Who's keeping the peace?: Regionalization and contemporary peace operations

International Security

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 157-195

  Bellamy, Alex J ^a   Williams, Paul D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22144469847     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/0162288054299446     Document Type: Review

References (149)

1. These operations took place in Liberia (twice), Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Burundi, and Sudan respectively.
2. It is not our intention in this article to explain the rise in non-UN peace operations.
3. Earlier attempts to evaluate peace operations include William J. Durch, "Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s," in Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 17-22;
4. Steven Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's, 1995);
5. A.B. Featherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's, 1994);
6. R.C. Johansen, "UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success?" Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 (October 1994), pp. 307-310;
7. and Daniel Druckman and Paul Stern, "Perspectives on Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions," International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1999), pp. 1-14.
8. "The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations" (A/55/305 S/2000/809) is commonly referred to as the Brahimi report after its chairman, former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi. The report was published in August 2000 in response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's request that the panel thoroughly review the UN's "peace and security activities" and "present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future."
9. See Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "What Future for Peace Operations? Brahimi and Beyond," International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 183-212.
10. See, for example, Hilaire McCoubrey and Justin Morris, Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000);
11. Renata Dawn, International Policing in Peace Operations: The Role of Regional Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002);
12. Paul Diehl and Joseph Lepgold, eds., Regional Conflict Management (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003);
13. Connie Peck, Snstainable Peace: The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997);
14. Jane Boulden, ed., Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations (New York: Palgrave, 2003);
15. Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003);
16. and Paul Diehl, "Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping," Global Society, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 337-360.
17. This latter position is presented throughout Frederick H. Fleitz Jr., Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002).
18. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p. 306.
19. Sir Brian Urquhart, email exchange with students from Marin Academy High School, UC Berkeley's Model UN Program, at Boalt Law School, March 1999, http://globetrotter. Berkeley.edu/UN/Urquhart/urqchat99.peace.html.
20. Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 217.
21. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, "Everybody's Doing It," World Today, Vol. 59, Nos. 8/9 (August/ September 2003), pp. 35-36.
22. Luiz Carlos de Costa, principal officer of the undersecretary general for peacekeeping operations, "Supporting Peace in New Kinds of Conflict," address delivered at the Seminar on Crisis Management and Information Technology, Helsinki, Finland, September 30, 2002, p. 4.
23. Both Luiz Carlos de Costa (ibid., p. 4) and Jean-Marie Guéhenno ("Everybody's Doing It") recently used this label.
24. According to Australia's foreign minister, Alexander Downer, multilateralism is a "synonym for an ineffective and unfocused policy involving internationalism of the lowest common denominator," and multilateral organizations are "behemoths." Quoted in Michelle Gratton, "The World According to Howard," Age (Melbourne), July 2, 2003.
25. See Adam Roberts, "Law and the Use of Force after Iraq," Survival, Vol. 45, No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 31-56;
26. and Roberts's subsequent exchange about his article with Catherine Guicherd of the French Ministry of Defense, "Letters to the Editor," Survival, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 229-231.
27. We agree with Roberts's conclusion "that the Council, while its role is always important, does not have a monopoly on international security issues." "Letters to the Editor," p. 230.
28. S/PV.3988, March 24, 1999, pp. 6-7.
29. The government of a state is legally entitled to request assistance from other states in the suppression of rebel groups. See Michael Byers, "Terrorism, the Use of Force, and International Law after 11 September," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 403-404.
30. "Secretary-General's Annual Report to the General Assembly," September 20, 1999, cited by Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 294.
31. See Norman J. Padelford, "Regional Organization and the United Nations," International Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May 1954), pp. 203-216;
32. and Francis O. Wilcox, "Regionalism and the United Nations," International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July 1965), pp. 789-811.
33. UN Security Council meetings 295, S.PV/295, May 18, 1948, and 330, S.PV/330, July 7, 1948. The Security Council issued a resolution (resolution 49, May 22, 1948) presented by the United Kingdom calling for all parties to "abstain from any hostile military action." It was passed with eight affirmative votes and three abstentions (the Soviet Union, Syria, and Ukraine). The resolution demonstrates that while the council rejected the Arab League's claims, it nevertheless lacked the consensus necessary to issue a stronger condemnation or to take enforcement measures.
34. Nathan A. Pelcovits, The Long Armistice: UN Peacekeeping and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1960 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 9-17.
35. See the United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, eleventh sess., Supplement No. 18, A/3992, 1957.
36. Asbjørn Eide, "Peace-keeping and Enforcement by Regional Organizations: Its Place in the United Nations System," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1966), p. 129.
37. S/PV.3922, August 31, 1998, p. 2.
38. See Security Council resolution 1234, April 9, 1999.
39. See S/PV.3987, March 19, 1999.
40. See Security Council resolution 1304, June 16, 2000.
41. Although it should be noted that the Australian-led mission in the Solomon Islands had host-state consent, the fact remains that the Australian government chose not to seek the approval of the Security Council. We are not implying that Australia was either morally or legally obliged to do so, just that it self-consciously chose not to.
42. See Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society (London: Palgrave, 2002), p. 87.
43. The UN Mission in Kosovo enjoyed a close relationship with NATO; the UN's Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was temporarily bolstered by the French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF); the UN's missions in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone all enjoyed close links with ECOWAS; the UN's operation in Burundi (ONUB) replaced the AU's earlier mission; the UN's mission in East Timor (UNMISET) was partly composed of the follow-on military component of the previous Australian-led coalition (INTERFET); and the UN's stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) followed the U.S.-led multinational force.
44. Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?" International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 2003), p. 49. Gilligan and Stedman argue that there is "evidence of regional bias in the UN's selection of missions, but the worst bias is against Asia, not Africa." The probable explanation for this bias can be found in the creation of relatively strong states in Asia and their insistence on an "ASEAN way" of noninterference.
45. This role was foreseen by Inis Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," International Organization, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 1966), pp. 367-379.
46. See, for example, Ingvar Carlsson, Han Sung-Joo, and Rufus M. Kupolati, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/ 1257, December 15, 1999, p. 42.
47. Jeremy Ginifer, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (New York: UNIDIR, 1995), pp. 54-55.
48. See Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001).
49. Because the French-led IEMF in the DRC included contributions from non-EU states such as Brazil, Canada, and South Africa, we label this operation a "coalition of the willing."
50. The Pacific Island Forum is an organization comprising Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island states designed to facilitate political and economic cooperation. Although the forum issued a statement supporting the mission, it does not have the legal or political mandate to authorize it.
51. Although in Liberia during the 1990s the ECOWAS Monitoring Group had the consent of the official government led by Amos Sawyer, in practice it proved impossible to avoid enforcement action against Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia forces, which controlled most of the country if not the executive mansion.
52. See Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989);
53. and Connie L. McNeely, Constructing the Nation-State: International Organization and Prescriptive Action (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1995).
54. For more details, see Michael Pugh, "The World Order Politics of Regionalization," in Pugh and Sidhu, The United Nations and Regional Security, pp. 31-46.
55. Christian Reus-Smit has persuasively argued that states acting illegitimately incur more costs than those acting legitimately. See Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
56. James Gow and Christopher Dandeker, "Peace-Support Operations: The Problem of Legitimation," World Today, Vol. 51, Nos. 8/9 (August/September 1995), p. 171.
57. See also Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, "The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 327-347.
58. See Richard Shapcott, Justice, Community, and Dialogue in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001);
59. and Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
60. For example, in 1978 there was virtual unanimity in international society that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and ousting of the Khmer Rouge was illegitimate. A purely dialogic under-standing of legitimacy would be forced to insist that although not wholly illegitimate (because there were actors, however few, that supported the Vietnamese), the intervention was more illegitimate than legitimate. Given the barbarity of the Khmer Rouge regime, this is an intuitively problematic statement. For more details, see Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 78-110.
61. From this perspective, legitimacy is a social fact built on consent that is meaningful only to the members of the community that accepts it. Ian Clark, "Legitimacy in a Global Order," Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. S1 (December 2003), p. 80. For further elaboration of this conception of legitimacy,
62. see Christian Reus-Smit, ed., The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
63. We follow Barry Buzan's definition of "world society" as a domain composed of three types of actors (states, transnational actors, and individuals) where no single type is dominant over the other two. Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. xviii, 118-119. "International Society," by contrast, comprises states.
64. The concept of a "common morality" is put forward by Terry Nardin, "Justice and Coercion," in Alex J. Bellamy, ed., International Society and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 247-264.
65. Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 185.
66. This is the approach adopted by Nicholas J. Wheeler in "Liberal Interventionism versus International Law: Blair's Wars against Kosovo and Iraq," University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2003, p. 5.
67. This point was first suggested in Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "How Do Norms Matter?" in Michael Byers, ed., The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). We are grateful to Nicholas Wheeler for bringing this to our attention.
68. For more details, see Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peace-keeping (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), chaps, 5, 6.
69. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 33;
70. and Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 351, 360-362.
71. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, p. 33.
72. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, A/56/863, March 11, 2002, par. 10.
73. Durch, "Keeping the Peace," pp. 17-22.
74. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping, p. 7.
75. Featherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping.
76. Johansen, "UN Peacekeeping," pp. 307-310.
77. It should be noted that Security Council discussions with troop-contributing countries are not a matter of public record.
78. See, in particular, A.B. Featherston, "Putting the Peace Back into Peacekeeping: Theory Must Inform Practice," International Peacekeeping, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 3-29;
79. and A.B. Featherston, "Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution, and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks," in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham, eds., Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 190-218.
80. Diehl, International Peacekeeping, p. 33.
81. Johansen, "UN Peacekeeping," p. 309.
82. Druckman and Stern, "Perspectives on Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions," p. 3.
83. For contrasting views, see David Owen, Balkan Odyssey: Experiencing the Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995);
84. and Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition (London: Verso, 1997).
85. "Military Assistance to Sierra Leone," Ministry of Defense press release 270/00, October 10, 2000.
86. Ewan MacAskill and Richard Norton-Taylor, "Flawed Evidence Led to 'Mission Creep,'" Guardian, May 16, 2000.
87. In 1998 Tony Blair's government was embroiled in controversy over the so-called Arms-to-Africa affair in which the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office was found to have colluded with the military consultancy firm Sandline International to bring thirty tons of arms and ammunition into Sierra Leone in contravention of a UN arms embargo that had been drafted by Britain.
88. See Paul D. Williams, "Fighting for Freetown: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3 (December 2001), pp. 140-168.
89. See "Four Die in First Clash with British," Guardian, May 18, 2000.
90. For accounts of the hostage rescue mission, see Richard Connaughton, "Operation Barass," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 110-119;
91. and Damien Lewis, Operation Certain Death (London: Century, 2004).
92. See, for example, John Pilger, "Britain Is Recolonising Sierra Leone in an Attempt to Get Its Hands on the Country's Diamonds," New Statesman, September 18, 2000, p. 25.
93. On May 22, 2000, just fifteen British military observers were part of UNAMSIL.
94. See Tony Blair, "Britain's Role in Sierra Leone," press statement, May 19, 2000.
95. See, for example, S/PV.4139, May 11, 2000; S/PV.4054, October 22, 1999, p. 8;
96. S/PV.4099, February 7, 2000, pp. 3-4;
97. "A Line in the Sand," Economist, September 16, 2000, p. 25;
98. and Hugo Young, "We Are Good At Getting In, Not So Good At Getting Out," Guardian, May 18, 2000.
99. S/PV.4139.
100. See, for example, Sierra Leone, briefing paper (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, May 8, 2000);
101. Jon Swain, "The Making of a Monster," Sunday Times (London), May 21, 2000;
102. Quoted in "Cook's Double Trouble," Daily Telegraph, May 15, 2000.
103. "Sierra Leone Cruelly Exposes UN's Crisis," Guardian, May 6, 2000. See also S/2000/13, January 11, 2000, par. 25.
104. Statement to the House of Commons, May 23, 2000. See also statement by the prime minister's office on Sierra Leone.
105. See Amos Sawyer, "Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges in West Africa: The Case of the Mano River Basin Area," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (September 2004), pp. 437-463.
106. See the discussions in Sierra Leone: One Year after Lomé, Strategy Planning Series No. 5 (London: Center for Democracy and Development, September 15, 2000).
107. See Peter Penfold, "Will Justice Help Peace?" World Today, Vol. 58, No. 11 (November 2002), pp. 21-23.
108. We owe these insights to Michael Kargbo.
109. U.K. Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, Cm. 3999 (London: 1998).
110. Judith Bennett, "State, Society, and Governance in Melanesia," Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies working paper 2002/5 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2002), pp. 9-10.
111. See also Gerard A. Finn and Terence A. Wesley-Smith, "Coups, Conflicts, and Crises: The New Pacific Way?" working paper (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center, June 13, 2000).
112. Satish Chand, "Conflict to Crisis in the Solomon Islands," ANU Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol. 17, No. 1 (May 2002), pp. 154-159.
113. Elsina Wainwright, The Solomon Islands: Our Failing Neighbor (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003).
114. "Agreement between the Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and Other Personnel Deployed to the Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security," Australian Treaty Series [2003] ATS 17, July 24, 2003.
115. "Alexander Downer Responds to Foreign Policy Criticism," ABC The World Today, June 27, 2003, http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2003/ s889845/htm.
116. Satish Chand, "Deficit Bias, Debt Accumulation, and Repeat Economic Crises in Papua New Guinea," working paper (Canberra: Australian National University, June 2003). These concerns were partly produced by Papua New Guinea's previous experiences with Australian-led peace-keeping in Bougainville. See
117. Jim Rolfe, "Peacekeeping the Pacific Way in Bougainville," International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 38-55.
118. David Fickling, "The Bad Old Days of Colonialism," Guardian, July 21, 2003.
119. I b i d.
120. "Agreement between the Solomon Islands, Australia, et al.," articles 2 and 9.
121. "Harold Keke's Surrender Met with Elation," ABC AM, August 14, 2003, http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2003/s924093.htm.
122. "Solomons Arms Amnesty Comes to a Close," ABC Correspondents Report, August 24, 2003, http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2003/ s930601.htm.
123. See Annika S. Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations, Adelphi Paper No. 343 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002).
124. David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002).
125. Specifically, the council "welcome[d] the leadership exerted by Australia and New Zealand, in close partnership with the other countries in the region in this regard." Statement by the President of the Security Council on the Solomon Islands, SC/7853, August 26, 2003.
126. See Alison Des Forges/ "Burundi: Foiled Coup or Creeping Coup?" No. 93 (May 1994), pp. 205-208.
127. S/2003/1146, December 4, 2003, p. 10.
128. Ibid., p. 11 and p. 9.
129. For details, see Ahmedou Ould-Abdullah, Burundi on the Brink, 1993-1995: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2000).
130. According to one respected analyst, Jan van Eck, far from "representing a genuine national consensus among Burundians," the Arusha process became "one of the major sources of dispute and contention." Van Eck, "We Can't Guarantee Their Safety," Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), March 3, 2003.
131. The protection force was originally intended to be a multinational force with troops from Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa. The other contingents, however, did not arrive, claiming that the security situation remained too precarious.
132. The United Kingdom's representative explicitly reiterated that the SAPSD did not have a UN mandate in S/PV.4399, October 29, 2001, p. 2.
133. See, for example, Security Council resolution 1375, October 29, 2001; statements by the president of the Security Council and the Ugandan representative as chairman of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, S/PV.4406, November 8, 2001, pp. 4-5; and statement on behalf of the Security Council by Mr. Knight (Jamaica), S/PV.4417, November 15, 2001, p. 2.
134. See S/2002/1259, November 18, 2002.
135. Quoted in S/PV.4655, December 4, 2002, p. 4.
136. See S/PV.4675, December 18, 2002, p. 3; and S/PRST/2002/40, December 18, 2002.
137. See "Communiqué of the Ninety-first Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution at Ambassadorial Level," Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, April 2, 2003. AMIB was authorized to comprise some 3,500 troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa. The Arusha agreement envisaged its deployment by the end of December 2002, but logistical and political difficulties delayed its arrival.
138. Indeed, both contingents received crucial bilateral funding from the United Kingdom and the United States. Denmark, Germany, and Italy also made contributions to AMIB.
139. The force comprised 866 troops from Ethiopia, 228 from Mozambique, 1,508 from South Africa, and 43 military observers from Benin, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, and Tunisia. Ethiopia later indicated a willingness to expand its contingent to 1,300. See S/2003/1146, p. 7.
140. Liesl Louw, "On the Streets of Bunia and Burundi," eAfrica, July 2003, pp. 12-13.
141. The Pretoria Protocols were signed on October 8 and November 2, 2003, respectively. They set out commitments regarding political, defense, and security power-sharing. For details, see S 2003/1146, pp. 3-4.
142. S/2003/1146, p. 8.
143. See Human Rights Watch, Everyday Victims: Civilians in Burundi's War (New York: Vol. 15 No. 20(A), December 2003), pp. 9-15.
144. "Zuma's Other Hotspot: Two Rebel Factions Hold the SA-Backed Peace Process to Ransom," Africa Confidential, Vol. 44, No. 16 (2003), p. 6.
145. Quoted in "Burundi Peace Agreement," Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social, and Cultural Series, Vol. 40, No. 11 (2003), p. 15532B.
146. For the dangerous security situation in 2002, see S/2002/1259, p. 6.
147. S/2003/1146, p. 6.
148. Ibid., p. 11.
149. We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this formulation.