Optimal auctioning and ordering in an infinite horizon inventory-pricing system

Operations Research

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 2004, Pages

  Van Ryzin, Garrett ^a   Vulcano, Gustave ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Basestock policy; Dynamic programming; Infinite horizon; Inventory control; Optimal auction; Pricing

Indexed keywords

BASESTOCK POLICY; INFINITE HORIZONS; OPTIMAL AUCTIONS; PRICING;

APPROXIMATION THEORY; COSTS; DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING; ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INTERNET; PUBLIC POLICY; RANDOM PROCESSES; THEOREM PROVING;

INVENTORY CONTROL;

EID: 19744377148     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1040.0105     Document Type: Article

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