Friendship and the Self

Ethics

Volumn 108, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 502-527

  Cocking, Dean ^a   Kennett, Jeanette ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0346968522     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233824     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. Some worthy recent discussions include Elizabeth Telfer, "Friendship," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1970-71): 223-41; L. A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Neera Kapur Badhwar, ed., Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Michael Stocker, "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65.
2. Some worthy recent discussions include Elizabeth Telfer, "Friendship," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1970-71): 223-41; L. A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Neera Kapur Badhwar, ed., Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Michael Stocker, "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65.
3. Some worthy recent discussions include Elizabeth Telfer, "Friendship," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1970-71): 223-41; L. A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Neera Kapur Badhwar, ed., Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Michael Stocker, "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65.
4. Some worthy recent discussions include Elizabeth Telfer, "Friendship," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1970-71): 223-41; L. A. Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980); Neera Kapur Badhwar, ed., Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Michael Stocker, "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 747-65.
5. Here my lack of interest in ballet itself would be evidenced by my being more likely to make an excuse or my different kind of interest indicated by such thoughts as: "I'm at a loose end, why not?" or "I don't know many people at work, this might be a way. . . ." Or I might attend out of a sense of duty, reminding myself that my aunt doesn't get out much and can't get to the ballet without an escort. The other person's interest would not of itself provide the reason.
6. Of course, one could deny the force of the 'simply' here by pointing to the possibility of a friend's interests in, say, deplorable or idiotic pursuits. So, for example, the fact that my friend likes to watch sadistic films or to count blades of grass or to go bungee jumping (when I suffer vertigo) would not and should not suffice to make me interested in these things. But the fact that there may be constraints on the interest one can have in one's friend's interests does not touch the point we make here. It remains true to say that one can be disposed to be interested in pursuing certain activities that one otherwise would not be, simply on account of one's friend.
7. It has been suggested to us that the term 'direction' is an infelicitous one for our purposes since it has unfortunate connotations of domination and control. In the context of a discussion of friendship, which is acknowledged on all sides to be a relationship of mutuality and choice, this certainly would be unfortunate. We hope our spelling out of the concept of direction throughout the article makes it clear that we have a common and more benign usage in mind. I am no more dominated or controlled by my friend when I allow myself to be directed by her interest in deciding what movie to see than I am dominated or controlled by the passerby whom I ask for directions to the cathedral. We thank the referees for encouraging us to clarify this point.
8. It is true that Aristotle emphasizes the importance of shared activity to friendship but, as we will argue, he sees this as a product of the friends' preexisting shared tastes and shared conception of the good life. For Aristotle change is not integral to friendship -indeed it is more likely to threaten friendship.
9. Nancy Sherman, "Aristotle and the Shared Life," in Badhwar, ed., pp. 91-107, p. 98.
10. See also, e.g., EN 1156b17. "For all friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure . . . and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of the friends themselves; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities also are alike in both friends." Here it seems clear that Aristotle's view is that all friendships, including friendships of pleasure and utility, are based on resemblance.
11. We acknowledge that for any two friends a great many points of similarity could be found. But, for any two people a great many points of similarity could be found.
12. There are numerous examples of this phenomenon in popular culture. Television's Odd Couple and the nursery rhyme Jack Spratt spring to mind. Another well-known literary case is that of Darcy and Bingley in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice. Austen writes: "Between him and Darcy there was a very steady friendship in spite of a great opposition of character. - Bingley was endeared to Darcy by the easiness, openness, ductility of his temper, though no disposition could offer a greater contrast to his own, and though with his own he never appeared dissatisfied" (Pride and Prejudice, ed. James Kinsley, World's Classics [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990]), p. 13.
13. There are numerous examples of this phenomenon in popular culture. Television's Odd Couple and the nursery rhyme Jack Spratt spring to mind. Another well-known literary case is that of Darcy and Bingley in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice. Austen writes: "Between him and Darcy there was a very steady friendship in spite of a great opposition of character. - Bingley was endeared to Darcy by the easiness, openness, ductility of his temper, though no disposition could offer a greater contrast to his own, and though with his own he never appeared dissatisfied" (Pride and Prejudice, ed. James Kinsley, World's Classics [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990]), p. 13.
14. There are numerous examples of this phenomenon in popular culture. Television's Odd Couple and the nursery rhyme Jack Spratt spring to mind. Another well-known literary case is that of Darcy and Bingley in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice. Austen writes: "Between him and Darcy there was a very steady friendship in spite of a great opposition of character. - Bingley was endeared to Darcy by the easiness, openness, ductility of his temper, though no disposition could offer a greater contrast to his own, and though with his own he never appeared dissatisfied" (Pride and Prejudice, ed. James Kinsley, World's Classics [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990]), p. 13.
15. I may of course be disposed from motives other than friendship to pursue activities that we have in common. I may be motivated by ambition to spend more time with you. What this also suggests, then, is that even if the recognition of greater similarity between us provides the occasion for us to spend more time together this need not indicate a move toward companion friendship.
16. It follows then that I cannot love you for any characteristics which I am unable to love in myself, and it is this kind of thought that underpins Aristotle's view that companion friendship is only available to the virtuous, for only they can truly love themselves. There is some truth in this last claim. Perhaps I am not inclined toward friendship with you because I do not like what I see of me when I look at you. I see my mean streak reflected in you or my tendency to brood over imagined slights. I am surely more likely to be inclined toward friendship with someone in whom I see reflected my particular sense of humor or my burning concern with social issues.
17. Of course, Aristotle thinks that friendship between the virtuous involves people of stable character and dispositions and so will not be so easily dissolved as the lesser friendships of pleasure and utility. Nevertheless, he holds that great disparity in any respect puts friendship out of reach and goes so far as to say that, "if we were right in saying that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must remain the sort of being he is" (EN 1159a11).
18. That Aristotle's mirror view of friendship has this narcissistic element is supported by Elijah Millgram's examination of it in "Aristotle on Making Other Selves," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1987): 361-76. Millgram concludes that "Aristotle's explanations of friendship are uniformly self-oriented . . . self-love is playing too great, and the wrong kind of, a role" (see pp. 375-76).
19. Indeed, one might say that such value-laden objections are misguided in targeting an account of the nature of friendship. However, one might say that it is a constraint on the plausibility of any account of the nature of friendship that such an account does not violate the positive value that we place on friendship.
20. And here we note an important difference between the interpretations of the portrait painter and that of the friend. As is well recognized, friendship is a reciprocal relationship. The reciprocity of the relation itself influences the process and the outcome of creative interpretation in friendship. This is not true of creative interpretation in the portrait painter case. The subject is passive with respect to the interpretation.
21. See, e.g., Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1983), esp. p. 41; and Mary Ann Warren, "The Moral Significance of Birth," Hypatia 4 (1989): 46-65. It is doubtful, Warren says, "that a child reared in total isolation from human . . . beings could develop the capacities for self-awareness and social interaction that are essential to personhood." Nathaniel Branden argues in "Love and Psychological Visibility" (in Badhwar, ed.) that the self is made visible by the responses of the other in friendship and love. He says, "All of us, to a profoundly important extent, experience who we are in the context of our relationships. . . . And we keep growing and evolving through our encounters" (p. 69). We agree with Branden here and claim that our view explains that evolution of the self through friendship. We disagree, however, with his further claim, that this experience of psychological visibility can only be provided by someone who is similar in the respects in which one becomes visible.
22. See, e.g., Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1983), esp. p. 41; and Mary Ann Warren, "The Moral Significance of Birth," Hypatia 4 (1989): 46-65. It is doubtful, Warren says, "that a child reared in total isolation from human . . . beings could develop the capacities for self-awareness and social interaction that are essential to personhood." Nathaniel Branden argues in "Love and Psychological Visibility" (in Badhwar, ed.) that the self is made visible by the responses of the other in friendship and love. He says, "All of us, to a profoundly important extent, experience who we are in the context of our relationships. . . . And we keep growing and evolving through our encounters" (p. 69). We agree with Branden here and claim that our view explains that evolution of the self through friendship. We disagree, however, with his further claim, that this experience of psychological visibility can only be provided by someone who is similar in the respects in which one becomes visible.
23. See, e.g., Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1983), esp. p. 41; and Mary Ann Warren, "The Moral Significance of Birth," Hypatia 4 (1989): 46-65. It is doubtful, Warren says, "that a child reared in total isolation from human . . . beings could develop the capacities for self-awareness and social interaction that are essential to personhood." Nathaniel Branden argues in "Love and Psychological Visibility" (in Badhwar, ed.) that the self is made visible by the responses of the other in friendship and love. He says, "All of us, to a profoundly important extent, experience who we are in the context of our relationships. . . . And we keep growing and evolving through our encounters" (p. 69). We agree with Branden here and claim that our view explains that evolution of the self through friendship. We disagree, however, with his further claim, that this experience of psychological visibility can only be provided by someone who is similar in the respects in which one becomes visible.
24. Sherman, p. 94. See also EN 1097a34-b25. As John Campbell has pointed out to us, it is not really clear that this view is coherent. We can imagine that one might be dependent upon one's friends in order to attain self-sufficiency. But unless at some point one's virtue does not depend upon others how could one claim to be self-sufficient in virtue? We will let this apparent contradiction between self-sufficiency and dependence upon others slide and grant that there might be some way to render this view intelligible.
25. John Cooper, "Aristotle on Friendship," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amélie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 301-40, pp. 322-23.
26. I can imagine that if Iris moves away, or we cease to be friends, I will have no interest in renewing my subscription to the ballet.
27. It might be objected that an objective presentation of one by another need not be a mere accurate reflection but might involve significant interpretation of oneself by the other. So, e.g., one's therapist or a fellow philosopher assessing one's work may provide interpretations that are objective, and yet such interpretations may be very influential in how they affect one's character. We agree. Our claim is that an acceptance of direction and interpretation by another is a constitutive feature of friendship and not that the drawing process as such is unique to, or a sufficient condition of, friendship. It should not be a problem for our view, then, that there are other relationships, which, like friendship, involve an acceptance of some kind of drawing by another. Nevertheless, the drawing that goes on in friendship is distinct in kind and our discussion in a later section of the importance of governing conditions in defining the nature of different relationships should help show this.
28. Sherman, pp. 105-6.
29. In fact, Sherman concludes her article by claiming not only that "contrasting oneself with another" is a way to self-knowledge and must be a part of friendship but that this is in tune with Aristotle's view. We have already indicated how contrast in friendship might provide one with some self-awareness. Moreover, we have indicated how difference might be accommodated by an idealized mirror view and provide a kind of direction and interpretation. It is hard to see, however, how the idea that differences might be sharpened and confirmed in friendship could be accommodated within a mirror-type view, and Sherman offers no suggestions on this score. The evidence she provides for the claim that this was Aristotle's view of friendship is slight.
30. Laurence Thomas, "Friendship," Synthese 72 (1987): 217-36.
31. Ibid., p. 217.
32. Ibid., p. 224.
33. Ibid.
34. Jeffrey H. Reiman, "Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood," Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1976): 26-44, p. 32. Reiman also attacks the secrets view in a directly value-laden way, claiming that it suggests a "distasteful . . . market conception of personal intimacy . . . the value and substance of intimacy - like the value and substance of my income - lies not merely in what I have but essentially in what others do not have."
35. Ibid., p. 32.
36. It has been suggested to us by one of the editors that we have given the secrets view short shrift for it is the knowledge given by self-disclosure (which need not be intentional self-disclosure) that is essential to friendship, and it is this which represents the kernel of truth in the secrets view. It should be clear from our discussion that we do not deny the importance of knowledge of the other in friendship - indeed it is essential to the interpretive process - but rather we deny the importance of privileged knowledge obtained through secret sharing. It is an interesting further issue as to exactly what kind of knowledge is essential to friendship. An editor of Ethics has put to us that all that might be required is that the affection friends have for each other is not entirely based on false beliefs and is counterfactually stable in worlds where the friends acquire more accurate knowledge. As we indicate above, our requirements are a little stronger, since we think it important that close friends do have some understanding of what each other values and cares about.
37. However, there does not seem to be any single piece of private information (not directly concerning the friend) that one must share with one's friends or else forfeit the claim that they are indeed one's friend.
38. For more on the importance of these governing conditions in helping to identify different kinds of relationships, see Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley, "Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation," Ethics 106 (1995): 86-111.
39. Of course, there may be all sorts of conditions relevant to why a person either enters into or terminates a certain relationship which would not plausibly also count as conditions which govern that relationship. So, e.g., our being thrown into a dangerous situation together may have been crucial to our becoming friends, but continuing danger is not crucial to our remaining friends. And I may initially be attracted by your green eyes or your similarity to me without these things being important in our ongoing relationship. There are, however, acceptance and terminating conditions, such as those we mention above, which do importantly govern different sorts of relationships and which shed light on the differences between them. We thank an editor of Ethics for pointing to some possible confusion on this point.
40. David Shapiro, Autonomy and Rigid Character (New York: Basic, 1981).
41. Ibid., p. 75.
42. The painfully shy person is another character type who has difficulty in establishing friendships. Here it might not be quite right to say that the painfully shy person is not open to the drawing process. Rather, she seems to lack the self-confidence to engage in it.
43. We are suggesting here that these considerations provide support for our account but not for the secrets or mirror views. We are not claiming that these considerations alone show that these other views fail as accounts of what (in part) constitutes friendship. For it could be argued that the only support given to our view here is that it may characterize certain consequences of some other common constitutive features of close friendship. As a referee has similarly pointed out to us, the process of mutual drawing might not itself be constitutive but only an accidental effect of whatever is constitutive of close friendship. We think, in fact, that the process of mutual drawing is not only a constitutive feature of close friendship but also does characterize certain consequences of other constitutive features. So, e.g., it may be a consequence of the disposition to act for the other's sake in friendship that friends engage in some mutual drawing. However, the secrets and mirror views do not provide an adequate characterization of the consequences of other common constitutive features such as mutual interest, affection, and the desire to share experiences. As we have argued, such features seem neither constitutively constrained by, nor vitally expressed through, requirements of similarity or secret sharing. The objection might still be pressed, however, that we have not provided any argument here for thinking that mutual drawing is any more than a consequence of these other constitutive features. We consider this objection below.
44. Many people have had friendships fade because their friend's interpretation of them has become too fixed. This rigidity of interpretation may not threaten familial relationships which are, as Thomas points out, more structured and role governed than friendship, but it is incompatible with close friendship.
45. On the similarity point: imagine that my friend becomes very ambitious like me. Her interpretation of my ambitiousness is no longer light-hearted, and I find her new similarity to me very confronting. It seems plausible to suppose that in these circumstances we would drift apart. On the secrets point: perhaps a failure to share secrets would lead to or compound the failures of interpretation, but we think it is more plausible to suppose that such failures would have an impact on the disposition to share one's secrets.
46. We can think of two ways in which the advocate of a similarity view might quite plausibly insist that similarity governs friendship. First, she might say that it is necessary that a friend does not engage in activities that would violate one's most important values. For example, it may be necessary that they do not become an active racist. Second, she might say that it is a requirement of friendship that the friend shares some abstract conception of the good. So while they need not share our particular interests, say in ballet, they must nevertheless have an abstract appreciation of such goods as joy, beauty, and knowledge. We can agree with both of these claims. Both, however, are at best trivially true. The first caveat would not apply distinctively to friendship. We would not want to work with or live next door to the Ku Klux Klansman. And the second would seem to capture almost everyone. While we differ a lot in terms of particular interests almost everyone shares an appreciation of such abstract goods as joy. In any case our view shows why such similarity (albeit trivial) might be required. For most of us would not be prepared to be directed by the interests of the extreme racist or by someone altogether lacking an abstract conception of the good. Of course, some individuals may require more in the way of evaluative similarity in their friends than this broad level of agreement. But the more that is demanded here the more such an individual comes to resemble the rigid person who is incapable of friendship. We thank Dirk Baltzly for discussion of this point.
47. Similarly, Thomas argues that friendship is to be distinguished from such role governed relationships as that of teacher and student, or psychiatrist and patient, in that it is a minimally structured relationship. We agree with Thomas that friendship is not as convention bound as many other sorts of relations: at issue is which view of friendship provides appropriate governing conditions for friendship.
48. A referee has suggested we are claiming that friendship is distinguished by an open-ended or unlimited interest in the drawing of the friend. However, to say that the drawing involved in the friendship case is not undertaken with any particular end in sight is not to suggest an open-ended or unlimited receptivity to drawing. As we go on to say below, one may well not be willing to be drawn by a close friend in various ways. Complete disinterest in, or dislike of, the ballet might mean that I will not be directed to go by Iris's interest in it. The difference between the drawing involved in friendship and that involved in a professional relationship is that in the former but not the latter case I may be directed to, say, go to the ballet just because it is Iris's interest and not because I think Iris is a good judge of how I might improve my psychological health.
49. In Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice, Elizabeth Bennet argues that friendship does provide us with reasons in the way we have suggested: "You appear to me Mr. Darcy to allow nothing for the influence of friendship and affection. A regard for the requester would often make one yield readily to a request, without waiting for arguments to reason one into it. . . . In general and ordinary cases of friendship, where one is desired by the other to change a resolution of no very great moment, should you think ill of the person for complying with the desire, without waiting to be argued into it?" (p. 43).
50. We thank Michael Smith for his vigorous presentation of this kind of objection. For more extensive discussion on the problem of alienation in friendship, see Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-71; and Cocking and Oakley.
51. We thank Michael Smith for his vigorous presentation of this kind of objection. For more extensive discussion on the problem of alienation in friendship, see Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134-71; and Cocking and Oakley.
52. James McLaren has suggested in conversation with us that among actors, where intensive mutual interpretation is a professional commonplace, it is considered bad form to engage in mutual interpretations in one's friendships. It is a bit like bringing one's work home. (A similar situation might confront analysts in their private lives.) Are such cases, then, counterexamples to our view: Are these close friendships without mutual interpretation? We do not think that they are. First, it is not clear that the interpretations that are considered bad form include any interpretations or just those that are filtered through the prism of the professional expertise in question. Second, it is not clear that these are close friendships or at least that the closeness and intimacy of the friendship isn't adversely affected by the absence of interpretation. If the problem is that the individuals concerned are disposed to offer interpretations imported from their professional framework, then it is not hard to imagine that this would be alienating. If the problem is that on account of their intensive engagement in professional interpretation all kinds of interpretation are burdensome, then again it is not hard to imagine that, to this extent, the depth of one's involvement with one's friends suffers. Moreover, it might not just be interpretation that suffers here. An actor's emotional engagement with a part might leave them with little interest in shared activities or expressions of affection with their friends.
53. That a friend contributes to one's identity and presents a reason for one to be moved to pursue shared activities in this way seems just the sort of thing that various writers have had in mind in making and responding to the objection that our foremost moral theories alienate us from ourselves and our friends. See, e.g., Bernard Williams on having one thought too many, in "Persons, Character, and Morality," in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and for a Kantian response see Barbara Herman, "Agency, Attachment, and Difference," Ethics 101 (1991): 775-97, esp. pp. 780-83. See also n. 43. Again, our account of the nature of friendship not only fits well with, but helps explain the value of, friendship assumed in these discussions. By contrast, the mirror view makes it hard to see why friendship would be thought valuable at all, let alone valuable in a way which might compete with morality. We hope to expand on this issue elsewhere.
54. That a friend contributes to one's identity and presents a reason for one to be moved to pursue shared activities in this way seems just the sort of thing that various writers have had in mind in making and responding to the objection that our foremost moral theories alienate us from ourselves and our friends. See, e.g., Bernard Williams on having one thought too many, in "Persons, Character, and Morality," in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and for a Kantian response see Barbara Herman, "Agency, Attachment, and Difference," Ethics 101 (1991): 775-97, esp. pp. 780-83. See also n. 43. Again, our account of the nature of friendship not only fits well with, but helps explain the value of, friendship assumed in these discussions. By contrast, the mirror view makes it hard to see why friendship would be thought valuable at all, let alone valuable in a way which might compete with morality. We hope to expand on this issue elsewhere.