Children's understanding of their own and others' mental states. Part B. Understanding of others precedes self-understanding for some false beliefs

British Journal of Developmental Psychology

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 201-209

  Mitchell, Robert W ^a   Neal, Melissa ^a  

^a EASTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21244475618     PISSN: 0261510X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1348/026151004X21099     Document Type: Review

References (22)

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