Internal control versus external manipulation: A model of corporate income tax evasion

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 151-164

  Chen, Kong Pin ^a   Chu, C Y Cyrus ^b  

^a NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b ACADEMIA SINICA   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21644458376     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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