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Journal of Economic Theory
Volumn 76, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 72-105
Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model
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EID: 0031236228     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2293     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (31)
References (16)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.