Humeanism without humean supervenience: A projectivist account of laws and possibilities

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 107, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 191-218

  Ward, Barry ^a  

^a Department of Childhood Studies at Rutgers University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 20744449729     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1014583323702     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. Adams, E. (1970): 'Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals', Foundations of Language 6, 89-94.
2. Ayer, A.J. (1956): 'What is a Law of Nature?', Revue Internationale de Philosophie 10, 144-165,
3. collected in A.J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968).
4. Armstrong, D.M. (1983): What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Blackburn, S. (1980): 'Truth, Realism, and the Regulation of Theory', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. V, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
6. Blackburn, S. (1984): Spreading the Word, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
7. Blackburn, S. (1987): 'Morals and Modals', in C. Wright and G. Macdonald (eds.), Fact, Science and Value, Essay's in Honour of A.J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, Oxford: Blackwell.
8. Blackburn, S. (1988a): 'How to be an Ethical Anti-Realist', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XII, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
9. Blackburn, S. (1988b): 'Attitudes and Contents', Ethics 98, 501-517.
10. Blackburn, S. (1993): Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Blackburn, S. (1998): Ruling Passions, New York: Oxford University Press.
12. Carroll, J. (1994): Laws of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Chisholm, R. (1946): 'The Contrary'-to-fact Conditional', Mind 55, 289-307.
14. Dretske, F. (1977): 'Laws of Nature', Philosophy of Science 44, 248-268.
15. Earman, J. (1986), A Primer on Determinism, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
16. Geach, P. (1965): 'Assertion', Philosophical Review lxxiv.
17. Gibbard, A. (1990): Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
18. Goodman, N. (1947): 'The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals', Journal of Philosophy 44, 113-128.
19. Goodman, N. (1973): Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, 3rd edn., New York: Bobbs-Merrill.
20. Hall, N. (1994): 'Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance', Mind 103, 504-517.
21. Lange, M. (2000): Natural Laws in Scientific Practice, New York: Oxford University Press.
22. Lewis, D. (1973): Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
23. Lewis, D. (1980): 'A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance', in R.C. Jeffrey (ed.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability (pp. 263-293), Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
24. Lewis, D. (1986): Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
25. Lewis, D. (1994): 'Humean Supervenience Debugged', Mind 103, 473-490.
26. Loewer, B. (1996): 'Humean Supervenience', Philosophical Topics 24, 101-127.
27. Mackie, J.L. (1962): 'Counterfactuals and Causal Laws', in R.J. Butler (ed.), Analytical Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell.
28. Maudlin, T.: 'A Modest Proposal' (Unpublished Manuscript).
29. Maudlin, T.: 'Why be Humean?' (Unpublished Manuscript).
30. McDermott, M. (1999): 'Counterfactuals and Access Points', Mind 108, 291-334.
31. O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. and Price, H. (1996): 'How to Stand up for Non-Cognitivists', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 275-292.
32. Ramsey, F.P. (1931): The Foundations of Mathematics R.B. Braithwaite (ed.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
33. Rescher, N. (1969): 'Lawfulness as Mind-Dependent', in N. Rescher et al. (eds.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
34. Thau, M. (1994): 'Undermining and Admissibility', Mind 103, 491-503.
35. Tooley, M. (1977): 'The Nature of Laws', Canadian Journal of Philosophy VII, 667-698.
36. van Fraassen, B.C. (1989): Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
37. Ward, B. (2001): A Humean Projectivist Theory of Natural Laws and Objective Chances, PhD Thesis.
38. Ward, B.: 'Humean Chance Laws without Undermining Futures: How to Vindicate and Justify the Principal Principle'.
39. Ward, B.: 'Sometimes the World is not Enough: The Pursuit of Explanatory Laws in a Humean World'.
40. Woodward, J. (1984): 'A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation', Erkenntnis 21, 231-262.