Captains or pirates? State-business relations in post-socialist Poland

East European Politics and Societies

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 21-39

  Schoenman, Roger ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Corruption; Lobbying; Oligarchs; Political parties; Privatization

Indexed keywords

EID: 20744444431     PISSN: 08883254     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0888325404272216     Document Type: Review

References (58)

1. Tadeusz Dolȩga-Mostowicz, The Career of Nikodema Dyzma. Wroceław, Poland: Wydawnictwo Dolnośla̧skie, 94.
2. Joel S. Hellman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist Transitions," World Politics 50:2(1998): 203-34;
3. and Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
4. Poland's growth rate is 3.3 percent yearly according to the World Development Indicators (WDI), http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. GDP growth is just one of many indicators of economic of development but is often used as a first-cut comparative measure. Other countries with positive average growth are Slovenia (2.12), Hungary (0.97), the Czech Republic (0.62), and, surprisingly, Albania (1.53).
5. Searches conducted with OCLC Social Science Abstracts revealed the following number of matches for keyword searches limited to "Eastern Europe" and "Privatization" (143), "Big Bang reform" (22), "institutional reform" (31), but only 7 for "lobbying" (1 relevant) and 5 for "interest groups."
6. Anders Aslund. How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995);
7. and Jeffrey Sachs and Katharina Pistor, The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).
8. See Barbara Blaszczyk, Uwarunkowania Wzrostu Sektora Prywatnego w Polsce- Praca Zbiorowa (Warszawa, Poland: Centrum Analiz Spoleczno-Ekonomicznych, 1999).
9. Timothy Frye and Andrei Shleifer, "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand: Private Shops in Moscow and Warsaw," American Economic Review 87:2 (June 1997): 354-58.
10. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
11. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 2001: Energy in Transition (London: The Bank, 2001).
12. See Alice Amsden, Jacek Kochanowicz, and Lance Taylor, The Market Meets Its Match: Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994);
13. Robert Wade, Governing the Market Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990);
14. and Stephen Haggard, Steven Benjamin Webb, and the World Bank, Voting for Reform Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment (New York: Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, 1994), among others.
15. David Stark, Szabolcs Kemeny, and Ronald Breiger, "Postsocialist Portfolios: Network Strategies In the Shadow of the State." (Unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, 2000).
16. Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, or CBOD (The Public Opinion Research Center), Aktualne problemy i wydarzenia (136). (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS, 2001).
17. Interviews conducted in Warsaw.
18. Based on interviews in 2001 conducted with the owners and executives of the largest Polish companies.
19. Rzeczpospolita, 16 July 2001.
20. See reports by INE-PAN in the largest Polish business newspaper at www.rzeczpospolita. pl/dodatki/lista500_2001_010508/lista500_2001_a_6.html.
21. To overcome this problem, interview-based analysis will follow the large-n exploration developed here.
22. Firm ownership is coded according to the three largest owners. 1 = state-owned, 2 = 100 percent state-owned sole proprietorship in preparation for privatization (state-owned legal person), 3 = communal ownership, 4 = private domestic ownership, 5 = private foreign ownership, 6 = co-operative ownership, 7 = privately managed state investment portfolio. For example, a code of 145 means that the largest owner is the state, the second largest is private domestic owner, and the third is a private foreign owner.
23. Based on interviews conducted at all nationally visible business organizations: PKPP, PRB, BCC, KIG, Polski Zwiazek Przemysłu.
24. Thane Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-Style (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999);
25. Steven Lee Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions, Russian Research Center Studies 89 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998);
26. Jadwiga Staniszkis, Post-Communism: The Emerging Enigma (Warsaw, Poland: IFiS PAN, 2000); and
27. Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor R. Townsley, Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Class Formation and Elite Struggles in Post-Communist Central Europe (London: Verso, 1998).
28. Rzeczpospolita, 16 July 2001.
29. See Sylwia Wilkos and Marcin Walecki, multiple chapters in Marcin Walecki, ed., Finansowanie Polityki: Wybory, Pieniadze, Partie Polityczne (Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2000).
30. Jack Bielasiak quoted in Joseph Brada, "Privatization is Transition - Or Is It?" Journal of Economic Perspectives 10:2(1996): 67-86; and
31. Jack Bielasiak, "Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30 (1997): 475-96.
32. "Ruch Dwoch," Polityka, 21 July 2001.
33. In 2000 campaign, financing regulations restricted the types of contributions that could be accepted. Restricted sources of funding for Presidential campaigns were defined in the law of 25 May 2000 (Dziennik Ustaw Nr 43, poz. 488). Parliamentary campaigns were reformed on 16 May 2002 (Dziennik Ustaw Nr 46, poz. 499). Political party financing was reformed in the law of 31 July 2001 (Dziennik Ustaw Nr 79, poz. 857).
34. Gazeta Wyborcza, 13 July 2001
35. Marcin Walecki, "Dochody Polskich Partii Politycznych," in M. Walecki, ed., Finansowanie Polityki, 113.
36. Interviews conducted at the Ministry of the Treasury in 2000.
37. See, for example, Maria Jarosz, Manowce Polskiej Prywatyzacji (Warsaw, Poland: PWN, 2001).
38. Interviews conducted at the Ministry of the Treasury in 2000.
39. Access to information has stirred a serious public debate in Poland. My repeated requests for access to public documents containing this information at the Ministry of the Treasury were denied "in order to prevent unfair competition." The irony of this response was not lost on the secret police (UOP) functionary at the ministry, but my third request was also denied. My appeals to the minister during her well-publicized appearance in an Internet chat room run by Gazeta Wyborcza resulted in assurances, but my final request for access was also rejected.
40. Polityka, March 1999. Various informants cited this dynamic when describing the system of supervisory boards.
41. Rzeczpospolita, 12 December 2001.
42. Interview with Alexander Gudzowaty, Warsaw, Poland. 16 April 2001.
43. Piotr Gabryel and Marek Zieleniewski, Piata Wladza: Czyli Kto Naprawde Rzadzi Polska (Warsaw, Poland: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1998).
44. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (daily news briefing), 8 January 1998.
45. M. Wyjcicka, Zgodnie z prawem, ale . . ., 18 January 2001, www.radiozet.pl.
46. Tygodnik Finansowy, 17 January 2001.
47. Rzeczpospolita, 6 July 2001.
48. Gazeta Wyborcza, 22 July 2000.
49. Gazeta Wyborcza 2000 Ibid.
50. Interview with Jan Kulczyk, Warsaw, Poland, July 2001.
51. Jan Winiecki, Institutional Barriers to Poland's Economic Development: The Incomplete Transition (London: Routledge, 1997);
52. and Gazeta Wyborcza, 24 May 1999.
53. Walecki, Finansowanie Polityki.
54. The combined earnings of recognized state-owned firms (SOEs) in 2000 were 213.5 billion zlotys, which is 42.5 percent of the earnings of the top five hundred firms (502.1 billion zlotys). Foreign firms had 179 billion zCłotys earnings (35.6 percent) and private firms had 107.1 billion złotys (21.3 percent), In 1999, this was 48.8 percent for SOEs, 30.8 percent for foreign firms, and 19.8 percent for private firms. See www.rzeczpospolita.pl/dodatki/Iista500_2001_010508.
55. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 10.
56. Ministry of the Economy, Industrial Policy Guidelines for the Years 1999-2002 (Warsaw, Poland: Ministry of the Economy, 1999).
57. Venelin Ganev, "The Dorian Gray Effect: Winners as State Breakers in Postcommunism," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34:1(2001): 1-25.
58. Interviews with prominent business leaders, anticorruption activists, and business organizations.