The 2003-2004 Russian elections and prospects for democracy

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 369-398

  Sakwa, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ELECTION; POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT;

EID: 20444376172     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668130500073332     Document Type: Review

References (109)

1. BBC Monitoring of Putin's news conference following election victory, RTR Russian TV, Moscow, 2210 gmt 14 March 2004, in Johnson's Russia List (henceforth JRL), 8118/8.
2. Michael Urban, 'December 1993 as a Replication of Late-Soviet Electoral Practices', Post-Soviet Affairs, 10, 2, 1994, pp. 127-158;
3. Richard Sakwa, 'The Russian Elections of December 1993', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 2, March 1995, pp. 195-227.
4. Yitzhak M. Brudny, 'In Pursuit of the Russian Presidency: Why and How El'tsin Won the 1996 Presidential Election', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 30, 3, 1997, pp. 255-275;
5. Laura Belin et al., The Russian Presidential Elections of 1996 (London, M. E. Sharpe, 1998).
6. Richard Sakwa, 'Russia's "Permanent" (Uninterrupted) Elections of 1999-2000', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 16, 3, September 2000, pp. 85-112;
7. V. Gel'man, G. Golosov & E. Meleshkina (eds), Vtoroi elektoral'nyi tsikl v Rossii 1999-2000gg. (Moscow, Ves' Mir, 2002);
8. Vicki L. Hesli & William M. Reisinger (eds), The 1999-2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003);
9. Timothy J, Colton & Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000 (Washington, DC, Brookings, 2003).
10. Valery Vyzhutovich, 'Tycoon Puts his Cards on the Table', Moscow News , 16-22 April 2003, p. 3.
11. One of the more popular scenarios is that Putin himself could lead the government as prime minister after the end of his constitutionally limited two consecutive terms as president. After all, he would only be 56 years old in 2008 - young enough to enter the presidential ballot once again in 2012!
12. Nikolai Petrov, 'Russia's "Party of Power" Takes Shape', The Jamestown Foundation, Russia and Eurasia Review, 2, 16, 5 August 2003.
13. Kremlin.ru, 27 November 2003.
14. In his speech on 20 September Putin noted 'I'd like to say that I don't get involved in party politics. For precisely that reason I try not to attend events like this one today. My presence here at your congress is an exception. I have done this deliberately, in gratitude to your members in the Duma for our work together over the past four years', BBC Monitoring, RTR Russia TV, Moscow, 1600 gmt, 20 September 2003, in JRL, 7331/18.
15. Anatolii Kostyukov, 'Iz gubernatorov nadelali "petrushek': Gennadii Zyuganov obvinyaet vlasti v podloge', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 September 2003.
16. Agostino Depretis of Stradella, Piedmont, was leader of the historical left that replaced the government of the historical right in 1876 and went on to serve sporadically as prime minister in 1876-78, 1878-79 and 1881-87. Right and left came together to make a liberal party of the centre on the basis of common interests. In the autumn of 1882 Depretis dissolved parliament and in an electoral speech in Stradella on 8 October outlined a new programme of reconciliation. Criticising those who continued to harp on divisions between left and right, he declared that he was willing to accept in government anyone willing to 'transform himself'. The political concept of trasformismo was born, but soon turned into an abusive epithet and became a synonym for corruption and stagnation. Depretis's leadership came to be associated with a pragmatism that turned into unprincipled expediency. This is not a charge that can be levelled at Putin's regime - yet.
17. Manifest vserossiikoi politicheskoi partii "Edinstvo i Otechestvo" - Edinaya Rossiya: Put' natsional'nogo uspekha (Moscow, 2003).
18. This is Julie Corwin's conclusion; RFE/RL, Russian Political Weekly , 4, 1, 8 January 2004.
19. Vedomosti, 8 December 2003.
20. RFE/RL, Russian Political Weekly, 3, 43, 29 October 2003.
21. Having failed in his endeavours for the Duma election, Nemtsov insisted that on 8 December Yabloko and SPS should agree on a single presidential candidate, Gazeta.ru, 30 October 2003. At that time he could hardly have guessed the extent of the ruin of the liberal project on the day after the election.
22. The role of sociological polling in hindering liberal unity is an interesting sub-theme to this question. For example, Vladimir Petukhov of VTsIOM-A argued after the election that 73% of SPS supporters had adapted to the new circumstances in the country, whereas only 45% of Yablokites had; 23% of SPS people thought the economy in Russia was doing fine, whereas only 13% of Yabloko did. 'Thus SPS has become a liberal-conservative party defending private property, the market economy and so on, whereas Yabloko calls for a move to the left to become a fully-fledged social democratic party defending human rights and the ideals of freedom, justice and solidarity.' On this basis Petukhov strongly advised against the two parties uniting, Kommersant-Vlast, 26 January - 1 February 2004, p. 16. This was the sort of data that influenced Yabloko, fearing that allying with SPS would alienate core Yabloko voters. The argument fails to take into account the ability of intelligent leadership to forge a multifaceted liberal programme party that could precisely appeal to different constituencies within the framework of a single movement.
23. Predvybornaya programma Rossiiskoi demokraticheskoi partii 'Yabloko' , from website of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), http://gd2003.cikrf.ru/partii.html.
24. Predvybornaya programma Politicheskoi partii 'Soyuz pravykh sil', http://gd2003.cikrf.ru/partii.html.
25. Vyacheslav Nikonov, 'A Strange Start, Russian Election Watch, 3, 1, October 2003, p. 9.
26. ITAR-TASS, 20 September 2003.
27. In previous elections the vote for liberal parties had risen the further West the count went, and this is what Putin anticipated this time, but the mass abstention of traditional Yabloko and SPS supporters in the urban heartlands of Russia now led to their defeat.
28. Viktor Khamraev & Ilya Bulvanov, 'Konets pravykh sil', Kommersant-Vlast', 26 January-1 February 2004, p. 14.
29. Rossiiskaya gazeta, 11 December 2003.
30. For example, 'Russia: Before and After the Elections', 26 February 2004, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.ceip.org/files/ events.
31. Izbiratel'nyi blok 'Rodina' (Narodno-patrioticheskii Soyuz): programmnye dokumenty, http://gd2003.cikrf.ru/partii.html.
32. Za vlast' trudovogo naroda! Predvybornaya platforma KPRF, http:// gd2003.cikrf.ru/partii.html.
33. Gennadii Zyuganov, Vernost' (Moscow, Molodaya gvardiya, 2003).
34. RFE/RL, Newsline, 29 December 2003.
35. Viktor Khamraev & Ilya Bulvanov, 'Lenin v otlive', Kommersant-Vlast' , 2-8 February 2004, p. 18.
36. Ibid., p. 20.
37. In the run-up to the parliamentary election the party brought out a number of pamphlets for each of its main constituencies: for example, LDPR i Armiya, LDPR i veterany and Ivan, zapakhni dushu! for rural voters.
38. LDPR: k grazhdanani Rossii! Predvybornyi manifest (Moscow, 2003).
39. Programma liberal'no-demokraticheskoi partii rossii (LDPR), prinyata na XIII s''ezde LDPR 13 dekabrya 2001g. v g. Moskva, http:// gd2003.cikrf.ru/partii.html; also published as a brochure, Programma i ustav LDPR (Moscow, 2002).
40. For a good discussion see Rushan Galliamov & Ildar Gabdrafikov, 'Presidential Elections in Bashkortostan', Russian Election Watch, 3, 4, January 2004, pp. 7-8.
41. Novye izvestiya, 27 January 2004.
42. 'Odnopartiinaya Duma', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 December 2003, pp. 1, 3.
43. Henry E. Hale & Robert Orrtung, 'The Duma Districts: Key to Putin's Power', PONARS Policy Memo 290, September 2003.
44. Putin outlined the goals of his second term presidency in his fifth 'Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation' on 26 May 2004, in which he talked of the modernisation of the state, a struggle against poverty, the continued implementation of liberal economic and social policies in housing, healthcare, education, transport and budget reform and reiterated his commitment to the doubling of Russia's GNP within a decade: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/05/ 262021_64906.shtml.
45. Constitutional changes require not only a two-thirds majority in the Duma but also the approval of three-quarters of the Federation Council and the endorsement of two-thirds of Russia's regional legislatures - as well as the signature of the president.
46. Russian Federation State Duma Elections 7 December 2003: Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, http://www.osce.org/documents/ odihr/2003/12/1699-cn.pdf
47. http://www.osce.org/news/show_news.php?id=3757.
48. Nick Paton Walsh, 'Observers Condemn Russian Elections', The Guardian , 9 December 2003, p. 2.
49. Dmitrii Suslov, 'Devid Atkinson: vybory byli svobodnymi, no nespravedlivymi', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 December 2003, p. 3.
50. The Final Report was issued on 27 January 2004: http://www.osce.org/ documents/odihr/2004/01/1947_en.pdf.
51. Press Release, Embassy of the Russian Federation, London, 16 December 2003.
52. WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.htm, 28 January 2004, in JRL, 8037/23. A side show to the election was the struggle for control of VTsIOM, a state-funded agency. In 2003 the government changed it from a state unitary enterprise into a joint stock company and at the same time restructured its board. This provoked the resignation of its veteran head, Yurii Levada, who went on to found his own agency, initially called VTsIOM-A and then the Yurii Levada Centre for Public Opinion (Levada Centre), funded largely by Anatolii Chubais at the head of RAO UES. The role of sociological centres in the presidential election campaign is analysed by Valerii Vyzhutovich, 'Zatrudnyayus' s voprosom', Moskovskie novosti, 30 January - 5 February 2004, p. 11.
53. 'Vybory-2003: prognozy i deistvitel'nost", Rodnaya gazeta, 11 December 2003, p. 5.
54. Anatolii Kostyukov, 'Zyuganovu nuzhny v dume "Yabloko" i SPS, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 December 2003.
55. Kommersant-Vlast', 15-21 December 2003, p. 26.
56. Kommersant-Vlast', 15-21 December 2003, p. 27.
57. Kommersant-Vlast', 15-21 December 2003, p. 34.
58. Aleksandra Samarina, '"So vremenem my dob'emsya prozrachnykh vyborov"', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 September 2004, p. 2.
59. http://www.newsru.com/Russia/08Dec2003/wat.html.
60. The former Yabloko Duma member Igor Artem'ev became director of the new Federal Antimonopoly Service; the former Russian ambassador to the US and head of the Duma's international affairs committee Vladimir Lukin became human rights commissioner; Maksim Zabelin, Yabloko's former press secretary, took up an equivalent post at Gazprom; and Sergei Mitrokhin was considered for a post with Gosstroi.
61. Quoted in Budapest Analyses, 3 January 2004.
62. Peter Rutland, Russia 2003: The Power of One, Transitions Online, http://www.tol.cz Country Reports; http://www.tol.cz/look/knowledgeNet/ article.tpl?.
63. The surge in support for reviewing the privatisations of the 1990s is analysed by Oleg Bogomolov, '"Piratizatsiya" Rossii', Literaturnaya gazeta, 17-23 December 2003, p. 3, where the figure of 77% in favour of reviewing them is cited.
64. Rutland, Russia 2003.
65. ROMIR poll reported by Michael McFaul, Slate.com, 16 December 2003,in JRL, 7472/1.
66. This did not stop the idea of lengthening the presidential term to seven years coming up again, as in a motion of 8 October 2003 from Ivanovo oblast' included by the Duma Council in the lower chamber's plan of work in February 2004 ('Putina predlagayut ostavit' do 2022 goda', Izvestiya, 7 February 2004, p. 3); or in Akhmed Kadyrov's suggestion at this time that Putin should take on the presidency for life.
67. Kommersant-Vlast', 26 January - 1 February 2004, p. 17.
68. Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 January 2004.
69. Vedomosti, 26 January 2004.
70. The full text of Committee 2008's appeal to boycott the election can be found at http://www.komitet2008.ru.
71. Yavlinsky pointed to the events in Sverdlovsk oblast', where Yabloko and other independent candidates were refused registration for the oblast' Duma elections on 14 March 2004 because UR (and the governor, Eduard Rossel) feared competition; Novaya gazeta, 9-11 February 2004, p. 6.
72. RFE/RL, (Un) Civil Societies, 5, 1, 8 January 2004.
73. Argumenty i fakty, 24 December 2003.
74. BBC Monitoring of 14 March 2004 broadcast, in JRL, 8118/8.
75. A version confirmed by Sergei Markov, Transitions Online, www.tol.cz, 3 May 2004, in JRL, 8194/11.
76. This at least is the view of Stanislav Belkovsky, Vedomosti, 25 February 2004.
77. Khamraev & Bulvanov, 'Lenin v otlive', p. 21.
78. See Laura Belin, 'Glazev Gambles and Loses', RFE/RL, Russian Political Weekly, 4, 10, 17 March 2004.
79. Rybkin's registration in the first place as a presidential candidate, despite the fact that some 20% of signatures for his candidature were false, suggested the attempt by the CEC to ensure that as many candidates were to be registered as possible; The 2004 Russian Presidential Campaign: An Analysis of the Campaign, the Candidates, their Conduct and the Russian Political Environment (London, Russian Axis, 2004), pp. 65 and 69.
80. For a discussion of signature falsification and the Rybkin case see 'Vremya sobirat' kadry', Kommersant', 7 February 2004, p. 3.
81. Aleksandr Tsipko, 'Glaz'ev - eto El'tsin segodnya', Literaturnaya gazeta, 4-20 February 2004, p. 3.
82. Valerii Solovei, Rossiya, 26 February 2004.
83. Vedomosti, 12 January 2004.
84. Putin provided a broad analysis of the state of Russia when he came to power four years earlier, his achievements as president and his plans for the future, in a speech at Moscow State University on 12 February 2004; http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2004/02/62215.shtml.
85. Novaya gazeta, 9-11 February 2004, p. 8;
86. see also E. B. Shestopal (ed.), Obrazy vlasti v postsovetskoi Rossii (Moscow, Aleteiya, 2004).
87. Lilia Shevtsova, 'Russia's Electoral Time Bomb', Moscow Times, 1 March 2004.
88. A list of officials against whom complaints were lodged with the Central Electoral Commission is in The 2004 Russian Presidential Campaign, p. 54.
89. Henry E. Hale, 'Russia's Presidential Election and the Fate of Democracy: Taking the Cake', Newsnet: News of the AAASS, 44, 3, May 2004, p. 1.
90. Kabardino-Balkaria at 97.7% led the field in turnout, followed by Ingushetia at 96.2% and Mordovia third with 94.5%, followed by Dagestan at 94.09% and Chechnya at 94%. At the other end of the spectrum Krasnoyarsk came in with only 51.09%, Irkutsk 52.4%, Ivanovo 53.34%, Novgorod 54.5% and Sakhalin 54.8%. Nowhere was there a turnout below 50%. In Novgorod the governor, Mikhail Prusak, is no Putin enthusiast and had once called UR a 'mass grave'. Turnout can be used as a proximate index for the degree of authoritarianism and ability to mobilise 'administrative resources', divorced from the socio-economic characteristics of the region. Tatarstan's 83.2% turnout suggests that the result was not manipulated outrageously (as in Kabardino-Balkaria and the other places listed above), but was probably affected by administrative intervention. The effort to achieve high turnout is also connected with the level of subsidy from the centre, although a cross-cutting factor is the personal attitude of the governor to the president.
91. IA Rosbalt, 10 March 2004, in The 2004 Russian Presidential Campaign, p. 53. Among the more spectacular results were the 98.2 % of the vote cast for Putin in Ingushetiya and 91.8 % in Bashkortostan.
92. Vremya novostei, 15 March 2004.
93. RIA Novosti, 16 March 2004.
94. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 'Krizis liberalizma v Rossii', Vedomosti, 29 March 2004.
95. Stephen White, 'Russia's Disempowered Electorate', in Cameron Ross (ed.), Russian Politics under Putin (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 76-92.
96. Michael McFaul & Nikolai Petrov, 'Elections', in Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov & Andrei Ryabov, Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), pp. 23-55, in particular pp. 51-55.
97. http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/05/262021_64906.shtml.
98. Peter Lavelle, 'Untimely Thoughts: Analysis: Why Putin Tops the Polls', 2 February 2004, http://www.untimely-thoughts.com.
99. BBC Monitoring of 14 March 2004 broadcast, in JRL, 8118/8.
100. Moskovskii komsomolets, 1 September 2004.
101. http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/09/13/ 1514_type63374type63378_76651.shtml;
102. for details see Richard Sakwa, 'Putin's "Constitutional Coup" of 13 September 2004', in preparation.
103. Lilia Shevtsova puts this as follows: 'In any case, abolishing political competition, which Russia had just been getting used to, does a disservice to Putin by depriving him of genuine legitimacy', 'Russia's Electoral Time Bomb', Moscow Times, 1 March 2004.
104. Richard Rose, Neil Munro & Stephen White, 'Voting in a Floating Party System: the 1999 Duma Election', Europe-Asia Studies, 53, 3, May 2001, pp. 419-443.
105. Calculations by Vladislav Surkov, Komsomol'skaya pravda, 29 September 2004.
106. Trud, 30 December 2003.
107. 'Demokraty posle bankrotstva', Moskovskie novosti, 47, 16-22 December 2003, p. 6.
108. Natalya Arkhangelskaya, 'The Inscrutable Middle Class', Expert, February 2004, Special Edition, pp. 20-22.
109. For an interesting debate on the question see 'Kogda u nas poyavitsya zrelaya oppozitsiya?', Literaturnaya gazeta, 4-10 February 2004, p. 2, where the focus was on the absence of a structured civil society.