Corporate disclosure and operational strategy: Financial vs. operational success

Management Science

Volumn 51, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 920-931

  Ozbilgin, Mehmet ^a   Penno, Mark ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF IOWA   (United States)

Author keywords

Competitive advantage; Financial disclosure; Operational efficiency

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE; FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE; OPERATIONAL CHOICE; OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY;

DATA TRANSFER; DECISION THEORY; FINANCE; INFORMATION ANALYSIS;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EID: 22544480545     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1050.0380     Document Type: Article

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