Mind the gap

Nous

Volumn 32, Issue SUPPL. 12, 1998, Pages 373-388

  Papineau, David ^a  

^a KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 61949206301     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.16     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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12. Loar, B. (1990). "Phenomenal States," Philosophical Perspectives 4: 81-108.
13. McGinn, C. (1991). The Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
14. Mellor, D. (1995). The Facts of Causation. London: Routledge.
15. Menzies, P. (1988). "Against Causal Reductionism," Mind 97: 551-74.
16. Nagel, T. (1974). "What is it Like to be a Bat?" Philosophical Review 4: 435-50.
17. Papineau, D. (1991). "The Reason Why: Response to Crane," Analysis 51: 37-40.
18. Papineau, D. (1993a). "Physicalism, Consciousness, and the Antipathetic Fallacy," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 169-183.
19. Papineau, D. (1993b). Philosophical Naturalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
20. Papineau, D. (1995). "The Antipathetic Fallacy and the Boundaries of Consciousness," in Metzinger, T. (ed) Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Schoningh.
21. Segal, G. and Sober, E. (1991). "The Causal Efficacy of Content," Philosophical Studies 63: 1-30.
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