How to stand up for non-cognitivists

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 275-292

  O'Leary Hawthorne, John ^a   Price, Huw ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 20744455296     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048409612347251     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. The argument may be found for example in Paul Boghossian, 'The Status of Content', The Philosophical Review 99 (1990) pp 157-184;
2. Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992);
3. Paul Horwich, 'Gibbard's Theory of Norms', Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993) pp. 67-78;
4. I.L. Humberstone, 'Critical Notice of F. Jackson, Conditionals', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991) pp. 227-234.
5. For an early use of a similar point, see John McDowell, 'Anti-realism and the epistemology of understanding' in J. Bouveresse and H. Parret (eds.), Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1981) p. 229, fn. 9.
6. 'Minimalism and Truth Aptness', Mind 103 (1994) pp. 287-302 (page references in section IV below are to this paper).
7. Paul Horwich, Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) pp. 87-88.
8. Horwich makes it clear that he is not merely proposing to fall back on the idea that ethical judgements do not express beliefs, saying that 'the essential character of emotivism might be captured without having to question the existence of ethical propositions, beliefs, assertions, etc.'. On this point see Simon Blackburn, 'Wittgenstein's Irrealism' in J. Brandl and R. Haller (eds.), Wittgenstein: Eine Neubewehrung (Vienna: Holder-Richler-Temsky, 1990)
9. and 'Wittgenstein and Minimalism' in Garrett, B. and Mulligan, K. (eds.), Themes From Wittgenstein, Working Papers in Philosophy, No. 4 (Canberra: Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, ANU, 1993) pp. 1-14.
10. 'Reference Explained Away', The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984) pp. 469-492.
11. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
12. Horwich makes this point in 'Gibbard's Theory of Norms', Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993) pp. 67-78.
13. For more on these issues see Huw Price, Facts and the Function of Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989)
14. and 'Semantic minimalism and the Frege point' in S.L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994).
15. There is a very clear exposition of the program in Jackson's 'Armchair Metaphysics' in M. Michael and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), The Place of Philosophy in the Study of the Mind (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994) pp. 23-42. It is also a major theme of Jackson's 1995 John Locke Lectures.
16. See also David Lewis' 'Reduction of Mind' in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
17. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, 'Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation', The Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995) pp. 21-40.
18. This line of thought is pursued at length in connection with talk about meaning in Mark Lance and John O'Leary-Hawthorne, The Grammar of Meaning (forthcoming), and more generally in Huw Price, 'Metaphysical Pluralism', The Journal of Philosophy 89 (1992) pp. 387-409.