The third force? Independent regulatory agencies and elected politicians in Europe

Governance

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 347-373

  Thatcher, Mark ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22544443965     PISSN: 09521895     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00280.x     Document Type: Review

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