메뉴 건너뛰기
Social Choice and Welfare
Volumn 13, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 397-417
Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games
Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]
Indexed keywords

EID: 21344456816     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00182851     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (26)
References (7)
  • 1
    • 0000265025 scopus 로고
    • Weighted voting doesn't work: A mathematical analysis
    • Banzhaf JF III (1965) Weighted voting doesn't work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Rev 19: 317-343
    • (1965) Rutgers Law Rev , vol.19 , pp. 317-343
    • Banzhaf III, J.F.1
  • 2
    • 84970442212 scopus 로고
    • When is size a liability? Bargaining power in minimal winning coalitions
    • Brams SJ, Fishburn PC (1995) When is size a liability? Bargaining power in minimal winning coalitions. J Theor Politics 7: 301-316
    • (1995) J Theor Politics , vol.7 , pp. 301-316
    • Brams, S.J.1    Fishburn, P.C.2
  • 3
    • 34250283139 scopus 로고
    • A new index of power for simple n-person games
    • Deegan J Jr, Packel EW (1979) A new index of power for simple n-person games. Int J Game Theory 4: 113-123
    • (1979) Int J Game Theory , vol.4 , pp. 113-123
    • Deegan Jr., J.1    Packel, E.W.2
  • 4
    • 0042617181 scopus 로고
    • To the (minimal winning) victors go the (equally divided) spoils: A new power index for simple n-person games
    • Brams SJ, Lucas WF, Straffin PD Jr (eds) Springer, New York
    • Deegan J Jr, Packel EW (1983) To the (minimal winning) victors go the (equally divided) spoils: a new power index for simple n-person games. In: Brams SJ, Lucas WF, Straffin PD Jr (eds) Modules in applied mathematics: political and related models. Springer, New York, pp 239-255
    • (1983) Modules in Applied Mathematics: Political and Related Models , pp. 239-255
    • Deegan Jr., J.1    Packel, E.W.2
  • 5
    • 0041847932 scopus 로고
    • An axiomatized family of power indices for simple n-person games
    • Packel EW, Deegan J Jr (1980) An axiomatized family of power indices for simple n-person games. Public Choice 35: 229-239
    • (1980) Public Choice , vol.35 , pp. 229-239
    • Packel, E.W.1    Deegan Jr., J.2
  • 7
    • 84959582296 scopus 로고
    • A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system
    • Shapley LS, Shubik M (1954) A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system. Amer Polit Sci Rev 48: 787-792
    • (1954) Amer Polit Sci Rev , vol.48 , pp. 787-792
    • Shapley, L.S.1    Shubik, M.2

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.