy statements often appear in conjunction with broader discussions of ways to involve all "stakeholders" in decisionmaking and to encourage "citizen," "public," and "community" participation in collaborative efforts, the focus on supporting and relying upon formally-organized nonprofit organizations to achieve government goals appears more clearly in funding announcements. E.g., U.S. EPA & DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, EPA-840-R-98-001 CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA'S WATERS 81 (1998) [hereinafter CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN] (calling for Watershed Assistance Grants to nonprofit organizations as part of President Clinton's Clean Water Initiative);
30. 63 Fed. Reg. 45,156 (1998) (limiting funding of nongovernmental groups under the Sustainable Development Challenge Grants Program to incorporated nonprofit organizations).
31. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) commitment to Community-Based Environmental Protection (CBEP) has led to an extensive outreach effort, including an on-line newsletter and numerous documents published or funded by the EPA, aimed at encouraging local organizing. See OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. EPA, EPA-100-R-97-003, PEOPLE, PLACES AND PARTNERSHIPS: A PROGRESS REPORT (1997);
32. OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE ECOSYSTEMS AND COMMUNITIES, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 230-B-96-003, COMMUNITY-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: A RESOURCE BOOK FOR PROTECTING ECOSYSTEMS AND COMMUNITIES (1997);
33. THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, CENTER FOR COMPATIBLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO ACHIEVING A HEALTHY COMMUNITY, ECONOMY & ENVIRONMENT (1996), (funded by the U.S. EPA's Office of Sustainable Ecosystems and Communities).
34. U.S. EPA maintains a web site specifically for the purpose of providing information and contacts to nonprofit organizations. See U.S. EPA, EPA RESOURCES FOR NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, 〈http://www.epa.gov/epahome/nonprof.htm〉.
35. See, e.g., OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. EPA, MONITORING WATER QUALITY: EPA's VOLUNTEER MONITORING PROGRAM (1997), available at 〈http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/monitoring/volunteer/epasvmp.html〉 (listing government documents and connections to other organizations).
36. See, e.g. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-841-B-97-008, CATALOG OF FEDERAL FUNDING SOURCES FOR WATERSHED PROTECTION (1997).
37. Federal funding to nonprofit organizations often passes through state agencies. See, e.g. BUREAU OF RESOURCE PROTECTION, MASSACHUSETTS DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, GRANT AND LOAN PROGRAMS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR WATERSHED PROTECTION PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION (1998) (including funding opportunities available to nonprofit organizations, authorized by the federal Clean Water Act but administered by the Massachusetts DEP in coordination with the state's watershed initiatives).
38. SEE LAND CONSERVATION THROUGH PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1.
39. JAMES A. TOBER, WILDLIFE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND FEDERAL WILDLIFE POLICY (1989).
40. See also, Reauthorizing the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to Help the Conservation of Our Fish and Wildlife Resources by Forging a Partnership of Private, Public, and Nonprofit Organizations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Env't and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103rd Cong., 1st Leg. Sess. (1993).
41. E.g., Timothy Beatley, T. James Fries, and David Braun, The Balcones Canyonlands Conservation Plan: A Regional Multi-species Approach, in COLLABORATIVE PLANNING FOR WETLANDS AND WILDLIFE: ISSUES AND EXAMPLES 75 (Douglas R. Porter & David A. Salvesen eds., 1995) (describing the Nature Conservancy's interactions with multiple levels of government and the coordination of land acquisition plans with the requirements of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544, in the Hill Country near Austin, Texas).
42. The Nature Conservancy's growing role takes place against the backdrop of the Department of the Interior's interpretation and implementation of section 10(a) of the Endangered Species Act, which has opened the way for collaborative planning to preserve habitat while allowing development in selected locations. See, e.g., Fred P. Bosselman, The Statutory and Constitutional Mandate for a No Surprises Policy, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707 (1997);
43. Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1997);
44. J.B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: Pushing the Legal and Practical Limits of Species Protection, 44 SW. L. J. 1393 (1991);
45. Joseph L. Sax, Closing Remarks, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883 (1997);
46. Albert C. Lin, Comment, Participants' Experiences with Habitat Conservation Plans and suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996).
47. California's Natural Communities Conservation Planning process has provided an important model of collaborative efforts under state law. See Marc J. Ebbin, Is the Southern California Approach to Conservation Succeeding?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695 (1997);
48. Jon Welner, Natural Communities Conservation Planning: An Ecosystem Approach to Protecting Endangered Species, 47 STAN. L. REV. 319, 346 (1995);
49. Douglas P. Wheeler, Keynote Address, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 623 (1997).
50. In numerous recent publications, EPA endorses watershed planning in the exercise of its regulatory and funding authority under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, and advocates collaboration with other governmental and nongovernmental entities. See, e.g., CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 10, at 71-87;
51. 63 Fed. Reg. 14,109 (1998) (providing overview of the Clean Water Action Plan):
52. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. EPA, EPA-841-R-97-011, STATEWIDE WATERSHED MANAGEMENT FACILITATION (1997);
53. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. EPA, EPA-840-F-97-001, TOP 10 WATERSHED LESSONS LEARNED (1997);
54. OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. EPA, EPA-840-S-96-001, WATERSHED APPROACH FRAMEWORK (1996);
55. ASSESSMENT AND WATERSHED PROTECTION DIVISION, U.S. EPA, EPA-841-R-95-003, WATERSHED PROTECTION: A PROJECT FOCUS (1995);
56. ASSESSMENT AND WATERSHED PROTECTION DIVISION, U.S. EPA, EPA-841-R-95-004, WATERSHED PROTECTION: A STATEWIDE APPROACH (1995).
57. For a case study of the implementation of the watershed approach at the state level, see Sarah Michaels, Configuring Who Does What in Watershed Management: The Massachusetts Watershed Initiative, 27 POL'Y STUD. J. _ (forthcoming 1999) (evaluating the role of local watershed associations and the success of state government in building local capacity). The American Heritage Rivers Initiative is a new federal endeavor to assist collaborative river conservation and community development efforts along selected American Heritage Rivers that will likely encourage projects involving nonprofit organizations.
58. See Exec. Order No. 13061, 62 Fed. Reg. 48,445 (1997) (announcing the initiative);
59. Exec. Order No. 13080, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,667 (1998) (establishing criteria for review of proposals);
60. Proclamation No. 7112, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,949 (1998) (designating rivers).
61. See e.g., Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10391 (1997);
62. Drew Caputo, A Job Half Finished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10574 (1997);
63. A. Dan Tarlock, Federalism Without Preemption: A Case Study in Bioregionalism, 27 PAC. L.J. 1629, 1652 (1996) ("The limited ability of the federal government to protect biodiversity both on its own public lands and on private property has forced the federal government to induce state and local cooperation to implement national objectives.");
64. Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973 (1995);
65. Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can It Be Done?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 480 (1989).
66. See also Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991);
67. J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555 (1995) (surveying the shortcomings of federal statutes affecting the protection of biological diversity);
68. James C. Buresh, Note, State and Federal Land Use Regulation: An Application to Groundwater and Nonpoint Source Pollution Control, 95 YALE L.J. 1433 (1986) (discussing limitations on federal authority to address water quality problems).
69. Local governments hold key authority to address land use, but they too face important legal and practical limitations on their regulatory powers. See A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 562 (1993).
70. See John C. Sawhill, Creating Biodiversity Partnerships: The Nature Conservancy's Perspective, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 789, 790-91 (1996) (identifying several key motivations for partnerships between industry and the Nature Conservancy, including mitigation of impacts required as a condition of government permits for development, planning of projects so as to avoid government review, and a desire to make charitable contributions of money or services.)
71. See id. at 790. See also Alyson C. Flournoy, Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, Ecology and Law, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 105, 120-21 nn. 55-56 (1996) (discussing the establishment of the Disney preserve in Florida as a wetlands mitigation project and the continuing role of the Nature Conservancy as project manager).
72. See Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape, supra note 1, at 408-410 (discussing the nature of ongoing coordination in partnership arrangements).
73. Typically, the nonprofit role fits within the "regulatory space" that is created when government requirements allow an escape from strict prohibitions on development by means of mitigation projects, purchase of tradable development rights, or other tradeoffs. A wide range of such mechanisms is explored in Dana Clark & David Downes, What Price Biodiversity? Economic Incentives and Biodiversity Conversion in the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9 (1996).
74. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 63,053 (1995),
75. 60 Fed. Reg. 53,799 (1995) (providing notice of habitat conservation plans and applications for "incidental take" permits under section 10(a) of the Endangered Species Act, premised upon the purchase of mitigation credits from the Nature Conservancy to acquire and manage mitigation habitat for the golden-cheeked warbler).
76. See Hansmann, supra note 3, at 28 (discussing the "public goods theory" of the economic role of nonprofit organizations).
77. See Douglas, supra note 4, at 46-49 (summarizing political theories of diversity and experimentation among nonprofit organizations).
78. See Hansmann, supra note 3, at 29 (summarizing the "contract failure theory" of nonprofit organizations).
79. See LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 8 (1995) (arguing that the relationship between government and nonprofit organizations "may consequently not be one of superior and dependent, but one of interdependence").
80. The interdependence of nonprofit organizations and other entitles in an evolving institutional context presents challenging problems for structured analysis, as Peter Dobkin Hall has noted in his essay The Nonprofit Sector in the Postliberal Era: [W]e are forced by political and economic realities to abandon the rhetoric of sectoral independence and philanthropy and to investigate those sensitive and often obscure regions of sectoral interdependence and interpenetration. Doing this requires in turn an abandonment of unidisciplinary approaches to organizational behavior, for such approaches invariably contain implicit premises about organizational and individual rationality which have little bearing on the realities of institutional life. HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 2, 85, 113.
81. See generally W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 82-100, 139-48 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing theories of "open" systems, and concepts of interdependence between organizations and environments).
82. See, e.g., BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS (Lance H. Gunderson, et al, eds., 1995) [hereinafter BARRIERS AND BRIDGES].
83. See also Ankerson & Hamann, supra note 9; Flournoy, supra note 21; Jonathan B. Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories and Consequences, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 334 (1995)
84. (reviewing JONATHON WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME (1994)).
85. See, e.g., Edward A. Parson & William C. Clark, Sustainable Development as Social Learning: Theoretical Perspectives and Practical Challenges for the Design of a Research Program, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 30, at 428.
86. J.B. Ruhl has explored the applicability of themes in complexity theory to the evolution of legal Institutions, with a particular focus on environmental law. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997);
87. J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996);
88. J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996).
89. See also Colloquium, Beyond the Balance of Nature: Environmental Law Faces the New Ecology, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (1996);
90. Elinor Ostrom, Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 33, 34 (Susan Hanna and Mohan Munasinghe eds., 1995).
91. One way that nonprofit organizations serve a bridging role is by employing staff or having members and affiliates who participate in community networks of relationships reaching beyond their role in the organization. John C. Sawhill, The Good-Neighbor Policy, NATURE CONSERVANCY, January/February 1998, at 5, 6 (emphasizing the importance of becoming "part of a place, trusted and accepted locally").
92. In addition, nonprofit organizations readily serve as forums for political interactions and negotiations among the individuals who are associated with it in various ways. Nonprofit organizations have no single set of "owners," and organizational governance depends on creating means for resolving disagreements among members, staff, donors, and officers and directors. ("[S]ince a firm that has numerous owners must employ some form of collective choice mechanism through which those owners can exercise control, all such firms necessarily have a strongly governmental, or political, character." HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 4 (1996).
93. "Using our preserve portfolio and scientific knowledge as a point of departure, we have an opportunity to reach out to a wide new group of partners and to amplify our impact many times .... Perhaps most important, the Conservancy needs to learn to relinquish a degree of control to achieve a larger end." John C. Sawhill, Turning Outward, NATURE CONSERVANCY, March/April 1998, at 5.
94. See generally, LANCE H. GUNDERSON, et al., Barriers Broken and Bridges Built: A Synthesis, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES, supra note 30, at 489, 527 ("Throughout the case studies the emergence of nongovernmental groups (NGOs) or epistemic communities. . .has formed critical bridges, which appear to fill gaps in existing institutional hierarchies and serve as conduits or media for information flow .... [They] create and enhance connections that are otherwise lacking in the traditional management institutions."). See also Ankerson & Hamann, supra note 10, at 525.
95. The tendency of nonprofit organizations to become increasingly professionalized, bureaucratic, and similar to government or for-profit enterprises on which they depend has been extensively studied outside the environmental field: the lessons learned are worth noting here. See e.g., STEVEN RATTHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING (1993) (finding that government contracting for welfare services has made nonprofit providers more rule-bound and business-like, but less responsive to community needs);
96. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organization Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) [hereinafter NEW INSTITUTIONALISM];
97. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, in NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 41 (discussing possible explanations for why organizations become less adaptable and diverse as their relationships with their environment become more institutionalized);
98. Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (1996);
99. ALAN WARE, BETWEEN PROFIT AND STATE: INTERMEDIATE ORGANIZATIONS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 257 (1989). See also Knauer, supra note 10, at 974-99 (raising questions about the equity and social justice implications of nonprofit organizations created by government).
100. Timothy Duane's thoughtful analysis of the importance of a local community's "social capital" in fostering collaborative ecosystem management provides helpful insights in considering the ability of nonprofit organizations to represent or interact with other groups, including local communities. See Timothy P. Duane, Community Participation in Ecosystem Management, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 771 (1997).
101. See also Elinor Ostrom & Gina Davis, Nonprofit Organizations as Alternatives and Complements in a Mixed Economy, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING NEW ROLES, ISSUES, AND TRENDS 23 (David C. Hammack & Dennis R. Young eds. 1993) (recommending a multi-tier mixed public-private economy that fosters experimentation with nonprofit endeavors).
102. See Burton A. Weisbrod, The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private Enterprise and Government, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 541 (1997) ("The growth of nonprofit sectors throughout the world is thrusting nonprofits into the central debate over the organization of society. Until now, the nonprofit sector has benefited from being small and largely out of sight. Success has changed this, with growing demands for accountability.").
103. Cf. Freeman, supra note 7, at 21-33 (setting forth a normative model of collaborative governance that would encompass enhanced roles for nonprofit organizations).
104. Relevant critiques in the environmental field focus on the lack of established standards in "collaborative" settings that fall back on self-interested bargaining. See Houck, supra note 16, at 936-39 (warning about the dangers of standardless ecosystem management that relies on political processes conducted under the labels of collaboration and social learning); Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773, 836-839 (1989) (criticizing the acceptance of tradeoffs in wetlands mitigation);
105. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998) (summarizing key aspects of the Clinton Administration's reinvention agenda as it pertains to industry self-regulation, and cautioning against abdication of government responsibilities).