Inflation, taxes, and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy by use of a game of chicken

Canadian Journal of Economics

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 82-99

  Barnett, Richard C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2142860209     PISSN: 00084085     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00063     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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15. Woodward, B. (1994) The Agenda (New York: Simon and Schuster)