Counteroffers and efficiency in labor markets with asymmetric information

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 373-393

  Golan, Limor ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 19944381237     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/428705     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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